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Strategic management literature has given little atten¬
tion to purely competitive or "stalemate" industries,
large and important area of the economy.
tries,

a

Stalemate indus¬

extremely competitive and only marginally profitable,

have many strategy related problems.

It is relatively dif¬

ficult to develop effective strategies because there are few
if any opportunities for differentiation or gaining a com¬
petitive advantage

(Porter,

Hostile environments,

1980; Calori & Ardisson,

1988).

business environments which are

exceptionally harsh and risky,

aggravate the problem.

Some

argue that these conditions call for entrepreneurial
strategic postures
structures

(OS)

(SP)

and organic organizational

(Coven & Slevin,

1989).

One source of the problems associated with stalemate
and environmental hostility

(EH)

is the relatively high

transaction costs which charterize many of these

iv

industries.

Internalizing marketing functions often reduces

transaction costs
but vertical

(Williamson,

1975,

1986;

integration on an individual basis

viable option for commodity producers.
strategy of

Harrigan,

1986),

is rarely a

A cooperative

joint or collective vertical

integration can

internalize risky and confining aspects of the market.
A typology of economic organizations

is developed.

This study focuses on the red spring wheat industry because
producers

in Canada and the U.S.

economic environment,
marketing strategies.
than confirmatory.
concerns,

share a similar growing and

but have adopted radically different
This study is exploratory,

rather

It is oriented to producer strategic

rather than to the perspective of the government,

cooperative,

or investor-owned firm.

investigation

(tentative hypotheses)

Four areas of
are articulated.

order to explore possible relationships,

In

a sample of U.S.

and Canadian producers is surveyed by telephone.
Canadians have a pooling strategy.
strategic management include:
impacts of EH;

(2)

(1)

Conclusions for

pooling reduces adverse

pooling strategy performance cannot be

measured by price advantage;

it is successful to the extent

it reduces stress and other adverse effects of EH;

(3)

entrepreneurial SP & organic OS are not called for in this
industry;

(4)

important U.S.-Canada cultural differences

exist and must be considered before recommending a strategy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Wheat production is a complex,
highly asset-specific enterprise.

capital

intensive,

and

The industry is

characterized by exceptionally narrow profit margins and
almost no room for strategic maneuvering.

This

"stalemate"

condition is brought about by the large number of relatively
small,

individual producers,

the "low barriers to entry,

and the fact that wheat is a standardized commodity.
Producers generally must accept the market price because
there are few opportunities for them to enhance the price of
wheat through firm or product differentiation.

In these

ways wheat is typical of many commodity-based industries,
agricultural and non-agricultural.
large,

Together they comprise a

important sector of the economy,

useful to discover ways

and it would be

in which individual firms in these

industries can generate a competitive advantage.
The conditions of stalemate are further aggravated by
"environmental hostility."

Environmental hostility usually

refers to business environments which are exceptionally
harsh,

stressful,

and risky,

but in the case of wheat

(and

In the sense of the term, as it is used in
microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics,
that entry is not blockaded (Martin, 1988).

2
most other agricultural commodities),
physical environment

(e.g.,

elements

in the

weather and disease)

also

include many sources of risk and stress.
The focus of this dissertation is on ways

in which

collective strategies can increase the competitive advantage
of firms who must operate within stalemate industries and
hostile environments;

in particular on ways

in which wheat

producers may gain a strategic advantage through
internalizing aspects of the market through cooperative
marketing efforts.

There is a fairly well developed

literature on the theories of cooperatives,

and my research

is undertaken within the context of this literature.
However,

the theories of cooperative organization,

relatively few studies on cooperatives
management literature,

and the

in the strategic

concentrate on the cooperative entity

itself and its strategy,

rather than on the individual

member firm's effort to gain a competitive advantage.

This

study is written from the perspective of the producer firm
marketing its own commodity.

Similarly there is a growing

literature of competitive advantage theory
1990),

(Porter,

1985,

but unfortunately it fails to make more than passing

reference to firms in stalemate industries.
most useful

In many ways the

literature for this strategic analysis

of the transactional costs economic theory.

is that

3
A.

Overview of the Wheat Industry:

Stalemate and Environmental Hostility

Wheat production is a stalemate industry for many of
the reasons that it is a classic textbook case of a
perfectly competitive market.
producers,

Even the largest grain

utilizing thousands of crop acres to generate

over a million dollars of revenue annually,
without individual market power.

Grain producers have

continued to decrease in number,
sophistication

(Cummins et al.,

while growing in size and
1984),

impossible for an individual to gain a
individual

is a price-taker

(as opposed to collective)

but it remains
"volume” position by
horizontal

integration.
Grain is a truly homogeneous,
standardized product,

and as a result there is almost no

opportunity for differentiation.^
government-mandated,

well-defined,

Canadians,

national effort,

through a

have managed to

^ At first glance, the fact that 48% of the U.S. wheat
crop is produced by only 2.7% of the farms suggests a fair
degree of concentration. However, when one realizes that
this 2.7% consists of 2,700 farms, one gains some insight
into the magnitude of the industry, at least in terms of the
number of producers producing a homogenous product.
^ There are five distinct varieties of wheat, of which
hard red spring wheat is one. While this variety may be
prefered by some buyers for a specific purpose, and these
buyers will want it to have a standard protein and moisture
content, there are very few other ways to distinguish the
commodity.
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provide cleaner wheat for the world market.

This higher

quality does earn a small but significant premium on the
world market.
standards.

American producers conform to lower U.S.

Individual producers in the U.S.

who incurred

the extra costs to provide a product of a quality equal to
that which conforms to the Canadian standard,
receive a premium.

would not

Their grain would be commingled with

that of other American producers,
provided cleaner grain.

none of whom would have

Therefore,

their cleaner grain

would be sold on the world market as American standard
quality wheat,

for which there is no premium.

The

individual producers who differentiate their product
(whether by cleaning it more thoroughly or growing it
organically),

usually at a higher cost or lower yield,

may

not be able to extract a higher price on the world market.
In effect,

they will be producing for a market different

from the standard world wheat market.
Similarly,

there are almost no opportunities for an

individual producer to develop a volume strategy.
market is

The

large enough for many competitors^ with

operations of optimal-size,

and most producers will be

operating with economies of scale.

Producer firms are competitors in the production of
the commodity; they are cooperators only insofar as they
collectively vertically integrate their operations for
purposes of acquiring inputs or for marketing output.
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Table 1:

Size of U.S.

Spring Red Wheat Industry
1988/89

AREA

(Million acres):
Planted
Harvested
Yield (bu./acre)

SUPPLY (Million bushels):
Production
Beginning Stocks
Total Supply
USE:
Domestic
Export
Ending Stocks

(ERS,1990).

10.9
9.6
49.3

1989/90
1990/91
(forcasted)
13.4
14.3
12.0
13.0
45.7
47.0

473
75
547

548
39
587

193
315
39

219
350
18

610
18
628

Increasing size of individual firms will not indefinitely
provide increased economies of scale nor will acquiring a
large number of other firms lead to effective horizontal
integration of production.
While technological advances continue to increase
production efficiency,
and improvements,
unit of yield,

these improvements are incremental,

relative to the industry average costs per

will be short-lived,

i.e.,

the industry's

average efficiency will soon reflect the innovations,

and

today's improvements in production will become tomorrow's
expectation.

For example,

ten years ago early adopters of

microcomputer technology were able to reap a substantial
advantage in production control

(e.g.,

computerized

monitoring and regulation of grain drying)
control

(e.g.,

and financial

computerized long-range planning,

generation and cashflow monitoring.)

budget

Five years later,

these levels of control are the expected norm.

6
Almost all agricultural research is conducted by the
land grant universities and a relatively small number of
large seed,

chemical and agricultural machinery companies.

Few producers are capable of funding their own research and
development,

so nearly all the management and technological

improvements in the industry are available to all
competitors.

Similarly,

significant advantage,

cumulative experience is not a

and lack of experience is not a

barrier to entry.
Environmental hostility in the grain industry is now
pervasive and has been increasing for two decades.

World

production of wheat for export increased as Australia
entered the market in the late 1960s and the European
Community,

once a major importer,

exporter in the mid-seventies.
major exporter,
between the U.S.

became a major net

Argentina became the fifth

happy to exploit the political differences
and the USSR,

the country which ironically

had become the America's major market.
After three decades of reasonably stable prices,
prices became extremely volatile,

grain

especially when the USSR

began importing huge amounts during its infamous "Great
Grain Robbery" of 1973

(Morgan,

1980).

With the subsequent

increase in world grain production capacity, prices were now
sensitive to relatively small decreases in world demand.
Demand in turn was now more closely linked to global

financial and political changes completely out of the
control of the producer.
Prior to 1970 the U.S.

and Canada together had almost

the entire world export market to themselves;

at this time

it was possible for economists to view the two countries as
operating in effect as a duopoly
Table 2:

Export Volume
87/88

EXPORTERS:
U.S.
43.4
Canada
23.6
EC-12
14.8
Australia
12.2
Argentina
3.8
Others
7.2
Total foreign
61.6
IMPORTERS:
USSR
21.5
World Total
105.0

(McCalla,

(Million tons)

1967).

(ERS,1990)

88/89

89/90

90/91

37.9
13.5
21.0
10.8
3.5
10.5
59.3

35.0
16.5
21.0
10.7
6.0
8.2
62.4

34.0
19.0
22.0
11.0
6.7
8.3
67.0

15.5
96.9

14.0
97.4

15.0
101.0

One characteristic of a benign environment is that markets
can be controlled and manipulated,

as a dominant firm would

operate in an industry with little competition.

On an

international level this describes the way in which Canada
and the U.S.

were able to behave.

This is not to say that

there was not serious competition on the firm level,
perspective from which,
situation;

in this study,

it does however,

the

we are viewing the

account for the relatively

strong demand for the firm-level output and the overall
relatively high firm-level price which continued into the
mid-1970s.
But by the mid-1970s the increasing environmental
hostility was already evident with increased input prices

8
(especially fuel and land)

and the previously mentioned

increasing level of world competition.

Another turning

point was the linking of commodity prices to international
financial markets

(especially interest and currency rates).

With the 1979 grain embargo the situation reached crisis
levels.

In ten years the business climate for North

American producers had moved from one which was relatively
benign to one that was clearly hostile.
Another important characteristic of hostile
environments

in general,

and one that particularly affected

the grain trading situation during the late 1970s to mid1980s,

is

increased precariousness and riskiness of the

industry as a whole.

The sharp increase in demand for U.S.

grain during the early 1970s very rapidly led to the
expansion of existing loading and handling capacity,

and to

the building or acquiring of new facilities and equipment,
especially by railroads and investor-owned trading firms.
Cooperatives had to keep up with this very rapid expansion,
and many decisions were made with only short-term
considerations
requirements
cars.

in mind.

The increased grain transportation

led cooperatives to lease or purchase many rail

In the process most cooperatives became highly

leveraged.

When export demand leveled off

railroads were left with excess capacity,

in the 1980s,
and many

cooperatives were locked into paying leases on idle
specialized grain hopper cars

(Cummins et al.,

1984).
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Another factor which has contributed to the
current environmental hostility,

industry's

and in particular to the

overwhelming nature of the firm's business climate,
government deregulation of transportation.
Staggers Rail Act

(1980)

is

For example,

the

adversely affected grain

merchandising by increasing railroad pricing flexibility,

by

allowing secret rail contracts which benefited high volume
shippers,

and by increasing the ease with which railroads

were able to abandon routes.

Embargoes and rail

transportation regulatory issues were major factors that
made this

"a difficult time,"

local cooperatives

especially for producers and

(Cummins et al.,

The Economic Research Service
Department of Agriculture
"Wheat;

(USDA)

Situation and Outlook."

1984).
(ERS)

of the U.S.

publishes a quarterly
This report

(ERS,

1990)

provides reliable information about the current and
projected U.S.
situation.

and world grain production and trading

The May 1990

issue reports on a number of

conditions which provide further insight into the severity
of the industry's hostile environment:
(a)

Excess capacity;

"U.S.

wheat production is projected to

rise more than 650 million bushels^. ... [Total U.S.]
production is projected at 2.7 billion bushels,...the third
largest on record....World wheat production in 1990/91
forecast at a record 568 million tons.
5

While global

There are 36.67 bushels in a metric ton.

is

10
consumption is projected up almost 3 percent,
production"

(ERS,

1990,

p.

3).

it will trail

This projection now appears

to have been accurate.
(b)

Price volatility and low prices:

"Wheat prices received

by farmers during 1990/91 are forecast at $2.90-3.30 per
bushel,
1990,

p.

down from $3.71 and $3.72 the last 2 years"
3).

(ERS,

Wheat prices subsequently dropped from about

$3.50 to their current levels of about $2.50,

substantially

lower than anticipated by the rather pessimistic ERS May
projection.
(c)

Global economic influences;

constraints could limit imports.

"Foreign exchange
China^ is facing peak

years of debt repayment... and the government has already
imposed austerity measures throughout the economy and could
decide to hold down wheat imports to conserve foreign
exchange..."
(d)

(ERS,

1990,

p.

8).

Intense global competition:

"Major competitor production

is forecast up 4

% overall due to projected increases

area

and yields

area,

(except EC)

higher yields,

1984/85

in

(except Australia)....Increased

and the largest production since

in the competing exporting countries mean more

The U.S is projected to export about 34 million tons
of wheat (about 34% of the world's 101 million tons
projected to be exported by all exporters.) In 1988/89 the
U.S. exported 37.6 million tons, about 40% of the wheat
traded on the world market. China is one of the two major
importers; in 1988/89 it imported 15.5 million tons, the
same as the USSR (ERS, 1990, p. 11).
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competition and lower wheat export prices....[For example,]
Canada is projected to increase production 9%"
p.

12).

"Despite the larger U.S.

crop,

U.S.

1990/91 are projected 3% below 1989/90 as
crops lead to increased competition...
(e)

Global and national political

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
require changes

in U.S.

1990,

exports

in

large competitor

(ERS,

influences:

(GATT)

(ERS,

1990,

p.

14).

Recent General

provisions will

agricultural policy.

Aspects of

policy which would affect the grain industry include target
prices and Commodity Credit Corporation
levels,

(CCC)

loan rate

and the funding and commodity coverage of the Export

Enhancement Program

(EEP)

(ERS,

1990,

p.

18).

As the

current GATT round comes to a close it does not appear that
these projected provisions will be realized immediately,
largely because the highly protectionist European Community
failed to cooperate.

The policy changes remain a high

priority on the agenda.

B.

The Emergence of Two Grain Marketing Institutions

In order to appreciate how two very different systems
developed in North America,

one needs to consider the recent

history of the grain trade in the U.S.
farmers

and Canada.

Grain

in both countries prospered throughout and

immediately after World War I.
was for domestic consumption;

At this time most production
exports were not yet a major

12
factor.

Throughout the 1920s and into the

American wheat industry fell
depression.

'30s,

the North

into deeper and deeper

With these unprecedented economic conditions,

the two countries,

while sharing the same physical and

economic circumstances,

ultimately responded differently to

the crisis and permanently changed the organization of their
grain trading.
There was no significant Canadian or U.S.
government involvement
it today)
I.

(i.e.,

federal

agricultural policy as we know

in wheat production or marketing before World War

With wheat supplies scarce in Europe and North America

during the war,
imposed.

export quotas and fixed wheat prices were

The U.S government pursued its price and

production objectives through wheat purchases and sales.
This approach successfully prevented runaway inflation and
supported wheat prices at harvest.

These successes

subsequently inspired demands for similar programs
and Young,

(Harwood

1989).

In Canada the government also took control of grain
distribution.

Canada established a national sales agency,

the Board of Grain Supervisors,
1918 wheat crops.

which marketed the 1917 and

The following year a new agency,

Canadian Wheat Board

(CWB),

the

was established to help grain

marketing revert to peace-time market conditions.
operated during this transition year,

It only

but it was the first

workable example of peace-time centralized marketing and
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would later serve,

in the minds of farmers,

what they needed on a long-term basis

as the model for

(Canadian Wheat Board,

1989) .
In the U.S.,

with a strong member-owned cooperative

opposed to government or investor-owned)

(as

marketing

infrastructure in place and a politically experienced and
active cooperative movement to influence the Congress^,

the

Federal government gradually responded to the post-war
economic crisis by enacting supportive legislation.
Canada,

In

the prairie farmers also recalled the boom years of

"the Great War," and the government's successful role in
helping to achieve this prosperity.
farmer cooperatives
to in Canada)

(or "pools,"

Ottawa was pressured by

as they were often referred

into enacting economic crisis-inspired

legislation.
The goal of both governments regarding grain was
similar:

to restore economic prosperity to agriculture

In post-civil War America, the severe agricultural
depressions of the 1870s and '80s, and especially the
monopolistic exploitation of grain farmers by the
transcontinental railroad in concert with a few grain
companies (Norris, 1901; Morgan, 1980), led to the rise of
many "grassroots" political, economic, and social action
organizations.
Foremost among these was the Grange.
Strong
antitrust sentiments and viable cooperative organizations
emerged from these organizing efforts.
Although the Grange
itself faded, its decades of effective political action
helped lead to the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act
(1914), and finally the Capper-Volstead Act (1924).
This
legislation legitimized agricultural cooperatives, and set
them apart as a fundamentally different kind of corporate
form, to be regulated differently for tax and antitrust
purposes.

14
production and to introduce stability into the marketing
system.

However,

the two governments introduced

fundamentally different reforms,

reforms which led to

radically different grain marketing institutions.

These

differences have continued for over half a century to
characterize the major difference between the two greatest
wheat marketing systems in the world.

1.

The Organization of Wheat Marketing in the U.S.
American wheat marketing is based on private,

owned firms

(lOFs),

for example,

farmer/member-owned firms

Cargill,

(cooperatives),

marketing about 60% of the U.S.
marketing the remaining 40%.

crop,

and on
with the former

and the latter

The government's particular

role varies from farm program to farm program,
essentially,

investor-

but

it supports grain marketing through direct

subsidies,

an Export Enhancement Program,

to buyers,

target prices,

subsidized loans

and other mechanisms designed to

make the market work more smoothly and more equitably.
might logically be argued that these adjustments
with the free market,

but the U.S.

position is that the overall,
on the

It

interfere

government's ostensible

long-range intent is to rely

"free market."

American cooperatives make a substantial contribution
to the marketing of domestically produced grain.

U.S.

cooperative farm level purchases account for about 40% of

15
total grain sales.
cooperatives

Most direct purchases are by local

(Cummins et

al., 1984).

The overall structure

of the industry's cooperative marketing in the U.S.
fourfold:

farmer-member,

local co-op,

is

regional co-op,

and

interregional co-op.
a.

Farmer-members sell to one of three buyers:

private domestic processors,
firms

(lOFs),

elevator),
b.

that is,

to a local cooperative

to

investor-owned
(usually a local

or occasionally to a regional cooperative.

The 2,339 locals

(Cummins et al.,

grain from members and nonmembers.
are elevator and storage facilities.

1984)

receive

The main services
Locals sell grain

to domestic processors,

directly to farmers,

directly

into the export market,

and most commonly to regional

cooperatives.
c.

The primary purpose of regional cooperatives is to

function as an assembly point for grain from local
cooperatives.

As the transportation system changed in

the 1980s, mainly as the mode of rail transportation
changed from individual carloads to unit trainloads,
the regional became much more important.

As the

hostile environment of the late 1970s and 1980s forced
farms to become larger,

to build more on-farm storage

facilities and to acquire their own trucks,

it often

became more feasible for these farms to sell directly
to regionals.

With the need to assemble ever larger

16
unit trainloads,

it became essential for regionals to

compete more intensively
cooperatives)
d.

(often against other

for the grain in the region,

There are 16 interreaionals which function as very

large regionals.

Harvest States Cooperative is an

example of an interregional cooperative organization.
Interregional member-owners are the regional
cooperatives,

and the interregionals buy only from

their affiliated regionals.

Interregionals are

important grain assembly areas,
export.

Over two thirds of regional and interregional

grain goes for export.
processed

especially for grain

(e.g.,

livestock feed.

Much of the remainder is

soy bean oil and meal)

or mixed for

Regionals handle one-third of all

American off-farm grain sales

(Cummins et al.,

1984).

The evolution of this complex structure can be viewed
as developmental stages in an on-going collective vertical
integration by farm managers,

as an effort to internalize

large segments of the market and thereby:

(a)

to take

greater control of the marketing of their product,
way into the international grain market,
(b)

2.

all the

and consequently

to reduce some transaction costs.

The Organization of Wheat Marketing in Canada
The Canadian government organized the current Canadian

Wheat Board in 1935.

It is now a completely farmer-owned
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corporation responsible to the government.

The purpose of

this organization is to reduce market risk for producers by
providing a system whereby they can pool their wheat
barley).

(and

The CWB takes possession of each participating

producer's crop,
the total supply.

and then works to obtain the best price for
The government determines what it expects

the world price to be,

and the CWB issues the grower an

initial payment upon delivery of his grain to one of the
provincial wheat pool elevators.
are complete,

After the final CWB sales

the average price is calculated.

Each

producer then receives a supplementary payment to adjust his
total payment to this price per ton ,

less CWB overhead.

If the government miscalculates its price forecast,

i.e.,

the world price ultimately proves to be less than that
initially forecasted by the government,

the government

absorbs the loss and the producer is not penalized.
The Canadian Wheat Board is a unique North American
institution.
cooperative,

It cannot be categorized strictly as
lOF,

or government agency,

characteristics of all three.

but it shares

Unlike any of these three

organization types as they are known in the U.S.,
does not own any storage,
assets;

transporting,

the CWB

or processing

it is strictly limited to a coordinating function.

Canadian cooperatives and private firms provide farmers

Reference to tons will be to metric tons
pounds).

(2200

if
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elevator,

storage,

much as U.S.
firms do.

and general grain crop assembly services,

local and regional cooperatives and private

In the U.S.,

as mentioned earlier,

16 "super¬

cooperatives," called interregional cooperatives,
trainloads and shiploads
carloads)

(as opposed to train hopper

of grain from member cooperatives

and regionals)

assemble

(Cummins et al,,

coordinating role of the U.S.

1984).

(i.e.,

locals

In this way the

interregional cooperatives is

somewhat analogous to the CWB's role.

However,

handles wheat on a much larger scale.

The U.S

the CWB

interregionals account for only about one third of the U.S.
exports; the other two thirds is handled by lOFs.
is only marginally analogous to the lOF.
directly with end-users,

The CWB

They both deal

but again the scale is different:

the CWB trades about as much wheat as all U.S.

lOFs

combined.
There is no American marketing institution that
approaches the scale of the CWB.
was established,

the government banned trading on the

Winnipeg Grain Exchange,
later

[1949]

Eight years after the CWB

also barley)

and the CWB became a wheat
monopoly

(Bothwell et al,,

(and
1981).

With few exceptions all wheat and barley produced in the
country must legally be sold through the CWB.^

The CWB

^
The two exceptions are grain that is used
domestically for livestock feed and the minuscule amount of
grain that is not grown in the prairie provinces.
Although
the CWB will handle these grains on request, the producer
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organization is single largest merchandiser of both wheat
and barley in the world.
excepting the U.S.,

All grain exporting countries,

organize their marketing through

centralized marketing boards along the lines of the Canadian
system,

but the CWB is clearly the world's largest grain

marketing board.
the drought,

In 1988-89,

the CWB sold about 22 million tons of grain for

Canadian growers.
corporations,

a poor yield year because of

The CWB is also one of Canada's largest

and it is the nation's single largest net

exporter.

It exports to over 70 countries,

countries,

China and the USSR,

the total volume

(CWB,

although two

account for almost a third of

1989).

From the farmer's point-of-view,
organizationally as a cooperative,

the CWB functions

that is,

as a form of

collective vertical integration of a grain producer's
business in response to market failure.
and governance of the CWB,

the origin

as opposed to that of the normal

cooperative organizational form,
differences.

However,

reveal fundamental

Cooperatives are organized and governed by

member-patrons, whereas the wheat marketing board was
organized by the government and to a large extent is
governed as a semi-autonomous government agency.

strategic control,

i.e.,

governance,

The

of the CWB is mid-way

may legally, if he/she so wishes, sell these grains through
an independent company.
Private firms handle the small
remainder of Canada's grain production: oats, rye, flax, and
canula (CWB, 1988).
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between a true cooperative and an lOF.

The CWB is not

directly governed by a board of directors representing the
interests of the owners
cooperatives,

(farmer-members in the case of

equity owners in the case of lOFs); however,

there is a Producer Advisory Board of 15 farmers.

10

The

CWB obviously has closer ties to government than U.S.
agricultural marketing organizations
formed by an act of Parliament,

etc.),

the CWB was

the government forecasts the

initial price and guarantees it,
commissioners,

(e.g.,

the government appoints

but the CWB corporation is self-

managed and self-financed

(CWB,

1989).

The different institutional origins of marketing boards
and cooperatives are significant.
through voluntary,

Cooperatives emerge

grassroots organizations,

such as the

grange; marketing boards are instituted through an act of
Parliament.

These different origins reveal fundamental

national differences;

geographical differences

(wider

This board is elected by farmers, and advisors
serve for 4 years.
Monthly board meetings are held, 11 of
which are held in the 11 administrative districts in the
prairie provinces for the convenience of farmers who wish to
have direct input at least once a year.
The CWB is administered by 5 commissioners who are
appointed by the federal government.
These appointees are
selected from people in the industry, often former farmers,
and they are advised by the advisory board.
The CWB is
required to report to Parliament through a designated
Minister, and to publish an annual report on its operations.
It is interesting to note that while there are other
marketing boards in Canada, the CWB is the only marketing
board that is not administered by a province (CWB, 1988).
There is also a full time staff of about 500.
These
staff are not civil service employees; they are paid by the
corporation from the gross grain sales revenues.
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dispersal of farmers in Canada),

cultural differences

(greater positive attitude toward and reliance on government
initiatives in Canada

[Lipset,

industrial organization
Canadian National,

1990]),

(one of the two railroads,

is nationalized in Canada).

cooperative organization,

Unlike a

Since 1943

(when as noted

the government terminated the operations of the

Winnipeg Grain Exchange)
exceptions,
barley)

the

the CWB is not a voluntary

collective vertical integration.
earlier,

and differences in

all Canadian producers,

with few

have been required to market their wheat

(and

through the CWB.

The CWB therefore has an almost absolute monopoly in
wheat.

This effective monopoly position results in

considerable monopoly power in domestic sales,

as long as

American wheat can be excluded from the Canadian market.
The Free Trade Agreement allows this protection if it can be
demonstrated that Canadian wheat subsidies for its producers
are lower than U.S.

subsidies to American growers.

11

The

CWB's national wheat monopoly allows it to function
effectively in the international grain market as one of the
oligopolists.

The international buyer has the advantage of

"one stop shopping," and the seller

(the CWB)

enjoys the

opportunity to arrange for some control over price.

This

At this time they are extremely close, within
approximately 1%, and therefore there is considerable
discussion in how one should calculate indirect subsidies,
such as costs of research and extension efforts devoted to
wheat farm production and management.
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strength,

in combination with the Canadian ability to

differentiate its grain as a substantially cleaner,
quality product,

higher

has enabled it to enhance the price for growers.

C.

The Pooling Strategy

The single greatest strategic difference between U.S.
grain marketing

(whether cooperative or lOF)

and Canadian

grain marketing is that the CWB markets wheat by pooling,

an

approach that has been called "...the most fundamental of
cooperative strategies"
[ACS],

1987,

p.

36).

(Agricultural Cooperative Service

"Pooling capital and volume to obtain

economic benefits is the essence of cooperative effort"
(ACS,

1987, p.

36).

Pooling is contingency pricing.

Examples of

contingency pricing abound in American non-grain
cooperatives.

One example is the final price of goods from

a supply cooperative.

The final

(net)

price is contingent

upon the ultimate cost of doing business,
list price at the time of purchase,
year,

i.e.,

one pays the

then at the end of the

after the total revenues and costs have been

calculated,

the difference is returned to the member-owners

as patronage refunds.

Most non-grain cooperatives use the

secure base provided by pooling programs to build successful
domestic and international marketing efforts

(ACS,

1987).
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American grain cooperatives

(excepting those few

involved in the 1990 Harvest States Cooperative experimental
efforts)

are a notable exception.

About 95% of American

grain farm managers choose to operate in the cash market,
either being paid the current market price at the time they
make delivery,

or through the government CCC program,

being

paid most or all of the market price immediately and,
depending on how the market moves subsequently,
if any,

later.

By contrast,

the Canadian Wheat Board pays producers an

initial amount upon delivery of their grain,
(if any)

A specific example using the most recently

avaiable figures
crop year

A.
B.
C.

and the balance

when it determines what it will receive for the

grain pool.

TABLE 3:

the balance,

(CWB,

(per ton)
1989,

p.

for the wheat pool of the 1988-89

28)

will illustrate the process:

Receipt from Producers

(14.2 million tons HRSW)

Final sales value per ton
Initial payments to producers
Gross surplus (A-B)

DEDUCT OPERATING COSTS:
Carrying charges (elevators & storage)
Interest
Freight
Drying
Lease of 2000 rail hopper cars
CWB administrative overhead
D. TOTAL OPERATING COSTS
E.

Surplus on operations

F.

DEDUCT:

G.

Intermediate surplus

(C-D)

Interim payment
(E-F)

$204.26
167.21
37.05

4.061
(2.367)
.537
.002
.536
1.262_
4.03
33.01
15.00
18.01
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H. ADD;
I.

Interest earned after 9/30

.80

Balance for distribution
to producers (G+H)

$18.81

Most non-grain producer marketing cooperatives
distribute members'
Saubaei,

1985).

net revenues on a pool basis

(Buccola &

In a report to Congress entitled

"Positioning Cooperatives for the Future"

(ACS,

1987),

a

committee argues that pooling is the only marketing method
done on a truly cooperative basis and that "buy-sell volume
should be treated as non-member business." A group of
agricultural producers may be allowed to incorporate as a
cooperative and to enjoy the attendant advantages,

such as

special tax treatment and exemption from some regulations
against collusive behavior.

However,

these producers must

abide by a number of rules in order to qualify for and
maintain their special status.

One of the regulations is

that they must not do more than 50% of the cooperative's
business with non-members.

In essence then,

since U.S.

grain

cooperatives do not pool and all of their tranactions are
straight buy-sell business,

this proposal would take away

the organizations cooperative status.
Pooling has been shown to reduce risk and increase
efficiency

(Sporleder, Tough,

& Malick,

1987).

However,

most grain farmers "apparently prefer independent decision¬
making,

believing they can do significantly better by
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themselves.
evidence"

This belief...[is]

(ACS,

D.

contrary to all available

1987).

The Firm as Production Function

In order to appreciate the role of marketing strategy
in relation to the firm-level business as a whole,

it is

worthwhile to briefly summarize the nature of production
within the wheat industry.
scale,

In order to achieve economies of

each firm requires relatively large tracts of land;

the average production unit is about two square miles in
area

(1,280 acres).

technology

(e.g.,

harvesting,

Substantial capital investments in

sophisticated equipment for tillage,

crop drying and storage),

have enabled managers

to keep paid labor to a minimum and often to keep it within
the family.

All economic and production decision-making is

vested in the farm manager,

and for the most part this

manager is a manager-owner.
Each year the manager arranges for the required
operating capital,
fungicides,
if used,

for the delivery of seed,

herbicides,

insecticides,

and for the spring tillage,

of the crop.

fertilizers,

and growth regulators,
planting,

and growing

The growing crop is closely monitored for

nutrient deficiencies and pest or disease problems.
the three to four month growing season,

the crop is

After
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harvested.

The intensity of the harvest takes on

characteristics of a military campaign coordinated
often largely implemented)

by the manager.

(and

By this time the

manager will also have arranged for adequate crop drying and
on-farm grain storage.
This often dramatic,

annual sequence of events

constitutes the production cycle.

At this point the average

manager will control over one thousand tons of a salable
commodity that must be sold in order to pay the operating
loan,

to service the longer term debt,

and to provide some

financial return to equity and management.

It is at this

stage in the overall process that the production phase per
se has ended and the marketing phase becomes central.
Microeconomic theory assumes the product will be sold in the
market at a

"market-clearing" price,

that is,

at a price

which reflects the current total supply of and demand for
this product.
The supply and demand will be changing over time,

but

presumably there will at any particular time be an
equilibrium price.

The grower's cost of production is

irrelevant to the market;

what counts is how much grain in

aggregate is put into the system.

The traditional way for

grower's to deal with this situation is to produce at the
lowest cost.

Profit-maximization manifests

minimumization.

Prices are critical

itself as cost-

in neoclassical

microeconomic theory because they are viewed as signals
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which indicate to producers how much they should produce,
that is,

what their output

(q)

decision should be.

in theory will only produce until marginal revenue
(i.e.,

price in a purely competitive market)

marginal cost

(me).

Price

(i.e.,

intersection of aggregated output
of the supply

(S)

curve,

Producer #1

MR)

equals their

i.e.,

the lower part

and aggregated demand

(D).

Market

Market equilibrium price is determined by this
in the

(MR)

is determined by the

(Q),

Producer # 2

Producers

intersection;

"long-run" rational producers are expected to adjust

their output accordingly.

Strategy is reduced to long run

output decisions.

E.

The Firm as Governance Structure

The foregoing scenario may reflect what happens
aggregate in the long run
market imperfections;

(five or more years),

in

assuming no

it tells us nothing about how firms
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operate
or the

in either the short run
intermediate run

tells us

(the current growing season)

(one to four years)

little about the role of strategy.

and therefore
The problem of

course lies in the fact that neoclassical microtheory has a
severely limited theory of the firm.
Neoclassical microeconomic theorists would agree that
their theory does not have a rigorous,
the firm.

However,

"realistic” theory of

they would add that theory is meant to

abstract from and therefore to simplify reality,
make reality more manageable.

in order to

A realistic theory is not

essential nor even desired for their purposes.

It may be a

gross oversimplification to treat the firm as a

"black box,"

but it nevertheless allows for the development of price
theory.

The ultimate test of theory is not the realism of

its assumptions but rather its ability to explain and
predict.

For the purposes of neoclassical theory,

argue that whatever producers really are
they act as

if they were omniscient,

one may

like in reality,

rational decision¬

makers operating in a perfectly functioning market.

However,

it takes very little field research or imagination to
realize that

in fact producers have relatively

information,

and therefore cannot make totally rational

decisions,

little

and that the market is significantly flawed by

opportunism.

Also,

if one has a more ambitious objective,

such as to understand firm-level strategic behavior,
neoclassical theory of the firm is

inadeguate.

the

29
The neoclassical approach,
pointed out,

as Williamson

(1985)

has

is analogous to physicists ignoring friction

when viewing mechanical systems and in so doing facilitating
the articulation of the "laws” of physics.

Williamson views

transaction costs as being the economic counterpart of
friction.
The neoclassical view of the firm as a production
function,

that is,

as a black box with a set of inputs,

internal production process,

and one or more outputs,

facilitate price theory building.

an

does

The price received for

the output is a function of the aggregate output of the
industry,

i.e.,

the supply,

and the aggregated demand.

Most

of the agricultural economics literature discusses the wheat
industry in terms of price theory.

It focuses on explaining

the movement of prices at all levels and in predicting the
impact of policy on prices.

However,

ignoring the fact that

profit maximizing is limited by bounded rationality and
opportunism,

prevents one from adequately explaining firm

strategic behavior or understanding the advantages of
alternative market strucutres for a commodity such as wheat.
Williamson's view of the firm as a governance structure
offers greater insight into the strategic possibilities.

"A transaction occurs when a good or service is
transferred across a technologically separate interface"
(Williamson,

1985,

p.

1),

that is,

transferred between two

"technologically separable activities" which could
potentially be run by separate firms.

For example,

a

transaction occurs when wheat is transferred from farm to
handler-processor.

There may be no technical reason why the

transaction should involve two firms,

but there may be

economic reasons why they should or should not be
integrated.

For example,

there are costs of collecting data

and processing the information necessary to making sound
economic decisions regarding the transfer and to negotiating
the transfer.

Transaction cost analysis considers the costs

of handling the transaction through markets or through a
hierarchical organization,
The firm,

such as a cooperative.

having completed the harvest,

is now

confronted with a number of potential transfer of output
alternatives.
On-farm

ENDUSER

HARVEST

Figure 2:

Simple Flow of Transactions

Each alternative transaction arrangement will have different
transaction costs,

and a theory which is adequate for

strategic management purposes will enable one to consider
the goal of minimizing the production and transaction costs
in selecting the preferred strategy.

This study is
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concerned with these strategic choices,

and in particular

with the implications of the fact that fundamentally
different marketing institutions exist in Canada and the
United States.
We can focus on Hard Red Spring Wheat,

a wheat grown in

large parts of the Canadian prairie provinces
Saskatchewan,
to the south

and Manitoba)
(Montana,

production processes,
conditions,

(Alberta,

and the northern plains states

North Dakota,

and Minnesota).

the levels of technology,

the growing

and the quality of the farmgate commodity,

identical in the two countries.

However,

The

are

producers in the

two countries face different alternative marketing
strategies.
All wheat and barley produced in these provinces
in effect,

(i.e.,

the entire national crop of these two

commodities)

is sold through the Canadian Wheat Board

(CWB).

While the CWB takes ownership and takes full responsibility
for sales,

it does not actually physically handle grain.

Growers deliver their grain to elevators operated by one of
the three provincial wheat pools or by a private company,
such as Cargill.

These organizations store the grain and

coordinate the transport of the grain to barge terminals in
Vancouver and Thunder Bay.

The CWB is a grain pool.

Growers are paid an initial set payment upon delivery of
their grain,

and at the end of the sales period

all of the national crop has been sold),

(i.e., when

the balance over
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the total initial payments,
overhead charge,

less a relatively minuscule CWB

is distributed proportionately to growers.

All growers therefore receive the identical price per ton of
grain,

adjusted for their particular location relative to

one of the terminals.
By contrast,

in the U.S.

Harvest States Cooperative

only one organization,

(HSC)

the

headquartered in St.

Paul,

Minnesota but operating throughout the northern plains
states,

offers the services of a grain pool.

This pool was

instituted this year on an experimental basis for a very
limited number of the members in HSC's 500 local affiliate
cooperative elevators spread throughout the northern plains
area.

The American farmer has a number of marketing

options,

aside from the experimental grain pool.

all cases the initial step,
the grain on-farm
a local elevator),

as in Canada,

In almost

is either to store

(and eventually to deliver the grain to
or from the start to store the grain at a

local private or cooperative elevator.

(The very largest

operators often have the ability to store all of their grain
on-farm and to transport it directly to a large regional
elevator,

thus reducing some of the transaction costs of

moving the grain into the market.)

It is at this point that

the marketing options in the two countries diverge sharply.

Currently there is about 13 million bushels of onfarm storage capacity, as compared to about 9 million
bushels of off-farm storage capacity (Dahl, 1990).
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American producers who fail to pool have three basic
options:

to sell their grain in the cash market^^,

taking

full payment at that day's cash price; to seal their grain
in a government CCC storage facility,
loan rate

14

taking the government

; to hold the grain and hedge,

futures contracts or options.

either through

(Only about 5% of growers use

the commodities market to hedge.)

Although only the first

provides the full cash price immediately,

the latter two

have the advantage that the seller is provided a "floor"
while he is able to wait to see if the cash market might
rise.

In short,

it allows him a little longer before he

must make the final decision,
were.

"to pull the trigger," as it

There are of course various combinations of these

three basic options,

and these options can be exercised in

light of varying amounts of marketing information and
advice.

But essentially, we are comparing two institutions:

the "free" market

(U.S.)

and a more "planned," hierarchical

structure of truly cooperative grain marketing.
The failure to implement a pooling strategy in American
grain marketing cooperatives suggests that a strategic
choice not to pool has been implemented by the members
through their board of directors.

It is unclear as to what

Growers can either sell to the cooperative or to a
private company, such as Cargill.
Growers who choose this option can subsequently
either sell their grain on the cash market and repay the
"loan" or simply forfeit the collateral grain, keeping the
initial proceeds.
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accounts for this apparently paradoxical behavior in
American grain cooperatives.

From the producer's point-of-

view the overriding concern should be strategic control of
this integrated phase of his business,
is interpreted differently.
control is delegated,

and perhaps "control"

Since in cooperative strategies

the board of directors'

control role is critical.

strategic

We have been able to trace the

logic of the emergence of cooperative structures.

While it

manifests itself differently through contrasting structures
in the two cultures,

it appears to derive ultimately from

the producer's own perception of his particular situation in
relation to his environment.

The effectiveness of the

contrasting strategies should be revealed in the producer
perceptions of the business environment,

and this assumption

underlies the approach of this dissertation's research.

F.

The Significance of this Study

There are three major reasons why the subject of this
dissertation is important to the field of strategic
management.

First,

this study is concerned with cooperative

strategy, an area which has until recently been ignored by
strategic management studies.Stalemate industries offer

Nielsen (1988), commenting on the dearth of
material on cooperative strategy, observes that "there have
only been two Strategic Management Journal articles that
consider cooperative strategy at all (Wright, 1984;
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almost no opportunities for product differentiation or
competitive advantage,

and as a result, have largely been

avoided in spite of the fact that they compose a major
component of advanced economies.
on price alone.

Firms in stalemate compete

For most firms in a stalemate industry,

cooperative strategies are perhaps the single most important
means of gaining a competitive advantage,
greater market power,

or of creating the possibility to

compete in terms of what Best
Competition."

of acquiring

(1990)

refers to as "the New

Institutions to facilitate cooperative

strategies have been developed in both countries,
to a much greater extent in Canada.

although

Cooperative ventures

can be viewed as joint vertical integration,

and yet the

extensive literature on vertical integration

(e.g.,

Harrigan,
single,
market.

1986; Williamson,

1975,

1981,

1986)

refers only to

usually larger firms internalizing aspects of the
The collective efforts of small firms to reap the

obvious benefits of vertical integration through a
cooperative strategy,

deserve attention.

Equally important

are the accompanying solutions to governance problems of the
resulting cooperative entity.

These efforts have led to

organizational designs which differ for historical and
perhaps cultural reasons,

and their specific marketing

Thorelli, 1986). The PIMS research data base does not even
record data concerning cooperative strategies." I will limit
my comments to the concerns of Nielsen (1988) most relevant
to agricultural marketing cooperatives.
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strategies differ,

but the strategic intent of joint

integration is similar.

It can be argued that a firm's

fundamental strategic decision is whether to "make" or to
"buy," i.e.,
market.

to internalize an activity or to utilize the

For small firms in a stalemate industry,

often the

only way to implement the choice will be to do so jointly
with one's "competitors."
The empirical research on which this study is based is
important because it considers the conclusions of earlier
strategy research within a different context,

I will be

looking at how firms in stalemate manage in hostile
environments,

in particular,

how their experience appears to

compare with that reported by other researchers in other
industries.

"Environmental hostility" is a strategic

concept that is more encompassing than stalemate;

it

includes many of the environmental characteristics
experienced by firms in stalemate but also emphasizes the
high risk factor.

While there has been relatively little

empirical work on strategies for survival in hostile
environments.

Covin and Slevin

(1989)

concluded that small

firms with organic structures and entrepreneurial strategic
postures achieve higher performance levels in hostile
environments.

They further concluded that more mechanistic

structures and "conservative" stances appear to yield better
performance in benign environments.
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From my own experience I personally do not find this
conclusion intuitively appealing.
(1989)

First,

Covin and Sievin's

organic-mechanistic dichotomy is probably not a very

useful distinction here.

Williamson's market-hierarchy

polarity would appear to be more relevant.

Secondly,

firms

in hostile environments which adopt a more aggressive,
riskier
tend,

(so-called "entrepreneurial")

it would appear,

The Covin and Slevin

strategic posture

to increase stress and vulnerability.

(1989)

findings need to be tested in a

range of different industrial and cultural settings.
Finally,

this study will be important in terms of

comparative strategy.

It is a straightforward cross-

cultural study of one industry.
lies

in the fact that firms

producers)

Its particular interest

(in this case,

in the same industry

(wheat)

and the same world

market but on different sides of the border
in differently structured markets),

cooperative in Canada.
of the U.S.

and strategy

(and operating

have chosen to implement

very different cooperative strategies.
(Canadian Wheat Board)

agricultural

The structure

(pooling)

are more

Cooperation in the market structure

is generally limited to initial grain handling,

and the strategy is largely shooting for the highs of the
cash market.

Strategic management generally concentrates on

the alignment of organization structure with the business
environment,
performance.

in hopes of improving or at least explaining
This focus often helps to explain performance.
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but

it may be that the other components

particular

fundamental

particular

structure or

in the

cultural differences,
strategic posture,

equation,

in

rather than a

deserve equal

or

greater attention.
In retrospect almost any agricultural
have

served as

a

case

study to

developing competitive
engulfed
that

in

illustrate the problem of

strategies

Canada.This

study's

from comparative

cultural

overall

approach

institutional

a.

fact,

internationally

(Lipset,

and

advantage
it

is

a
and

based on an
clear benefits

(Williamson,

1986),

from U.S.-Canadian cross-

1990).

the two countries
in the

is

there are

analysis

is much to be gained

studies

In

Wheat has the

industry

importance to both the U.S.

underlying two-fold assumption:

there

stalemate

a particularly clear example,

commodity of major economic

and b.

in a

a hostile environment.

it offers

commodity could

compete with each other

same market.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

A."Stalemate"

1,

A

Structural
In the

Definition

early

1980s the Boston Consulting Group

and Michael

Porter

competitive

systems:

"volume,"
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degrees
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differentiation and competitive
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economies
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"stalemate."

their potentials

Industries

Competitive Systems According to the BCG
(from Calori & Ardisson, 1988)
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Stalemate industries appear to have neither
differentiation nor competitive advantage opportunities.
Economic recession or growth slowdown leads to worldwide
over-capacity and price wars;

in this situation stalemate

industries are social and financial traps
Ardisson,
facile;

1988).

(Calori and

Porter's strategic recommendation is

simply avoid stalemate industries. However,

the

discipline of strategic management has a responsibility to
confront rather than to avoid the more perplexing marketing
problems.

"Stalemate industries still represent an important

part of the economies of developed countries,
important problem to solve"
Calori and Ardisson

and an

(Calori and Ardisson,

(1988)

1988).

demonstrate that it is

possible for individual producers to develop effective
differentiation strategies in the stalemate industries of
corrugated cardboard paper and stainless steel.

Other

examples of stalemate industries include cement,

basic

chemicals, many agricultural inputs

(e.g.,

fertilizer),

and

nearly all agricultural commodities.
There are four characteristics of a stalemate industry:
1.

The market is large enough for many competitors with

operations of optimal-size

(i.e.,

realize economies of scale),

large enough to

and most competitors have

reached this size.
2.

The industry's production technology is available to

all competitors.
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3.

Cumulative experience is not an advantage

(i.e.,

lack of experience is not a barrier to entry.)
4.

The products or services are well defined and

standardized.
Competition in the industry is limited to price competition.
Stalemate industries are "purely competitive" in the
economic sense.^
narrow,

Since the profit margins are extremely

the industries are very sensitive to diminutive

increases in cost of inputs and to any downturn in the
economic environment.
occur,
losses.

Supply and demand adjustments will

but only after a long time,

after many years of

It is important to recognize that this structural

definition of a stalemate industry is multidimensional and
more precise than the usual marketing-oriented definitions
based on demand growth rate.

For example,

between a so-called "declining industry"
decreasing)
demand)

and a "mature industry"

the distinction

(i.e.,

(i.e.,

demand

relatively stable

does not contribute greatly to understanding the

core nature of a stalemate industry.

Calori and Ardisson's

Economists use the term "purely competitive" to
describe a market in which a homogeneous product is produced
by many producers, each producer producing only a small
amount of the product, relative to the total industry
output, so as not to be able to exert market power. As a
consequence of being unable to shape the market in which
they operate, producers will be price-takers, incapable of
earning an economic profit. Another characteristic of a
purely competitive market, and one which aggravates this
inability to earn an economic profit, is easy entry of other
producers.
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(1988)

cardboard industry,

for instance,

steel industry is declining,

is mature and their

but both are stalemate

industries.

2.

Producer Strategic Alternatives to Stalemate
From the point-of-view of the individual producer in a

stalemate industry there are a number of strategic
alternatives,

short of initially avoiding the industry.

Each alternative has an inherent negative aspect which must
be weighed against the advantages of the alternative
and Ardisson,
1.

Exit:

1988).

(Calori

Six strategies follow:

this is the most obvious solution to the

stalemate.

(The attendant disadvantage is the set of

social and financial problems.)
2.

Horizontal integration

(i.e.,

acquire competitors):

this may provide industry leadership in production
capacity and the ability to regulate price,
risky

but it is

(because one is now more deeply involved in an

already questionable industry)
acquisition opportunities.

and there may be no

Furthermore,

this strategy

may have important Sherman antitrust implications.
3.

Organize a cartel or rely on government subsidies:

cartel may be illegal,
subsidies,

and in any case it,

is a short term solution.

like

a
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4. Move to a lower cost of production area:
strategy,

if possible,

This

often presents social and

financial mobility barriers.
5.

Focus on a local market:

the future then depends on

the local market's future.
6.

Innovate technologically

(product or process):

innovation requires large R & D expenditures,

is rare

in a technologically mature stalemate industry,
usually incremental
Process innovation

and is

(rather than breakthrough).
("de-maturing" an industry)

is more

likely to occur but is more difficult to protect.

3. Moving toward the Volume Quadrant
No producer desires to be in the stalemate quadrant.
The problem is to determine a means of escaping it.

In the

previous section I reviewed six alternative escape routes.
The escape route of choice for Calori and Ardisson
product differentiation.

(1988)

is

This route will not be viable for

most individual producers of agricultural commodities.
Fleming

(1989),

following Calori and Ardisson's

(1988)

lead,

demonstrates how individual producers in the apple and dairy
sectors have managed to escape the stalemate quadrant by:
(a)

differentiating their products

strategy),
(b)

(using a niche

and

becoming volume producers,

or rather least-cost

producers by introducing low cost production processes.
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In general however,

there are few opportunities for small

producer firms in stalemate industries to escape stalemate
as individuals.

Noticeably absent from Porter's

(1980)

the BCG's recommendations or Calori and Ardisson's
list of strategic responses

or

(1988)

(except implicitly in item 3),

is any reference to collective strategic action by producers
in the same industry.
From the point-of-view of the individual agricultural
producer,

differentiation is extremely difficult.

And it is

impossible for everyone else simultaneously to implement it.
The prospects for moving toward the volume quadrant are
almost as dismal.

The volume quadrant is at least possible,

although extraordinarily unlikely on an individual basis.
There are at least three ways it might come about.
First,

collectively producers might turn to the

government to lock in a competitive advantage for themselves
by limiting the supply that can legally be produced.
mechanism is simple:
quota,

The

each producer is allocated a production

and total production is maintained at or slightly

below demand.

In effect the producers take control of the

market and are then able to regulate the price.
management is regularly practiced in Canada

Supply

(and the E.C.),
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but it has usually been rejected in the U.S.
economic and legal reasons.

for political,

2

A second way to achieve a volume position is through
horizontal integration by acquisition.
however,

This approach,

would be infeasible for an individual to implement

in agriculture on a national level. A possible exception
would be the case in which one had a natural monopoly.^
Simply developing economies of scale for one's firm is not
enough to achieve a volume position;

in stalemate all of

one's major competitors are already at their optimal size.
Creating a cartel to achieve horizontal integration is,
noted above,

(a)

impractical

(given the number and

geographic dispersion of producers),
illegal.

and

(b)

probably

History tells us it would also be short-lived.

A volume position is, however,
firms which,
integrate.

as

achievable for small

through collective action,

vertically

If a significant number of producers chose to

market their commodity collectively
supply cooperative,

(or in the case of a

to purchase their inputs collectively),

they can take greater control of price,

to the degree that

The policy of tobacco production quotas is a notable
exception to the American reluctance to implement supply
management.
^ Cranberry production, for example, is limited by the
number of bogs, and there are no more bogs being developed.
It is conceivable although extremely unlikely that an
individual could gain control of the existing bogs and have
a natural monopoly. Very few examples of potential natural
monopolies in agriculture come to mind.
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they can sell

(or buy)

in volume.

Collective vertical

integration by definition subsumes effective,
primarily intended,

even if not

horizontal integration.

Each producer can continue to produce individually
(i.e.,

to make the operational farm management decisions),

but each would join together to market the homogeneous
product collectively
cooperatively.)

(i.e.,

to make the strategic decisions

This hierarchical approach is in contrast

to the conventional procedure of an individual marketing
from the farmgate to an investor-owned commodity
corporation.

A review of the conditions which lead to

vertical integration (Section C below)

suggests that

vertical integration will often be an appropriate strategy
in stalemate industries.

B.

1.

“Environmental Hostility”

"Environmental Hostility”
Hostile environments are characterized by precarious,

risky industry settings,
overwhelming

(i.e.,

intense competition, harsh,

dominating)

business climates,

relative lack of exploitable opportunities.

and the

By contrast,

benign environments provide a safe setting for business
operations with many investment and marketing opportunities.
Benign environments can be controlled and manipulated as a
dominant firm would in an industry with little competition.
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(Covin and Slevin,
Friesen,

1983).

1989; Khandwalla,

1977; Miller and

Covin and Slevin (1989)

conclude that

hostile environments are particularly damaging to small
firms due to their limited resource bases.

2. Organization Structure and Environmental Hostility
Hall

(1980)

investigated the "survival strategies" of

manufacturing firms in "hostile" environments.

He observed

that high performing firms responded to hostile environments
by developing internal administrative structures which
allowed effective and efficient management of any necessary
strategic repositioning.

Covin and Slevin (1989)

cite

earlier studies which suggest that threatening environments
cause organizations to emphasize discipline and authority
(i.e., control issues)
Mintzberg (1979)

and to become more hierarchical.

observed that:

Hostility affects structure through the
intermediate variables of the predictability of
work, in that hostile environments are
unpredictable ones.
But of greater interest is
its relationship with the intermediate variable of
speed of response, since very hostile environments
generally demand fast reactions by the
organization.
(p. 269)
Organizational designs which are relatively more
heirarchical and which emphasize communications up and down,
along rather than across the lines of authority, are
referred to as "mechanical," as opposed to "organic,"
structures.

Organic structures are "shorter" and would seem

to permit rapid organizational responses to changing
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external forces in unpredictable environments. The "taller”
mechanistic structures would be more appropriate to
predictable environments (Burns and Stalker,
and Lorsch,

1967).

1961; Lawrence

It would follow that organic structures

would be effective for firms operating in hostile
environments, and this expectation is supported by
Khandwalla (1977).

The research of Covin and Slevin (1989)

demonstrated that small firms with organic structures
performed better in hostile environments whereas small firms
with mechanistic structures performed better in benign
environments.

i

3. Strategic Posture and Environmental Hostility
Covin and Slevin (1989) define a firm's strategic
posture as its overall competitive orientation, and
therefore its entrepreneurial vs. conservative orientation
is indicative of its strategic posture.

A firm's

entrepreneurial-conservation orientation is reflected in the
extent to which management is inclined:
(a) to take business-related risks,
(b)

to favor change and innovation in order to achieve
a competitive advantage, and

(c) to compete aggressively with other firms
(Miller,1983).
Management of entrepreneurial firms is innovative, pro¬
active, and risk-taking.

The strategic orientations of

these firms is analogous to those of Miles and Snow's (1978)
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prospector firms and Mintzberg's

(1973)

organizations.

Conservative firms,

non-innovative,

reactive,

to Miles and Snow's
(1973)

entrepreneurial

on the other hand,

and risk-averse,

(1978)

are

and are analogous

defender firms and Mintzberg's

adaptive organizations.

Covin and Sievin's

(1989)

research concludes that small firms which have
entrepreneurial orientations performed best in hostile
environments whereas more conservative firms perform best in
benign environments.
It is important to note that this research concludes
that "neither organization structure

(i.e.,

organicity)

nor

strategic posture are significant independent predictors of
firm performance"

(p.

81).

What is significant is the

interactive effect of structure and strategy in the context
of degree of environmental hostility.

The conclusions of

their research can be summarized graphically in Figure 4;

High performance
in hostile
environments

Organic

ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE
Mechanistic

High performance
in benign
environments

Conservative

Entrepreneurial

STRATEGIC POSTURE
Figure 4:

Organization Performance as an Interactive
Function of Organization Structure and Strategic
Posture (from Covin & Slevin, 1989).
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Although the above typology is useful,

it implies that

the role of strategy is simply to choose an organizational
form

(structure)

environment.
D below:

and a strategic posture appropriate to the

The population ecology perspective

Collective Strategies)

(see Section

might argue that small firms

would find a truly hostile environment to be totally
incapacitating and that "strategic choice"

(Child,

1972)

would not be an option.

C.

Producers

Vertical Integration

in a stalemate

(i.e.,

"purely competitive")

industry in a hostile environment are usually passive
"price-takers," but individuals may come together to form
bargaining cooperatives and become price-makers.

Producer

cooperatives are a means for producers to ensure fair prices
for their products

(Bunje,

1980).

Agricultural producers,

organized as an agricultural marketing cooperative,
negotiate price,
schedule,

quality of the commodity,

can

and delivery

and in so doing take an active role in shaping

their market and gaining market power that they would not
otherwise have.
The central strategic advantage of cooperation is that
small

firms

in a hostile environment can create a
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hierarchical structure to achieve greater market power,
usually enough to shape the market to some degree for their
mutual advantage.

Cooperatives may emerge primarily for

social reasons or for economic reasons.

In the latter case,

cooperatives arise out of market failure,

and the formation

of cooperatives can then be viewed as analogous to vertical
integration
1986).

(Emelianoff,

Williamson

(1985)

1942;

Nourse,

1922;

Sexton,

1984,

is useful in describing the

underlying motivation and the evolution of this market
structure.

1.

Transaction Costs
Transactional cost analysis hypothesizes that an

economic enterprise will develop a structure that will allow
it to minimize its production and transaction costs
given environment.

in a

Organizational forms or "governance

forms" which are most successful in reducing these costs
will have a competitive advantage in their environment
(Williamson,

1981).

The transactional cost approach helps

to identify those situations in which agricultural producers
will find it beneficial to organize collectively so as to
reduce their transaction costs and increase their
competitive advantage,

i.e.,

move away from of the stalemate

quadrant.
As noted earlier,

a transaction occurs whenever "a good

or service is transferred across a technologically separate

52
interface"

(Williamson,

1981, p.

1544).

The act of moving a

commodity from the farmgate to the buyer provides many
examples of these transaction costs.

Included here are all

the costs associated with gathering and processing of data
to create information useful for decision-making,
contract negotiation,
compliance.
a.

for

and for monitoring and enforcing

Transaction costs arise from :

bounded rationality,

implying imperfect information

and one's limited ability to comprehend and analyze it;
b.

opportunism,

guile"

that is,

(Williamson,

"self-interest seeking with

1981).

If one had perfect information about the future,
contracts would be complete.
opportunistic,

all

Or if people were never

contracts would not have to be complete; when

unforeseen problems arose, people would simply agree to
workout the problem amicably.
Williamson

(1981)

developed four principles for

"efficient"^ organizational design. These principles will
determine the organizational design that will provide a firm
the greatest competitive advantage.

This section of the

study will review those transactional cost approach concepts
which,

from the farm manager's point-of-view,

are relevant

to the strategic decision to integrate the operation

^ Efficient is used here as the ability to minimize
transaction costs.
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vertically by creating or joining a cooperative
organization.

2. Asset Fixity Principle
This principle states that as assets become more fixed
(i.e., more specialized or "specific”),

autonomous market

contracting will becomes less efficient

(Williamson,

1981).

An asset is more specific the less easily it is able to be
sold to another user or used for an alternative purpose.
That is,

the higher its transfer cost,

the greater is its

specicifity; the greater its specicifity,

the more its

resale or market value will differ from its historic
purchase cost.

Transfer costs can arise from the asset's

technological characteristics,

its location,

dysfunctional factor markets.

The higher the asset fixity,

the higher are the barriers to exit.

or

This principle has

broad implications for competitiveness in agriculture
because almost all agricultural assets used in the
production of commodities are highly fixed in Williamson's
sense.
The consequences of this situation are vulnerability of
producers to opportunistic behavior by their trading
partners.

This vulnerability is pervasive in agriculture^,

^
A simple grain farming example will illustrate the
principle and its applicability to a farm manager
considering agricultural cooperatives. Suppose a farmer
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and it is one of the main reasons the industry's environment
can be termed hostile.

Benign environments would allow

producers a reasonable degree of control in their markets.
To the extent that integrating forward reduces a producer's
vulnerability,

involvement in a cooperative will be an

attractive strategy.

As one would therefore expect,

cooperatives have historically increased membership and
market share during recessions, when markets have shrunk or
stagnated,

that is, when it has become more difficult to

escape the stalemate quadrant,

and when environmental

hostility was increasing.
There is also the possibility of asset fixity on the
buyer's part.

The theory of contestable markets

Panzar and Willig,
assets,

1982)

(Baumol,

argues that the immobility of

rather than industry concentration per se,

market power.

leads to

Only if assets are immobile on both sides of

the market will excessive market power of the buyer exist.
The reason the trader is able to offer low prices to the
farmer is that there are barriers to exit

(because of asset

acquired a grain farm and specialized grain production,
harvesting and drying equipment. His intent is to supply a
local grain elevator; this elevator has a degree of local
monopsonistic power. If the ownership costs of these assets
is $300,000 and his variable costs of production are
$100,000, and if he had been led to believe that the grain
trader would purchase his annual crop for $500,000, he would
be anticipating a $100,000 profit. Once the grain producer
has made this commitment, the trading partner may be tempted
to renege on the agreement. In the short run, all the buyer
needs to pay is an amount large enough to cover variable
costs and contribute something towards the asset ownership
costs, the annual rental-equivalent price of those assets.
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fixity),

and therefore potential competitors for the buyer

will not enter the market.
by the farmers affected
cooperative)

Collective vertical integration

(i.e.,

an agricultural marketing

is thus a logical strategic alternative.

With

this strategy of countervailing power producers can
counterbalance the market power of buyers,

leading to a more

equitable and efficient market

1956).

(Galbraith,

A cooperative may increase efficiency by transforming
the market relationship from one approaching simple
monopsony to one of bilateral monopoly
Quandt,

1971).

(Henderson and

Such competition may also reduce market

segmentation because owner-members of cooperatives may
pressure management to provide information that aids the
farm manager in making decisions.
to the farmer;

This is a direct benefit

it would not be forthcoming from an lOF and

it does not increase the cooperative's profit.
terms of increased economic efficiency,

Finally,

in

the greatest benefit

of the cooperative to farmers is in reducing the threat of
opportunism in the face of asset fixity,

and thereby

encouraging their investment in specialized production and
marketing facilities.

3.

The Uncertainty Principle
The uncertainty principle states that the greater the

uncertainty surrounding a transaction,

the greater the

likelihood the transaction will be efficiently mediated by
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the autonomous market

(Williamson,

1979).

Recall that one

of the three main characteristics of environmental hostility
is high degrees of uncertainty in the market.

Transaction

cost analysis argues that the potential for opportunistic
behavior increases with increasing uncertainty.

This

potential provides farm managers an incentive to shift from
market institutions
contracts

(e.g.,

(e.g.,

the spot market)

to contingent

patronage refunds and "pooling")

and

collective vertical integration.
Contingent pricing has many advantages for a farm
manager in an uncertain,
hostile environment).

often volatile market

(i.e.,

It prevents both sides from

committing too early to prices that prove ultimately to be
too high or too low in the light of imperfect knowledge
about ever-changing supply and demand conditions.
Contingency pricing

(in effect a promise to pay the grower

what the buyer can afford)

could also benefit lOFs.

could implement contingency pricing,

lOFs

but contingency pricing

will likely work more smoothly in a member-owned marketing
cooperative.

Since producers own the cooperative

corporation and thus have access to its financial records,
and since producer-owners can control management through the
board of directors,

producers are "less likely to believe

that the cooperative is using contingency contracting to act
opportunistically"

(Staatz,

1987).
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4.

The Externality Principle
The externality principle states that a firm is

motivated to integrate vertically when those in adjacent
marketing stages impose negative externalities on the firm
(Williamson,

1981).

If growers were having difficulty

obtaining a needed input of a certain quality,
a further incentive to integrate vertically.

they may have
In general,

the strategic motivation for adopting vertical integration
will derive from the grower's desire to assure the quality
of subsequent stages.
Kirkman's

(1975)

description of Sunkist's^ strategy

provides an excellent example of the externality principle.
During the early 1900s California citrus growers noticed
that poor handling of their product through the distribution
system was reducing demand for their fruit in eastern
markets.

Recognizing the need for quality control,

and

understanding that it is often easier to control product
quality within a firm than across market boundaries,

these

growers integrated vertically in order to gain tighter
control over the distribution network

(also Mueller et al.,

1987) .
A primary reason for farm managers to adopt the
collective organization strategy is to create greater
competition for lOFs.

If successful in increasing

^ The original name of the cooperative effort was the
California Fruit Growers' Exchange.
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competition,

the cooperative will generate "public good"

benefits for all farmers in the area.

By contrast,

"no

independent lOF has an incentive to generate such positive
externalities

(although the logic of the competitive market

often forces such behavior)"

5.

(Staatz,

1987).

The Hierarchial Decomposition Principle
Williamson

(1981)

describes the hierarchical

decomposition principle as follows:
Internal organization should be designed in such a
way as to effect quasi-independence between the
parts, the high frequency dynamics (operating
activities) and low frequency dynamics (strategic
planning) should be clearly distinguished, and
incentives should be aligned within and between
components so as to promote both local and global
effectiveness (p. 1550).
Decomposing the firm's activities into relatively
independent functions frees top management from being
overwhelmed with tactical,

operational details.

Farm-level

managerial decision-making is especially time and site
specific.

For example, the more intensive livestock

production activities need to be tightly controlled.
likely that a farm manager would integrate forward,
or collectively forming a cooperative,
marketing,

It is
joining

in order to separate

buying and other longer-term strategic decisions

from daily operations.
At the same time it is equally unlikely that an lOF
would integrate backward into farming; this move would
require allowing more autonomy to farm managers than most
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lOFs are prepared to delegate.

"The more decentralized

nature of cooperatives make them a more efficient means of
carrying out... integration [of production-level and
i

strategic marketing decisions]

Harrigan

(1984,

1985,

than an lOF

(Staatz,

1987).

1986), perhaps more than anyone

else in strategic management, has developed the concept of
vertical integration as a competitive strategy.

One of her

major contributions is to recognize the dynamic of vertical
integration strategies relative to the changing competitive
conditions. While Harrigan does not explicitly consider
collective vertical integration,

and she does not give

attention to the unique problems of stalemate, her
implications for managers

(Harrigan,

1986)

hold as well for

farm managers.
Vertical integration "should be adjusted to changing
conditions"

(Harrigan,

1986). One advantage of cooperative

vertical integration strategy is that an individual firms
can dissolve their relationship with the cooperative more
easily than they could divest assets associated with
internal vertical integration.
possible with the CWB.)

(This exit would not be

But the stalemate condition that the

strategy is designed to lessen is not likely to change as
quickly as in industries operating in the other BCG
quadrants.
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Along these lines

it would appear that collectively

integrated corporations

"should scan outsiders frequently to

assess whether some activities could be done by others more
cheaply than in-house"
cooperatives

(Harrigan,

1986).

is to improve farmers'

The purpose of

welfare,

importantly by maintaining market share.

most

But if using an

outsider would reduce costs and not reduce market share,

it

may be advisable to use the outsider.
"Vertical
strategy"

integration is not a costless competitive

(Harrigan,

1986).

For example,

there will be

extra costs associated with strategic control.

These costs

must not exceed the benefits of the increased competitive
advantages associated with vertical

integration

(Harrigan,

1986).

D.

Vertical

Collective Strategy

integration as discussed in the previous

section is viewed as an alternative to open market failures,
as a firm's

internalization of the open market functions to

gain greater efficiency.

This study is concerned with the

small firm strategy of collective vertical

integration to

gain market power not otherwise available.

It is vertical

integration of a collection of organizations as opposed to
vertical

integration within one organization.
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Astley

(1984)

argues that collective strategies,

viable means of competing more effectively,

as

have been

ignored by strategic management because the prevailing
competitive strategy paradigm has focused on single
organizations
strategies),

(i.e.,

with business

(SBU)

or corporate

rather than on populations of organizations

(which would lead to industrial or collective strategies).

1.

The Concept of the "Collective Strategy"
The particular domain of strategic management is the

management of the organization-environment relation.

It is

generally assumed that to some degree this relationship can
in fact be managed.

Throughout our previous discussions of

industry structure,

environmental hostility and vertical

integration,

there has been implicit acceptance of one of

the basic notions of strategic management,

that the

environment is largely exogenous and to varying degrees the
individual
choice"

firm adapts its organization through "strategic

(Child,

1972).

basic assumption,

Ecological models challenge this

envisioning the environment as the

dominating determinant of organizational activity,

severely

limiting and in some cases eliminating the possibility of
"strategic choice"
Astley

(1984)

(Astley and Fombrun,

1983).

argues that traditionally strategic

management paradigm has characterized the management of
environment-organization relations as having:
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(a)

a pioneering ethos

adventurers,

(i.e.,

firms are solitary

circumventing threats and exploiting

opportunities in a faceless environment);
(b)

an egocentric orientation

behalf,
(c)

(i.e.,

"act[ing]

pursuing localized interests);

a battlefield analogy

(i.e.,

on their own

and

interorganizational

relationships are seen as ultimately competitive and
antagonistic,"

e.g..

Porter's

[1980]

devising of a

competitive strategy for bettering rivals.)
Astley further elaborates by isolating the critical
variable in organization-environment relations,

implied by

each of these characteristics:
(a)

the pioneering ethos implies constraint.

i.e.,

organization is constrained by a set of exogenous,

the
"and

rather intractable contingencies;"
(b)

the egocentric orientation implies autonomous choice;

(c)

the battlefield implies competition.
Astley

(1984)

contends that what has been missing in

strategic management paradigm is collaboration,
action,

or "joint

by organizations on matters of strategic

importance."

Collaboration results in "collective

strategies," which he defines as "joint formulations of
policy and implementation of action by the members of
interorganizational collectives"
Fombrun

(1983)

(p.

527).

define "collective strategy"

Astley and
as

"the joint

mobilization of resources and formulation of action within

63
collectives of organizations”

(p.

578).

Astley

(1984)

concludes by claiming that the first three characteristics
of traditional strategic management must be de-emphasized
somewhat in order that the discipline may come to recognize
and appreciate "the institutionalization of these collective
allegiances,

for they play an increasingly important role in

today's corporate society"
Astley and Fombrun
collective actions.
of bioecology,

(p.

(1983)

533).
develop a useful framework of

This 2x2 matrix is based on the field

the study of ways in which organisms

to their environments.

"adapt"

Organisms adapt either individually

(i.e.,

with somatic or genetic adaption)

or communally

(i.e.,

with communal or symbiotic adaption).

Without

digressing to a further elaboration of the schemata,

it is

important for the present understanding of agricultural
cooperatives to focus on one of the four classifications of
collectives:

agglomerate collectives (i.e., communal

adaptation).
An agglomerate collective consists of organizations
from the same species that have "dependence on common
[limited supply of]

resources,

but that do not directly

associate in order to cohere their respective actions."
Agglomerate collectives approximate:
...the conditions necessary for the economist's
model of pure competition to apply. They
[agglomerate collectives] are found in
environments in which resources are widely
dispersed and in which consequently, many small
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organizations are able to compete and survive
581) .

(p.

Information is the primary resource that flows through this
network.

Competition depends on the wide dissemination of

information;

"information impactedness"

of competitive markets

(Williamson,

leads to the failure

1975).

Population ecologists are most interested in
agglomerate collectives.

Populations are defined as

of homogeneous elements,"

each of which is very small and

"equally vulnerable to the environment,
economic forces,

"a set

particularly

and thus share a common fate."

Strategic

action by any individual member organization would appear to
play an insignificant role.

Astley and Fombrun

(1983)

would

point out to the population ecologists that while the •
importance of

individual strategic action may be diminished,

strategic action at a collective level is significant.
Organizations can be proactive in agglomerate collectives.
Astley and Fombrun rightly cite the U.S.

farming sector as a

case in point:
Through collective action, groups of competing
farmers have long succeeded in restricting
competition by lobbying for favorable government
regulation (p. 582)
Surprisingly,

■

these authors fail to mention a much more

important example of collective action:

agricultural

marketing cooperatives.
Observing that there are a large number of
organizations in agglomerate collectives,

they go on to
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imply the need for strategic control:

"a centralized

coordination and control mechanism is needed to monitor the
execution of the collective strategy.”
agreements are unworkable,
formalized structures.
example,

Noting that informal

they point out the need for more

They cite illegal cartels as an

and once again surprisingly fail to mention either

agricultural marketing cooperatives or national marketing
boards,

both of which are legal and far more important North

American examples of a collective strategy.

2.

Cooperative Strategy
From the producer's viewpoint strategic control is much

more important than Astley implies,

and it receives a

separate discusion in the next section.

However,

before

moving on to strategic control of collective strategies, we
need to review the scant but significant strategic
management literature of cooperative strategies.
(1988)
(1983),

acknowledges Astley

(1984)

Nielsen

and Astley and Fombrun

but takes a slightly different tack insofar as he

attempts to articulate the specific strategies that
collectives of organizations can adopt.
Nielsen's

(1988)

taxonomy of cooperative strategies

identifies four strategies: pool,

exchange,

de-escalate,

and
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contingency.

As he points out contingency is relevant to

agricultural policy,
Nielsen's

(1988)

but I will focus here on pooling^.

approach is to show how each of the four

generic cooperative strategies works in a negative-sum
game/declining market,
game/growing market,

zero-sum game,

a positive-sum

and in the situation where one wishes

to change a game/market to a positive-sum/growth market. An
example of the first situation is two school districts with
declining populations, pooling their resources to provide
essentially the same level of services.

An example of the

next situation is life insurance companies pooling data
rather than maintaining their own private data banks. An
example of a cooperative strategy for the third situation is
Intelsat,

an international cooperative effort that

recognizes the efficiency of pooling the resources of many
member countries to build,

launch,

and manage satellites

cooperatively rather than each country having its own
system.
Ocean Spray agricultural marketing cooperative is
Nielsen's example for that situation in which one wishes to
"de-mature" an industry.

Through "pooling," the cooperative

has grown from sales of less than $1 million in 1930 to over
$542 million in 1985.

Nielsen has chosen a good example.

^
The pooling strategy was discussed in detail in the
previous chapter.
The grain industry was described and
specific reference was made to the degree to which pooling
is used or not used in the U.S. and Canada.
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but unfortunately his description of the pooling process is
confused.

He states a number of times that the growers

"pooled their resources;" in fact, what they pool is their
crop.

They produce their crops individually,

market them cooperatively,

but they

and they carry out market

development cooperatively.

3.

Collective Vertical Integration as a Cooperative
Strategy
The focus of this study is the ability of collective

vertical integration to transform the strategic position of
relatively small,
commodity market.

individual producers vis a vis the whole
For the largest firms,

not all of the

vertical integration need be achieved through collective
action.

For the largest firms,

some functions

(e.g.,

the

storage and long haul transportation of their product)
be internalized directly,

i.e.,

on an individual firm basis

with capital and direction from within the firm.
the smaller firms,

can

But for

collective vertical integration will
g

often be a more cost effective strategy.

The net effect

relative to surviving in a hostile environment, will likely
be the same.

The local has inevitably been weakened by losing the
business of the largest farms who have chosen to bypass the
local, but the "free rider" attitude of some member-owners
has been at least as damaging. As one U.S. cooperative
manager related, "The price of loyalty to the cooperative is
about two cents a bushel."
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Vertical integration reduces stalemate,

but it also

mitigates some of the impact of environmental hostility.
For example.

Covin and Sievin's research would suggest that

the increased hierarchy of the vertically integrated
organization better enabled member-owners to deal with the
rapid,

profound structural changes which occurred in the

especially hostile environment of the past 15-18 years.

The

effective structure of the producer-member firm is
comparable to the organic structure described by Covin and
Slevin

(1989)

and others.

By contrast,

the mechanistic

structure of the individual producer may perform adequately
I

in a more benign environment.
Strategic posture is the other "significant independent
predictor of firm performance"

(Covin and Slevin,

1989).

Vertical integration transforms the strategic posture of
member firms from a more "conservative" into a more
"entrepreneurial" orientation.

The vertically integrated

structure better enables member-firms to compete more
aggressively.

Cooperatives increase competition by giving

members increased bargaining power.

Member-firms working

collectively can take more pro-active political and economic
roles in the market,
taker.

rather than simply reacting as a price-

Working collectively member firms will often be

better able to implement innovative marketing practices.
Covin and Slevin

(1989)

include as a fundamental

characteristic of more entrepreneurial firms,

a greater

inclination to take business-related risks.

One of the

primary reasons for forming a cooperative is to reduce
business risk by gaining greater market power.
many sources for this market power:
price information,
opportunities,

There are

increased access to

greater ability to detect marketing

increased bargaining power,

to utilize contingency pricing

and the ability

("pooling”).

Reducing risk is different from risk-avoidance,
strategic posture of the conservative firm.

the

The

entrepreneurial firm is not risk-seeking; however,

it is

prepared to operate in an environment which includes
substantial risks.

Rather than avoid risk situations,

entrepreneurial firms are organized to accommodate or to
internalize risk and to be relatively comfortable with it.
Firms better able to deal with risk will perform better in
hostile environments than firms which are not able to
accommodate risk.

Since benign environments by definition

offer greater stability,

the risk-avoidance strategic

posture would not hinder performance in these less hostile
environments.

Galbraith
sector"

(1967)

divides the economy into a "planning

(large firms with market power,

their environment)

and a "market sector"

able to control
(smaller firms

operating as price-takers in a competitive market).

The

goal of the members of agricultural cooperatives can be
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restated in Galbraith's terms:

to gain enough market power,

through collective vertical integration of the individual,
smaller firms,

to move from merely surviving in the market

sector to competing effectively with lOFs in the planning
sector.
Producers have demonstrated that they can increase
their market power through the cooperative strategy of
collective vertical integration.

Several studies have shown

that cooperatives increase the degree of competition that
might otherwise exist in the highly concentrated industries
of commodity marketing and food processing
McWilliams,

1977; Torgerson,

1977).

(Marion,

1978;

In spite of the fact

that lOFs continue to process and market the majority of
food and commodities in the U.S.,
expressed by legislators,

concern is periodically

private competitors,

and others,

that cooperatives have been too successful in gaining market
power

(Campbell & Garland,

1979).

One implication is that

government policy may have been too supportive of
cooperative marketing corporations and should now be
modified.
It may be appropriate here,

somewhat as an aside,

to

ask whether or not there is any evidence that cooperatives
have grown too powerful?

Growth is of course a major goal

of both cooperative and regular corporations,

although the

strategies for growth of the two types of firms differ
(Chen,

1984).

Agricultural cooperatives have continued to
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grow in recent years but not to the extent that is sometimes
publicized

(McWilliams,

1977).

Several studies have shown

that lOF food and commodity processing and marketing firms
continue to gain market power relative to cooperatives,

and

that concentration in these industries continues to increase
(Rodgers & Marion,

1990).

Collective vertical integration clearly offers some
strategic advantages for small firms,

but it also introduces

separation of ownership from management.
smaller firm,

Whereas in the

ownership and management may be so close that

they are embodied in the same person,

in the cooperative the

member-owner is distinct from the cooperative's professional
management.

Governance and strategic control become serious

issues whenever ownership and management become separate
(Berle & Means,

1932).

Issues of management-ownership

issues are usually discussed in the context of lOFs,

but the

problem is at least as great for small organizations that
collectively integrate.

Indeed,

"the governance and control

features of a cooperative are the most important elements
that distinguish the cooperative from other forms of
business"

).

20

(Agricultural Cooperative Service

[ACS],

1987, p.
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E.

1.

Strategic Control

The "Strategic Control” Concept
"Strategic control" is that process whereby ownership

(the principal)

assures itself that management

(the agent)

is performing in accordance with the organization's
strategic goals,

and whereby top management in turn is able

to monitor and to enforce or encourage lower levels of
management to work toward implementing strategic plans.
The strategic control mechanism is analogous to a
cybernetic system.

The principal,

e.g.,

ownership,

selects

or devises one or more gauges by which the agent's
performance is to be measured and then proceeds to monitor
the agent activity,

using the feedback to adjust activity,

performance measures or strategic goals.

Corporate measures

are very often financial, making it convenient to include
performance monitoring as a component of the overall
management information system (MIS).

Advantages of ease are

often overshadowed by the disadvantages of measuring
strategic long-term planning with short-range accounting
measures and by the restriction of intuitive evaluations.
Paradoxically, while strategic control systems are
advocated in theory

(see for example,

for the reasons listed below,

Lorange et al.,

1986)

in practice few companies

"identify formal and explicit strategic control measures and
build them into their control systems"

(Goold and Quinn,
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1990).

Three major reasons for establishing a control

system in a large organization are:
1.

to coordinate the efforts of all those who work

within it
2.

(Barnard,

1938);

to align the individual manager's aspirations with

corporate goals,

especially as regards the potential

divergence between ownership and management
Means,

1932; Eisenhardt,

(Berle and

1989; Jensen and Heckling,

1974); and
3.

to identify deviations from agreed upon objectives
■

and signal the need for top management intervention.
Since this study is treating the strategic role of
cooperative corporations from the perspective of the farm
manager

(i.e.,

ownership),

the focus of attention here will

be on the second reason.

2.

The Theory of the Firm and Property Rights
The neoclassical economic theory of the firm is a good

place to start,

but as many have observed,

it does not take

us very far in the effort to understand how a firm is
organized and how it grows and functions
Penrose,

1959; Schumpeter,

1942).

(Best,

1990;

The neoclassical economic

firm is conceptualized as a single owner/manager-operator
technical entity.
management,

At this point in its evolution ownership,

and the entrepreneurial force which initially

brought together and organized the productive resources,

are
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all embodied in one person.

9

Henderson and Quandt

(1971)

succinctly define the neoclassical economic firm as follows:
A firm is a technical unit in which commodities
are produced.
Its entrepreneur (owner and
manager) decides how much of and how one or more
commodities will be produced, and he gains the
profit or bears the loss which results from his
decision.
An entrepreneur transforms the inputs
into outputs, subject to the technical rules
specified by his production function.
The
difference between his revenue from the sale of
outputs and the cost of his inputs is his profit,
if positive, or loss, if negative.
The
entrepreneur's production function gives
mathematical expression to the relationship
between the quantities on inputs he employs and
the quantities of outputs he produces.
(52)

What is offered here is a black box, which could be labeled
"entrepreneurs production function," and an arrow in
(labeled "quantities of inputs")
("quantities of outputs.")
and strategic studies,

and an arrow out

Unfortunately for organizational

this is as far as mainstream

microeconomic theory takes us.

From this point forth,

conventional microeconomics uses this theory of the firm
simply to develop a theory of prices.
this root,
(1990)

Schumpeter

(1942),

Penrose

Branching off from
(1959),

and Best

represent a tradition much more fruitful for

understanding strategy behavior.
But implicit in the above quotation is the social
institution of property rights,

and it will be useful to

^
In reality, this assumption does not hold for most
firms, but it is fairly realistic assumption for most of the
firms (farms) that we have been using as our starting point
in this study.
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articulate its key assumptions.
above quotation,
neoclassical
(Condon,

The implication in the

is that the resources available to the

firm are "pure private property resources"

1987).

The entrepreneur holds rights to these

privately held resources,
will be combined,
of the profit,

determines how these resources

carries all of the risk and receives all

and may transfer these rights to anyone,

without restriction.
Many smaller firms are organized in this manner,
as a proprietorship;

i.e.,

but for the most part business

organization is far more complex.

However,

"all types of

organizations may be differentiated on the basis of how
risks are allocated among their constituents"
Hoskisson,

1990,

p.75).

There are three general ways of

organizing a business entity:
partnership,

(Baysinger and

and corporation.

sole proprietorship,
A simple but effective means

of distinguishing them initially is to consider how they are
viewed for tax purposes.

The sole proprietor is personally

responsible for the consequences of the business activity
and this
business.

individual

is taxed on the net income from the

A partnership allows a number of

individuals to

come together for the purposes of operating a business.
Depending upon whether or not an individual
(i.e.,

risk-bearing)

is a general

partner or a limited partner,

will or will not be held personally responsible.
partnership itself is not taxed directly;

he or she
The

rather the gains
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or losses are passed through to the individuals and taxed
there according to the role of the constituent.
A corporation's earnings,
directly,

on the other hand,

are taxed

almost as if the corporation were a person.

Similarly it is the corporation which for the most part is
held liable.

Individuals who hold equity shares

corporation bear some risk of

in the

losing their investment.

they are not personally liable,

Since

as they would be if they

were a general partner in a partnership,
limited to their actual investment.

their loss is

However,

it is this

equity position which entitles them to a share of the
organization's earnings.
corporate taxes paid,

They will also,

in addition to the

pay personal taxes on their income

derived from their business activity in the corporation.
Management,

however,

is paid a salary and is not necessarily

entitled to the residual cash flows.
There are two sub-categories of corporations:
Subchapter S corporations and Subchapter T corporations
(agricultural cooperatives).

S corporations were designed

to accommodate the needs of very small corporations
than 35 shareholders).
the advantages of

This corporate form offers many of

incorporation

well as advantages of

(no more

(e.g.,

limited liability)

individual taxation

taxation of the business income).

(i.e.,

as

no double

T corporations were

defined after the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act
to accommodate the way agricultural cooperatives were

(1922)
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legally entitled to operate.
are investor-owned firms
(cooperatives)

Whereas C and S corporations

(lOFs),

T corporations

are member-owned firms.

Therefore,

the

cooperative corporation can avoid being taxed directly
because the member-owners will pay the tax on their
individual earnings from the corporate activities.
The element which distinguishes each of these forms was
implied by considering each as treated for income tax
purposes.

The differentiating principle for each type of

economic organization is the underlying nature of the
property rights that describe ownership of the resources and
control of the resources employed by the organizations
(Condon,

3.

1987) .

Agency Theory
It is more useful to think of an economic organization

not as a technical entity
of the firm)

(neoclassical microeconomic theory

but rather as an established set of legal

relationships between all the agents who have dealings with
the firm

(Fama,

Fama and Jensen,

1980; Jensen and Heckling,
1983a,

1983b).

1979a,

1979b;

An economic organization is

thus the sum of the property rights of those who contribute
resources and who purchase the firm's goods or services;
is the
...nexus of contracts, written and unwritten,
among owners of factors of production and
customers.
These contracts or internal "rules of
the game" specify the rights of each agent in the

it
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organization, performance criteria on which agents
are evaluated and the payoff functions they face.
(Jensen and Heckling, 1979b, p. 170)
The primary property rights are the residual claims and the
allocation of the decision process among agents
Jensen,

1983a).

cash inflow:
taxes)
flow,

(Fama and

There are two kinds of claims to the firm's

fixed claims

and residual claims

(e.g., wages,
(i.e.,

debt service,

and

the right to the net cash

the amount left after all fixed claims are satisfied).
The residual claimants bear the risk

1983b).

(Fama and Jensen,

There are three characteristics of residual claims

which are important to strategic control:
1.

Ownership:

Residual claims are owned; and if there

is any restriction on this ownership,
role is tied to some other agent

then the risk-bearing

(e.g.,

as in a

partnership.)
2. Alienability:

Residual claims may be transferred,

and alienability is the degree of ease that one has in
transferring

(e.g.,

selling)

them.

A completely alienable

claim made be sold without restriction
is traded on a stock exchange.)

(e.g.,

a share that

Some claims can only be

transferred to other members of the organization
in most cooperatives)

(e.g.,

as

and some may not be transferred at

all.
3.

Ownership horizon: Residual claims have a time

component,

and the length of this time period is the

ownership horizon.

If it is unrestricted it is good for the
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life of the organization.

However,

claims may be valid only

for the time a person is an employee of the organization.
There are two aspects to the decision process:
1.

decision control

(i.e.,

decision to be implemented,
reward decision managers),
2.

decision management

the rights to choose the

to measure performance,

and to

and
(i.e.,

to implement approved decisions)

the right to initiate and

(Fama and Jensen,

1983a).

The nature of the business relationships of the various
participants is of primary importance.

We have been viewing

this relationship as a set of explicit and implicit
contracts,

and therefore agency theory contributes to our

understanding.

Eisenhardt

(1989)

argues that one should

"incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many
problems having a cooperative structure."
Agency theory clarifies the relationship between
ownership and management by emphasizing the social
institution of property rights.

Agency theory argues that

this separation between ownership and management is
economically efficient,
conflicts of interest
Indeed,

in spite of its potential for

(Baysinger and Hoskisson,

1990).

the development of the modern corporation has been

facilitated by the shift of residual risk from managers to
shareholders

(Fama and Jensen,

1983a).

The primary advantage of this separation is that it
allocates residual risks to parties who are able to bear it
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at the least cost.

Those who can diversify

(i.e.,

shareholders who can hold a diversified portfolio)

can

reduce risk; managers cannot diversify their employment.
Cooperative corporations are fundamentally different in this
respect because the members are the holders of equity
capital.

However,

they cannot readily sell their shares and

cannot diversify their risk.

4.

The Board's Governance and Strategic Role
Boards of directors provide a governance safeguard for

members'

equity and managerial employment contracts

(Baysinger and Hoskisson,

1990).

of directors will affect control,
strategy
Biggs

(Biggs,

(1978)

Composition of the board
operations and perhaps

1978; Baysinger and Hoskisson,

1990).

suggests that how directors perceive their jobs

may well determine the fate of a cooperative.

The

separation of owners from professional managers is a serious
corporate governance issue

(Berle & Means,

1932).

One's

perception of the issue will in part be determined by one's
theory of the firm.
Professional management in both corporate forms is
protected from risk,

and individual owners may eliminate

their risk by either selling their stock,
cooperatives,

or in the case of

by discontinuing their membership.

But the

interests of investor-owners or member-owners as a group
must be protected by governance mechanisms,

such as a board
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of directors.
specialize

As firms increase in size and move to further

(to benefit from economies of scale),

owners need

protection from the potential problem arising from the
separation of residual rights
decision rights.

(i.e.,

risk-bearing)

and

These potential problems derive from the

fact that those who make decisions are not necessarily the
residual claimants and will therefore not bear the
consequences of their decisions.
The governance issue is critical in all corporations,
but it is pivotal to our discussion because it is the basis
for the main differences between cooperative corporations
and regular corporations
Vitaliano,

(ACS,

1987; Condon,

1983; Vitaliano et al.,

1983).

1987; Condon &

However,

the role

of elected directors of cooperative enterprise "remains an
ignored issue in cooperative theory"

(Condon,

1987,

p.

22).

This fundamental difference between the two organizational
forms has been alluded to;

it resides in the fact that in an

lOF,

the rights to ownership and

unlike a cooperative,

control are traded on the stock market.
can be considered a perfect market,

If the stock market

then stock prices will

perfectly reflect the quality of management decisions
(Jensen and Meckling,
contrast,

1979b; Fama and Jensen,

1983a).

By

the cooperative ownership and control rights are

for the most part not transferable,

and there is

consequently no market for these claims and no objective
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market assessment generated about the performance of the
cooperative corporation's management.
Condon hypothesizes that this "loss of an important
control mechanism," leads to the requirement that directors
be member-patrons
...to replace the control mechanism on management
that is lost due to the effect of the property
right that prevents useful information about
management performance from being generated, (pp.
25-26)
The idea is that member-directors'

direct,

personal interest

in the firm's well-being will prevent them from condoning
managerial behavior which does not serve the interests of
the membership.
There are two issues here:
directors are "inside" directors

(a)

all cooperative

(as opposed to the lOF

situation with a more balanced board),

and

(b)

there are no

generally accepted measures of cooperative performance.

I

will briefly review the work being done on the latter
aspect,

and conclude this chapter with some comments on the

implications for board composition.
a.

Cooperative Performance:

"Measurement of cooperative

performance is extremely complex, yet very important for
farmers,
makers,

cooperative managers and directors, public policy
and the general public"

(ACS,

1987).

In its

simplest terms an organization's performance is how well it
attains its explicit,

strategic goals.

Cooperative

performance should be measured by the economic survival and
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well-being of its members

(Torgerson,

1977).

The objective

of cooperatives is "to improve the economic position of
farmers;” therefore,
bottom line,

the focus should be the "farmer's

as individuals and as a class"

Unfortunately,

(ACS,

1987).

"bottom line" includes a range of benefits:

increased price for output,
quality of inputs,

reduced cost or increased,

access to necessary services,

competition for agribusiness,

increased

and political influence in the

formation of agricultural policy.

"Direct and singular

measurement of cooperative performance with respect to their
objectives is impossible"

(ACS,

1987,

p.

45).

Therefore,

performance measurement must be by proxy.
An lOF's performance is usually measured in terms of
stock price,

return on owners'

investment and growth.

have the advantage of being readily available,

These

and they may

be useful for a partial assessment of cooperative
performance

(ACS,

1987).

VanSickle and Ladd

(1983)

have

developed a model which incorporates the unique
characteristics of cooperatives.

They claim it is more

appropriate than models used to study traditional,
cooperative firms.
maximizes total,
Boynton,

They offer a performance measure which

after-tax profits of members.

& Schrader

non-

(1982)

Lang,

Babb,

take a different approach to the

problem and are able to identify 58 "performance
dimensions," based on perceptions of relative performance by
cooperatives and proprietary firms.
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In the long-run performance will be affected by the
strategic behavior of the cooperative.

Staatz

(1984)

identifies three classes of participants in producer
cooperatives:

farmer-members,

professional management.

board members,

and

He then develops a theoretical

analysis of how benefits are distributed to these three
classes and of how that distribution affects cooperative
behavior.
From the farmer-member's perspective,
study,

the focus of this

the measure of performance must to some degree be
I

whether or not the cooperative provides the desired services
at a fair,

competitive price.

short-term price

(i.e.,

or long-term return?

However,

are we measuring

a price in any specific crop year)

A major conclusion of this study will

be that price is not a sufficient measure of adequate
performance.

Others have recognized that we need to go

beyond price considerations.

"In many respects,

the long¬

term market share is the manifestation of all facets of
cooperative performance combined"

(ACS,

1987,

p.

46).

But

we need to go even beyond this improved definition of
performance.

The findings of this study suggest that a

comparably important component of performance is the
reduction of stress in a hostile environment.
b.

Board Composition:

One's position on the

appropriate ratio of insider to outsider directors depends
largely on which way one believes the power flows.

Some
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theorists argue that the board's "legal authority to hire,
fire,

and compensate top management" enables it to govern

effectively

(Williamson,

1985).

Others

(including

Galbraith,

1967)

feel that power moves in the opposite

direction,

i.e.,

"astute or opportunist CEOs influence the

inclinations of the board"

(Baysinger and Hoskisson,

1990).

This latter contingent would prefer to have all of the
directors

(or at least a significant majority)

independent outsiders
example,

(Eisenberg,

1976).

after criticism of this type,

be

Recently,

for

the New York Stock

Exchange implemented the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)

proposal that it have only outside directors on its

audit committee

(Baysinger and Hoskisson,

1990).

"The board of directors should be regarded primarily as
t

a governance structure safeguard between the firm and owners
of equity capital..."

(Williamson,

1985).

The question then

would seem to be, will insiders or outsiders better protect
the owners interests? lOF owners are "outsiders," and it
would appear that they would be important that they have the
dominant role.

However,

given the unique relationship of

owner-members to the cooperative, member-owners are referred
to as insiders,

and outsiders are non-members.

Cooperative

boards are in this sense are composed almost entirely of
insiders.
Williamson

(1985)

argues that the secondary purpose of
I

the directors is to protect the firm-management contractual
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agreements,
useful

and that the inside directors will be more

in this secondary role.

One reason they are better

qualified comes from the fact that top managers,
in more hostile environments,

attempt to implement strategy

in a complex of external and internal forces.
often "less

especially

Managers are

influencers of events... than controllers of

certain outcomes"

(Bourgeois,

1987).

Inside directors will

have more and better information with which to evaluate
manager performance,

and as a result,

inside members will

tend to rely more on subjective than on objective control
measures.
Changes
emphasis of

in board composition,
[types of]

control,

Baysinger and Hoskisson

in the

may have important strategic

implications for the corporation"
1990).

through changes

(Baysinger and Hoskisson,

(1990)

make an important

distinction between strategic and financial controls.

The

former are based on trying to evaluate the behavioral or
decision-making processes of management and the latter are
more oriented to financial outcomes of these decisions.
Strategic controls require much more information,
inside directors,
decision-making,

and

being to some degree involved in the
will have much greater access to relevant

subjective information.

Therefore,

the inside directors

will rely more on strategic controls and the outside
directors more on financial controls.
Hoskisson hypothesize that,

Baysinger and

ceteris paribus,

outside-
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dominated boards will reward management based on "objective"
financial criteria,

and inside-dominated boards will reward

management on the basis of open and subjective evaluations
of the decision-making process.

And as a follow-up,

they

hypothesize that to the extent that outsider-dominated
boards do emphasize financial as opposed to strategic
controls,

they will:

1.

emphasize short-run profits,

2.

avoid high risk-high return strategies,

3.

prefer diversification,

4.

de-emphasize research and development.

and

Given the somewhat different usage by cooperatives of
the

"insider"

and "outsider" terminology,

it is not entirely

clear what the implications of Baysinger and Hoskisson's
(1990)

findings are for cooperative corporate governance.

"Use of outside,

non-farmer directors on cooperative boards

has gained support"

(ACS,

1987) .

The argument for outsiders

is that they bring a broader perspective,

that is,

expertise

and experience from outside the realm of production
agriculture.

However,

it can also be argued that they

should not be allowed to vote because they are not members.
Baysinger and Hoskisson's
conclusions are

(a)

strategic controls,

(1990)

most important

the distinction between financial and
and

(b)

the effects of relying more

heavily on one than on the other.

It happened that lOF

outside directors felt more comfortable with financial
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controls and consequently tended to exhibit the above
characteristics.

listed

It would appear reasonable to assume that

cooperative directors who relied more on financial controls
would exhibit characteristics similar to those listed above.
However,

it might be that the polarity would not be

outsider-insider,

but rather,

equity financing,

along the line of years remaining as an

active cooperative member.

considering the system of
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CHAPTER III
A TYPOLOGY OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

We may now summarize some of the main points by
developing a typology of organizational possibilities.
framework will be particularly useful
articulating hypotheses.

The

in developing and

The institutions represented by

the typology reflect the structural and pricing options in
the marketing situation faced by rational
producers

in a stalemate industry.

individual

Underlying this typology

is the specific wheat marketing situation as envisioned from
the producer's point-of-view.

The typology is generic to

the extent that it is generally applicable to all
commodities.

While some producers may utilize more than

one organizational form,
to all U.S.

not all institutions are available

and Canadian growers.

Each producer faces a number of transaction options,
varying degrees market or hierarchical.
of

to

Within each degree

integration there will be varying levels of riskiness.

These transaction options can be illustrated in terms of a
3x3 matrix formed by a vertical axis representing degree of

As with any typology one hopes the benefits of the
inevitable process of reductive abstraction will outweigh
ignoring some specific exceptions.
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joint integration (and strategic control)

and a horizontal

axis representing increasing levels of risk control.

A. The Basic Model

The two axes, each with its high, medium, and low
ranges,

form nine cells.

Each cell would represent a

specific potential competitive strategy.

Not all cells will

represent realistic options for all commodities, nor will
U.S. and Canadian producers of the same commodity
necessarily have the same marketing options available.

It

is instructive to fill the cells with examples of marketing
strategies available to producers of specific commodities.
The wheat industry provides a variety of marketing options
which will serve to illustrate the usefulness of the
typology.
Figure 5:

A competitive strategy typology is depicted in
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DEGREE OF
COLLECTIVE
INTEGRATION

USDA:
CCC loans
(target price)
Canada: quotas

HIGH
MODEL 1
(Hierarchy )

u.s.

MEDIUM
MODEL 2
(In-betwe an)

NONE
MODEL 3
(Market)

grain
co-ops

lOFs
e.g.,
Cargill

From
Producer's
Point-of-view

E.g.,
Land O'Lakes
poultry
contracts

E.g. ,
Ocean Spray;
most veg.,
fruit, rice
co-ops; HSC.

Broker
(options or
futures for
hedging; Forward contracts)

NOT
LIKELY
(Opportunism
problem)

HIGH
NONE
MODERATE
Hedging
Pooling
Cash
Contracts
Contracts
Market
Contracts
degree of risk control->

CONTRACTS =>

Figure 5;

Canadian
Wheat
Board

A Typology of Economic Organizations: Competitive
Strategies for Small Firms in Stalemate
Industries and Hostile Environments.

B.

Governance Structure

The vertical axis represents three governance
structural options,

each with varying degrees of collective
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vertical and horizontal integration and strategic control.
In decreasing order of governance they are:
(1)

the government.

administered,

either mandated or directly

organization

(i.e.,

substantial joint vertical

and complete joint horizontal integration with significant
possible strategic control);
(2)

the member-owned cooperative

(i.e.,

substantial degrees

of joint vertical and limited horizontal integration with
significant possible governance); and
(3)

the lOF

(i.e.,

no degree of collective integration or

strategic control).
While there are numerous specific variations of
organizational design within each of the three structural
categories,
distinct,
form.

it is more useful to focus on the three

inherently different patterns of organizational

Also,

while particular producers may not in fact have

all three structural options available in their locale for
all of their crops,

these structural categories are at least

theoretical possibilities.
Another way to distinguish between these three types of
economic organization is to observe who exerts strategic
control,

that is,

stakeholders

to examine who are the primary

in each type of organization,

and then to

The term "stakeholders” is unfortunately often used
loosely (and ineffectively) to refer to anyone who is in any
way a participant in an organization, that is, customers,
owners, managers, workers, suppliers, neighbors, government,
competitors, etc. For the purposes of this typology, we are
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consider which of the multiple possible benefits these
stakeholders might hope to receive,

i.e., which outcomes

they would most prefer to see realized by their
organization.

As the producer faces the three types of

organizing options,

the outward structural differences will

be apparent; what may be less obvious is the underlying
strategic motivations of the stakeholders.

The best

strategic option for producers will usually be the one which
aligns their own primary strategic objective with that of
the marketing institution.
The most immediately obvious government "stakeholders"
are the policy-makers,

but more generally,

are those citizens they represent,

the stakeholders

i.e., the commonwealth.

The citizenry has a multitude of often conflicting goals,
but perhaps its minimum expectation from government policy
is political and economic stability.

The third set of

stakeholders consists of commodity producers.
Commodity groups have a significant impact on policy,
and their primary goal is survival.

In the world market,

which is critical to the survival of the wheat industries of
both the U.S.
market share.
se,

and Canada,

survival translates into world

Since the CWB is not a government agency per

but rather a government-mandated,

largely autonomous and

completely self-supporting institution, producers have a

concerned with the primary stakeholders.
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great deal more strategic control at this level than do
American producers.
The stakeholders in cooperatives are the member-owners,
and not unlike the stakeholders in the other categories,
they have a number of goals and related expectations.

As we

recall from the earlier discussion of cooperative
performance measures

(pp.

82-84 above),

these multiple goals

make it difficult to determine a single,

comprehensive

quantitative measure of organization performance.

Simple

profit-maximizing may not be the goal for cooperatives.
An important conclusion from the earlier review of the
literature was that,

"In many respects,

the long-term market

share is the manifestation of all facets of cooperative
performance combined"

(ACS,

1987, p.

46).

Neoclassical

economists prefer to think of producers as "profitmaximizers" because this assumption facilitates the
development of price theory and leads to determinant price
results.

In fact, when we observe the behavior of

agricultural producers, we notice that they usually operate
as marginal producers, more concerned with survival than
with profit; that is,

in the long-run they are more

concerned with retaining

(or gaining)

an adequate market

share.
Cooperatives in general have a range of goals,

but

since the dissertation is focusing on grain marketing
cooperatives, we will limit the discussion to this type of
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cooperative.

It is not at all clear that most grain

marketing cooperatives have market share as their primary
goal.

Most producers simply use these organizations to

reduce some transaction costs,

namely the costs associated

with the earlier stages of grain handling and storage.
American producers,

cooperatives are their preferred conduit

into the cash market;
cooperatives

(i.e.,

For

for Canadian producers,

provincial wheat pools)

the

are the

preferred conduit into the CWB.
The lOF situation is fairly straight forward:
equity owners are the stakeholders,
certain rate of return,
organizational forms,

i.e.,

the

and they expect a-

profit.

Of the three

this one could most easily be viewed

as "profit-maximizing."

It is a strictly market institution

with attendant potential for opportunism.

C.

Risk Control

The horizontal axis represents three types of
transactions,

each associated with decreasing levels of risk

and decreasing residual property rights to the product.
three pricing arrangements are:
(a)

to sell in the cash or spot market

(high risk,

associated with completely retained residual rights to
profit);

The
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(b)

to contract to deliver the product at a specific price

or at least a specific minimum price,
contracting,
purposes
(c)

e.g.,

forward

futures contracts or options for hedging

(moderate risk, medium residuals); and

to pool the product and receive final payment when the

pool has been depleted

(low risk,

reduced residuals.)

Growers who integrate collectively will be in a
position to implement cooperative strategies,
pooling.

Pooling arguably reduces risk,

such as

and it has been

implemented for virtually all wheat and barley growers in
Canada through the Canadian Wheat Board.^
growers

U.S.

grain

(except for an experimental group at HSC)

chosen not to pursue this cooperative strategy.
an lOF could implement a wheat pool,

have
Technically

but success would be

highly unlikely because of the inherent trust problem
(opportunism)

associated with private, pure market

institutions.
Again,

as with the three structural categories,

each of

the transaction arrangements includes numerous variations.
But the variations are variations on a basic theme,

and it

is this basic theme that we need to focus on in order to
appreciate the logic of joint integration.

All wheat which is produced in the prairie provinces
and which is destined for export or domestic human
consumption, must by law be marketed through the CWB. An
insignificant amount of wheat is grown outside of the
prairie provinces and very little wheat is utilized for
livestock feed, but these relatively minuscule amounts may
legally be marketed privately.
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D. A Comparative Model

A question that comes immediately to mind is,

"How does

this typology relate to the environmental hostility
literature in strategy?"

While one can recognize stalemate

industries and hostile environments,

there is relatively

little empirical research that helps to articulate the
relationship between organization structure and hostile
business environments

Hall

(1980)

(Covin and Slevin,

1989).

considered survival strategies of firms in

hostile environments and observed that "high performing
firms typically reacted to increased hostility by creating
internal administrative structures" which enabled them to
reposition effectively and efficiently.

Producers who pool

have effectively internalized the market functions; that is,
rather than selling individually in the market, members of a
pool leave the sell decision to specialists who have the
experience,

the information,

and the time to focus on

marketing,

and who as a result are better able "to

reposition

[more]

effectively and efficiently" than

individual producers without these resources.
Earlier,

Lawrence and Lorsch

(1967)

found that firms in

hostile environments placed more emphasis on control issues.
If we think of strategic control as related to vertical
integration,

or in the case of wheat producers,

joint
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vertical integration, we can see that integrated producers
as a group will have greater control of the market.
Mintzberg

(1979)

argues that hostile environments

demand structures which allow fast reactions.

While

individual producers who attend closely to market movements
and producers who have integrated in order to pool

(and have

consequently delegated responsibility to marketing
specialists),
reactions,

have the structural capacity for "fast

the "bounded rationality" trait prevents

individuals always moving as rapidly as an integrated group.
"Fast reactions" are facilitated by the fact that the pool
has a large known quantity of committed grain and has
specialists who are often able to anticipate market moves.
Joint integration is the structure that allows the pooling
strategy and which allows for "fast reactions."
Burns and Stalker

(1961)

and Lawrence and Lorsch

(1967)

provide evidence that suggests "organic" structures provide
firms with the ability to respond rapidly to "changing
external forces in unpredictable environments"
Slevin,

1989).

(Covin and

The terminology of "organic" versus

"mechanistic" raises a semantic problem.

Organic structures

are conceived as "shorter" structures endowed with quick,
easy lateral communication systems.

By contrast,

mechanistic organizations are "taller," more hierarchical
structures, which rely on established communications paths,
usually with directives emanating from the top and moving
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downwards.

Nothing could be more organic the a small firm

where all decision-makers are in constant communication with
each other.

On the other hand,

we have defined it,

is a large,

a cooperative,

at least as

somewhat unweldly,

collective vertical integration of many independent firms.
It would fall into the category of mechanical.
we have to recall Chandler's
follows strategy."

(1962)

I think here

dictum that "structure

The pooling strategy requires a

collective effort; a jointly vertically integrated structure
enables the individuals to pool.
Khandwalla

(1977)

found that large firms which adopted

organic structures in hostile environments achieved higher
levels of performance.

Since we are considering small firms

which collectively adopt hierarchical structures in hostile
environments,

Khandwalla's findings might not appear

relevant to this dissertation.

However,

(1989)

(1977)

firms.

generalized Khandwalla's

Covin and Slevin

results for small

They claim to have found that small firms in hostile

environments which adopted organic structures in combination
with "entrepreneurial"

(i.e.,

"risk-seeking")

strategies,

performed better than firms with mechanical

(i.e.,

hierarchical)

(i.e.,

avoiding")

structures and "conservative"

strategies.

these findings.
firms.

"risk¬

There are numerous problems with

First, we know nothing about the sample of

For example,

were these firms the sole survivors of

a larger population which adopted the organic/
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entrepreneurial approach.

Miller

(198?)

found the exact

opposite in his research of the same structure/strategy for
small firms in Canada.

Covin and Slevin do admit that their

findings are only weakly supported.

Covin and Slevin
(i.e.,

(1989)

found that strategic posture

"overall competitive orientation")

and firm structure

had an interactive effect on performance.

Miller

(1983)

defined strategic posture as a reflection of a firm's
"entrepreneurial-conservative" orientation.
"Entrepreneurial" management is characterized by an
inclination "to take business-related risks,
favor...innovation...,

to

and to compete aggressively."

orientation is analogous to that of Miles and Snow's
prospector firms and Mintzberg's
organizations.

By contrast,

(1973)

This
(1978)

entrepreneurial

Covin and Slevin's

"conservative"^ strategic style is most importantly riskaverse.
In terms of the typology of organizations,

the degree

of risk control reflects the main aspects of this strategic
postures dichotomy.

Degrees of the two main components of

the polar opposites,

extent of aggressiveness in the market

and attitude toward risk,

are captured along the typology's

^
There terminology is unfortunate because of the
political connotations of "conservative." I will use this
term to be consistent with their research, but it needs to
be emphasized that there are no intended political
implications.
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horizontal dimension.

Highly aggressive,

high risk

positions can be located in the cash contract market region;
as one moves to the right hand side,
of

the a strategic posture

less price aggressiveness and a lower tolerance for risk

emerges.
The cooperative literature views the essence of a
cooperative strategy to be pooling.
highly undifferentiated,

Firms which deal

in

homogenous products or services

will often reduce environmental hostility by the cooperative
strategy of pooling.

The many small firms which make up a

purely competitive industry can structure their
organizations in such a way as to be able to pool their
product.

While it is essential to be organized

cooperatively in order to pool,

it is important to remember

that firms can be organized as a cooperative and not
necessarily pool

(e.g..

Model 2).

For example,

utilize cooperative marketing facilities,
or transportation arrangements,

U.S.

growers

such as handling

but retain the right to

actually sell their product on the open market.
The pooling strategy represents a more

"conservative"

strategic posture than selling on the open market or
contract hedging,

because pooling,

reduces down-side risk
chance of
run,

like mutual funds,

(while of course usually reducing the

large up-side gains.)

On average,

in the long

one would expect firms which pool to perform better

than those which operate in the volatile,

relatively
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unpredictable spot market.
guarantees
harvest,

(and pays)

As noted earlier,

pooling

the producer firm a price per ton at

and subsequently adds to this amount depending upon

the final receipt for the crop at the end of the marketing
season

(i.e.,

about one year after harvest.)

The pool price

is usually better than that which an individual producer
could obtain because the pool price is negotiated by an
organization with market power and with a professional
marketing department with access to more information.
A more entrepreneurial, more individualistic stance
would accept the inherent price risk of the cash market for
the potential of substantially greater gain.

Models 2 and 3

represent a fairly wide range of aggressive,

individualistic

competitive strategic postures.
postures,

In terms of entrepreneurial

the scope of this study is limited to the

entrepreneurial stance represented in Model 2.

If we superimpose the terminology of the Covin and
Slevin

(1989)

typology

(see Figure 2, p.

model proposed in the previous section

49 above)

onto the

(see Figure 3,

above), we have the following relationships:

p.
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DEGREE OF
COLLECTIVE
INTEGRATION

Covin &
Slevin
Typology:
1
1
1
1

HIGH
MODEL 1
(Hierarchy )
MEDIUM

U.S.
grain
co-ops

MODEL 2
(In-betwee

USDA:
CCC loans
(target price)
Canada: quotas

1
j
1
1
1

E.g.,
Land O'Lakes
poultry
contracts

1

A

Canadian
Wheat
Board

1
1

1
1

"Me chanistic"
tructure

E.g.,
1
Ocean Spray;
1
most veg.,
1
fruit, rice
1
co-ops; HSC.
1
i1

lOFs
e.g.,
Cargill

NONE
MODEL 3
(Market)

Broker
(options or
futures for
hedging; forward contracts)

From
Producer's
Point~of~view

CONTRACTS =>

1
1
1

NOT
••Organic’’
LIKELY
Structure
(Opportunism
!
1
problem)
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1

HIGH
MODERATE
NONE
Pooling
Cash
Hedging
Contracts
Contracts
Market
Contracts
- DEGREE OF RISK CONTROL->
<-•‘Entrepreneurial"
Strategic postures

Figure 6;

!
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

•• Conservative ••->
Strategic postures

A Typology of Economic Organization: Competitive
Strategies for Small Firms in Stalemate
Industries and Hostile Environments, with
overlay of the Covin & Slevin (1989)
typology.

Covin and Slevin

(1989)

would theoretically predict

better performance from the strategic postures and
structures of the lower left area.

We need to include U.S.
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grain cooperatives

in this quadrant because they are

in

large part simply used by producers to reduce transaction
costs as they move into the cash market.

By contrast the

theoretical position taken in this dissertation would
predict better performance from those firms
right quadrant.

in the upper

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

A.

Research Question and Hypotheses

A fundamental tenet of the strategic management
paradigm is that a firm's organization structure,
to its business environment,

relative

affects firm performance.

An

important component of the overall business environment is
the structure of the industry in which the firm operates.
Industrial structures may be categorized according to the
opportunities within these industries for differentiating
one's product or for achieving competitive advantage

(i.e.,

lower cost production or greater market share from volume,
technical advantage,

etc.).

"Stalemate industries" have low

potentials for differentiation or volume strategies
1980;

Calori and Ardisson,

1988).

(Porter,

Stalemate closely

approximates the conditions of "pure competition" of
microeconomic theory.
As noted earlier,
and standardized.

stalemate products are well defined

Large,

important sectors of the economy

fall into the stalemate category; examples include cement,
steel,

basic chemicals,

commodities

lumber,

(e.g., wheat).

competitive industries

cardboard,

and agricultural

The many small firms in highly

(i.e.,

stalemate industries)

will

106
generally share the same production technology,
respect they will be structured
managed)

(i.e,,

organized and

similarly for production purposes.

experience is not an advantage

(i.e.,

not a serious barrier to entry.)

and in this

Cumulative

lack of experience is

The market is large enough

for many competitors with operations of optimal size
large enough to realize economies of scale),
competitors have reached this size.
producers will be relatively easy,

and most

Entry of other
at least from a

technological point of view (Harrigan,

1986).

Microeconomic

theory tells us that producers in stalemate will,
in the long run,

(i.e.,

especially

tend to be "price-takers," and their profit

margins will be extremely small.
The wheat industry is inherently a stalemate industry.
The producers in this industry illustrate all of the
characteristics of the "pure competition" firms of
microeconomic theory.

"Environmental hostility" is a strategy concept which
is closely related to the stalemate concept,

but which

offers a more encompassing description of the business
environment.

Covin and Slevin

environments,

as opposed to benign environments,

characterized by:
(a)

intense competition.

(1989)

consider hostile
to be
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(b)

harsh,

overwhelming

(i.e.,

dominating)

business

climates,
(c)

a relative lack of exploitable opportunities,

(d)

precarious,

unpredictable,

and

risky business settings.

By contrast,

benign environments have less intensive direct

competition,

and provide a safe setting for business

operations with many investment and marketing opportunities.
Benign environments can be controlled and manipulated as a
dominant firm would in an industry with little competition.
(Covin and Slevin,
Miller and Friesen,

1989; Hall,

1980; Khandwalla,

1977;

1983).

What does the hostile environment concept add to the
idea of stalemate?

The notion of environmental hostility

broadens the environmental setting to explicitly include
specific environmental conditions,

such as uncertainty and

the intensity of the adverse characteristics of the
industry.

Stalemate or "purely competitive" industries are

not necessarily highly uncertain or always intensely
competitive.

While wheat is a clear case example of a

stalemate industry,

its economic setting is also,

of most agricultural commodities,
highly unpredictable,
Covin and Slevin

now extremely precarious,

often volatile,

(1989)

like those

and highly risky.

also conclude that hostile

environments are particularly damaging to small firms due to
their limited resource bases.

Again,

the thousands of small

firms in the wheat industry eminently illustrate the
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problem.

The limited resource base,

in large part due to

the high requirements for borrowed capital and extremely
narrow profit margins,

directly contributes to the elevated

degree of uncertainty in the wheat industry.

In many ways this study is following the environmental
hostility research stream initiated by Khandwalla
strengthened by Mintzberg
Friesen

(1983),

(1979),

Hall

and Covin and Slevin

researchers categorize environments,
or benign,

(1977)

and

(1980), Miller and

(1988).

These

as being either hostile

by asking managers how they perceive their

environment.

We know without asking that the wheat industry

is hostile; this study deliberately examines an industry
which is a classic example of stalemate and which clearly
suffers from environmental hostility.

However,

it is

unclear to what degree U.S and Canadian producers will
perceive conditions of stalemate and environmental
hostility.
The purpose of the cooperative strategies that we have
been discussing in earlier chapters,

is to reduce the effect

of these adverse industry and business environmental
conditions.

Therefore, producers using different strategies

should perceive their environments differently according to
the success of the strategy adopted.

To the extent that the

cooperative strategies differ in the two countries,

one

might expect to find a significant inter-group difference

1
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between the perceptions of managers of U.S.
firms.

and Canadian

This logic suggests two hypotheses:

HI

Producers in the two countries will differ according to
their perception of the adverse effects of stalemate
industry.

H2

Producers in the two countries will differ according to
their perception of the level of business environmental
hostility.

A third hypothesis emerges directly from the discussion
in the previous chapter,

"A Typology of Economic
I

Organization.”

Covin and Slevin

(1989)

found that an

entrepreneurial strategic posture of small firms with an
organic structure

(Model 2)

in hostile environments.

experienced higher performance

Covin and Slevin

(1989)

further

concluded that small firms with a mechanistic structure and
exhibiting a "conservative” strategic stance

(i.e.. Model 1)

failed to perform as well in environmental hostility.

These

findings lead to the hypothesis:

H3

Small firms following the Model 2 cooperative strategy
will "perform” better than small firms following the
Model 1 cooperative strategy.

This hypothesis is important because the Covin and
Slevin

(1989)

finding is somewhat surprising and may depend

upon the industry.

It may be that in stalemate industries

their conclusion will not be easy to substantiate.
Considering a firm's extreme vulnerability in stalemate,

the
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Covin and Slevin
intuitive,

(1989)

that is,

conclusion appears somewhat counter¬

one might more easily expect to

encounter higher performance
to survivability)

(even if we limit "performance"

in those firms exhibiting a "conservative"

strategic posture with a more vertically integrated,
hierarchical

(i.e., mechanical)

structure in environmental

hostility.
Related to this contradictory expectation. Miller and
Friesen

(1984)

earlier found that the positive relationship

between entrepreneurial strategic posture in hostile
environments and firm performance,
not evident in Canada,

held in the U.S.

but was

This finding suggests that there may

also be important underlying cultural differences in the
U.S.

and Canada.

Their observations recommend the

hypothesis that:

H4

An entrepreneurial strategic posture (Model 2) will be
preferred by producers in the U.S. and a "conservative"
strategic posture (Model 1) will be preferred by
producers in Canada.

This hypothesis is important for two reasons.
it may reveal fundamental cultural differences.
may suggest that pooling,

Second,

it

even if demonstrably better in

Canada and theoretically better for U.S.
practice be appropriate,

First,

firms, would not in

given the apparent dominant

strategic orientation of U.S. producers.

Ill
B.

Research Design

There are two components to the research:
(a)

a survey of producers to determine their perception of

degree of stalemate and environmental hostility,

and their

perception of the benefits to themselves of a cooperative
structure and an "entrepreneurial" or "conservative"
strategic posture; and
(b)

an analysis of producer price data to attempt to

evaluate relative performance of two fundamentally different
structures and strategies.
The survey design follows the approach of Covin and
Slevin

(1989)

and Khandwalla

(1977).

The survey consists of

a series of 26 questions, most of which are answered yes/no
or using a five-point Likert scale to indicate the extent of
agreement with a statement regarding industry structure,
perceived risk,

and strategic control.

A copy of the entire

survey is included as Appendix C.
The method of inquiry is a telephone survey of
producers in the U.S.

and Canada.

All respondents were sent

a pre-survey letter explaining the purpose of the survey and
when they would be telephoned.
included as Appendices A and B.

Copies of the letters are
All of the hypotheses are

tested by interpreting subjective responses in the survey.
The exploratory nature of this study suggests that anecdotal
evidence will be important to the overall interpretation.
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In addition,

the third hypothesis may be partially

evaluated by analyzing objective financial data,

namely,

a

time series of average prices received by growers in the
U.S.

and Canada.

I will attempt to adjust these prices to

make them comparable.

C.

Data Collection

The sample for testing these hypotheses comes from a
random

selection of firms
2

growers )

(14 U.S.

and 16 Canadian wheat

which market cooperatively,

by government edict.

either by choice or

The wheat industry was selected for

three reasons:
1. VTheat is a classic case of a stalemate industry,
its overall environment is clearly hostile.

and

(While the

variables being measured are perceptions of stalemate and
environmental hostility,

our expectations as to producer

perceptions will be determined by the inherent nature of the
wheat industry.)

The samples were randomly selected by the
organization from the member population.
Intervals in each
population (i.e., membership list) were determined by
dividing the number of members by the number of potential
respondents needed.
^
Each grower was telephoned at least three times
before being eliminated from the survey.
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2.

The wheat industry spans the Canadian-U.S.

and is important to both economies;

border

it is therefore ideal

for a cross-cultural study.
3. Wheat is marketed cooperatively in both countries,
but it is pooled only in Canada.
The Canadian organization from which the Canadian
sample comes is the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
organization,

headquartered in Regina,

(SWP).

This

Saskatchewan,

operates hundreds of elevators throughout the province and
functions as a marketing cooperative.
as Cargill,

such

compete with it for grain handling business.

The SWP market share is about 60%.
CWB,

Private firms,

It is independent of the

but it functions as the intermediary organization

between the CWB and the farmer.

However,

it obviously works

very closely with the CWB as all Canadian wheat and barley
is ultimately marketed through the CWB.
The SWP's name does not reflect the fact that this
organization is basically an agricultural producer marketing
cooperative analogous to an American regional cooperative.
Members use the wheat pool as an assembler; that is,
provides the grower with the necessary elevator,
transportation services.

the SWP

storage and

All Canadian producers receive the

pool price less individual costs incurred to deliver the
grain from their particular farm to either Vancouver or
Thunder Bay.
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I

interviewed two people at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool

headquarters to learn more about the Canadian wheat
marketing system and to obtain a sample of Canadian growers
to survey.
Analyst,
Chairman.

I

interviewed Verna Mitura,

and Ernie Harach,

Senior Policy

Executive Assistant to the

This organization was selected to be surveyed for

three reasons;
(1)

it is the largest wheat pool in Canada;

(2)

it is a cooperative marketing organization of comparable

scale to the Harvest States Cooperative,
organization being surveyed;
(3)

the American'

and

Verna Mitura had surveyed the membership for other

purposes

in March 1990,

and she was prepared to cooperate in

the implementation of this survey.
The Harvest States Cooperative
Paul,

Minnesota,

(HSC),

based in St.

is a large interregional cooperative with

about 500 affiliated cooperatives throughout the upper
midwestern states.

HSC agreed to provide names of producers

who were cooperative members but who were not pooling.
is unique among American cooperatives because in 1990
developed an innovative wheat pooling program.
Mr.

Lanny Jass,

Director of Marketing Programs,

I

HSC
it

interviewed
to learn

more about HSC's program and to obtain the survey sample.
He was very interested in the research because now that HSC
has

implemented pooling on a limited,

experimental basis,

he
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would very much like to evaluate the effectiveness of the
marketing strategy.
Responses to questions were keyed directly into a Lotus
spreadsheet while I was on the phone.

Data could then be

read directly into the ADAPS statistical computer program
for subsequent analysis.

D.

Measurement of the Variables

This research measures four variables:
(a)

perceived stalemate industry,

producers

i.e.,

the degree to which

in the industry would categorize their industry as

a stalemate industry;
(b)

perceived environmental hostility,

i.e.,

producer,

perception of environmental hostility;
(c)

strategic posture,

perceived as
(d)

i.e.,

the degree to which it is

"entrepreneurial"

performance,

or "conservative";

reflected in both financial data and the

degree to which the cooperative strategy is seen to reduce
adverse affects of stalemate or environmental hostility.
The most serious limitation to the measurement of these
variables,

with the possible exception of financial data,

is

that they cannot be measured directly and objectively.
The perception of stalemate considers the degree of
marketing opportunity at the firm level and at the
cooperative organization level.

Four marketing aspects are
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considered:

product differentiation,

differentiation, market share,

organizational

and locating a niche market.

The perception of environmental hostility has two basic
components:

the degree of riskiness or predictability of the

environment,

and the degree to which producers can control

these factors in the environment.

The perception of

strategic posture involves relating management style to
group-orientation,
marketing),

pro-activeness

attitudes about risk,

(i.e.,

aggressive

resource availability,

and

preference for marketing or production activities.
The criteria for the performance variable is usually
problematic in strategy research.

It is more complicated

with cooperative strategies because the goal of collective
vertical integration may not simply be one of profit
maximization,
The CWB,

or in this case gross earnings maximization.

for example,

does not justify its institutional

existence simply on its ability to extract the highest
possible price for the grower.

The CWB's explicit goals^

are to provide the grower with:
(a)

the convenience of "single desk" sales

transactions,
(b)

countervailing market power,

(c)

risk management,

e.g.,

timing and market access,

and

These goals were conveyed to me in a personal
conversation by Mr. Harvey Brooks of the CWB.
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(d)

market development.

It is possible to measure approximate relative gross
eairnings,

but earnings will not directly measure the above

stated goals.

For the sake of argument however, we may

initially assume that eaxnings reflect the relative success
of a competitive strategy.
In this study the financial performance criterion is
average gross earnings per-ton^,
income per acre
per acre).

as opposed to either gross

(or per average farm)

or profit

(per ton or

Gross earnings per acre vary according to yield;

profit per ton varies with yield and especially with costs
of production.

Both yield and profit may vary widely with

numerous exogenous variables.
not designed to increase
costs of production.

Marketing cooperatives are

(or guarantee)

yield or to reduce

All else equal, higher prices will

lead to higher profitability,

but the ceteris paribus

assumption is not necessary to demonstrate the benefits of
different mcirketing strategies.
The recent implementation of the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP)

in the U.S.

implies that the U.S.

government

has recognized the effectiveness of Ccmada*s centralized
grain marketing approach,

at least for export sales.

While

there is not yet sufficient data to confirm the marketing

^
"Ton," the Canadiaui/British English spelling of ton,
reflects the fact that I am comparing stcindard metric tons,
i.e., adxDut 2,205 pounds rather than the American ton of
2,000 pounds.
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improvements of the EEP strategy,
both the U.S.

and Canada,

it is widely believed in

that the EEP will narrow any

relative advantage Canadian growers may have been receiving
from the CWB's pooling strategy^.

E. Method of Analysis

The survey data will be analyzed using the ADAPTS
statistical computer program.

All of the analysis is within

the capacity of this program.

Analysis of the survey

results consists primarily of group and subgroup comparisons
and two-way contingency table analysis.

Histograms provide

a graphic illustration of the group differences.
The analysis of the comparative financial data,
aspect of the performance variable,

an

is problematic and

depends upon being able to reduce the two sets of data to a
comparable form.

If that can be accomplished,

further

analysis could consist of simple linear regression and
scatter plots.

Regression diagnostic procedures could

explore the data for influential years or observations.
It is important to keep in mind that this study is
meant to be exploratory rather than confirmatory.

In a

confirmatory study sample size and formal rules to control
variability would be critical.

Whereas a confirmatory study

^
The EEP raises other questions, such as its
compatibility with the U.S. GATT position. However, these
questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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is analogous to a proof,

an exploratory study is a search

for clues that might indicate possible relationships.

These

potential relationships might later be subjected to a more
rigorous investigation to determine the exact nature of this
relationship.
Beyond the formal analysis,

there will be the

opportunity to interpret anecdotes,

because these are in

themselves clues to or further commentary on possible
relationships.

Although the sample is small,

I will be

listening for ways in which a respondent's earlier answers
act as predictors for subsequent answers.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A.

Questionnaire Design and Response

All potential respondents were sent a pre-survey letter
(see Appendix A).

All but two respondents recalled seeing

the letter and were,
from me.

to varying degrees,

expecting to hear

Sending a pre-survey letter is highly recommended

in the literature

(Dillman,

1978).

I do not have conclusive

empirical evidence to support the claim that this letter is
critical to the success of the survey,

but from my

experience in this and a previous telephone survey,

I

suspect that a pre-survey letter contributes immensely to
the overall cooperation of the respondents.
One Canadian and four Americans refused to be
interviewed.
letter.

All but two respondents recalled receiving the

Two of the four Americans who refused to be

interviewed,

claimed not to have received a letter; the

other two did not offer a reason.

The one Canadian refusal

was based on the fact that she was no longer farming.
argument was of course irrelevant,

(This

but one is not in a

strong position to disagree over the telephone.)
One response rate problem is simply the difficulty of
reaching managers on the telephone.

The two major problems
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are unlisted numbers and unusual business hours.

I suspect

that many farm managers rely on answering machines to screen
their calls.

The manager periodically will return those

calls of the highest priority.

Although I asked those who

had machines to return my call by telephoning collect,

only

two did.
I think that for an exploratory study,

of greater

importance than response rate and number is quality of
response in a telephone as opposed to a mail survey.
one person refused to answer one of the questions
level of gross income),
question.

While

(regarding

everyone else answered every

In previous mail survey efforts,

I have received

many questionnaires which were only partially completed or
obviously misunderstood.

This situation leads to a serious

interpretation problem (Moffitt,
1990).

Christiansen,

and Fleming,

When one is actually talking with the respondent,

one can carefully rephrase the question to help clarify what
was intended by the question.

Telephone interviewees appear

to be more inclined to struggle patiently to answer the more
difficult, more thought provoking questions.

If one is

reasonably careful, there is not a significant danger of
answering the question for the respondents.
I think that for this exploratory study the most
importemt advcintage of a telephone survey was the
opportunity provided respondents to voluntarily elaborate
upon their answers.

For excimple,

I deliberately avoided
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using the term "pooling” so as not to specifically raise the
issue of pooling.

None of the American respondents

mentioned pooling during the questioning.

(However,

about

half were interested in discussing it informally at the end
of the formal interview process.)

By contrast all but two

of the Canadian respondents referred to pooling at least
once,

and most volunteered further information about pooling

at one or more times throughout the interview.

The most

common reference was to pooling as an explanation for
respondents feeling less concern about price volatility and
unpredictability than they might otherwise feel, were they
not pooling through the CWB.

It is notable that while the

pre-survey letter provided a cross-cultural context for the
interview,

Canadians did not compare their pooling system to

the American market system; Canadians referred rather to the
Canadian system of marketing canola.
In designing the questionnaire I had hoped the
resulting data would enable me to develop a profile of the
Canadian producer and a profile of the American producer,
especially as regards to perception of environmental
characteristics and preferred competitive strategies,

i.e.,

their preferred organizational structure and strategic
posture,

for marketing their product.

Canola, an important rape seed commodity, and other
minor grain commodities are traded on the open market, i.e.,
they are not pooled, as are wheat and barley.
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The questionnaire was designed to provide a subjective
evaluation of organizational performance which could
supplement or be compared to the objective gross earnings
data.

Gross earnings was not considered to be the ultimate

performance test.

I wanted the measure also to reflect the

degree to which the organization improved the overall
welfare of the member-producer.
this subjective evaluation:
own organization,

There are two aspects to

the performance of the member's

and this member's understanding of

alternative marketing approaches.

B.

1.

Perception of Business Environment

Stalemate Industry
The first set of questions

(numbers 1-8)

2

was

designed to help determine the extent to which managers
understand the stalemate nature of the wheat industry.

The

responses to these questions would indicate how we should
likely interpret hypothesis one.

I expected that producers

using different strategies would perceive their industry
differently.

Four industry characteristics are considered:

the ability to differentiate product quality,
differentiate the organization,
substantial market share,

the ability to

the ability to gain a

and the ability to develop or

^ The questionairre is included as Appendix B; the
results of the survey are graphically presented as Appendix
C.
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terms of the firm level possibilities and in terms of the
larger organizational possibilities.
In general,

farmers in both countries are sensitive to

the severe marketing constraints imposed on their individual
farms by the structure of the industry.

Questions 1,

3,

5,

and 9 ask about the above four characteristic in terms of
the individual firm,

e.g., what is the likelihood that one

could differentiate one farm's wheat from that of all other
farms?

69% of the Canadians and 71% of the Americans think

the chance is extremely low.

Very similar levels of

agreement between the two groups were obtained in response
to the other three industry characteristics.

Only one from

each group thinks that there is a better than "low chance"
that any individual firm can differentiate itself from other
firms in the industry.

All Canadians and Americans surveyed

think that at best there is only an extremely low
possibility for any single producer to gain a significant
market share.

88% of Canadians and 93% of Americans agree

that the chances of discovering a market niche on their own
is at best low.
If we turn to the possibility of organizations
achieving success with these characteristics,
quite different.

the picture is

In general the Canadians recognize the

potential effectiveness of working through a marketing
organization.

One Canadian and three Americans simply do

not know whether an organization can differentiate the
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not know whether or not an organization can differentiate
the quality of the grain it is handling and therefore gain a
higher price.

However,

of the Americans,
Similarly,

81% of the Canadians,

but only 36%

are sure that an organization can.

88% of Canadians but only half of the Americans,

are convinced that an organization can differentiate itself
and thus gain higher prices.
only half of the Americans,

Again,

81% of Canadians but

are certain that an organization

can discover or develop a niche market and enhance the price
received for the grain.
these three questions,

On the basis of the responses to
one can conclude that Canadians

clearly have a better appreciation for the potential benefit
for marketing through an organization.
I should note however,

that I found the response to the

other organization question to be puzzling.

Half of the

Canadians and almost half of the Americans simply do not
know if a marketing organization can gain a significant
t

market share.

The remaining Canadians and Americans are

quite certain that no organization can possibly attain a
market share large enough to have any impact on the price.
I am not surprised by the American answer,

but the Canadians

market through the CWB which has a near absolute monopoly
and has enough monopoly power to affect price.

The

respondents may not have understood the question as I had
intended it to be understood.
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more effective than the non-pooling strategy,

the Canadian

growers would be more insulated from the adverse effects of
the industry constraints.

I think it is better to think of

this hypothesis as an indicator whether or not there is a
basically different way of thinking about marketing in
stalemate.

Two different profiles do seem to emerge.

Both

groups clearly understand the weak nature of their
individual position relative to the whole industry.
However,

those who have adopted a pooling strategy clearly

recognize the benefit of pooling.

The other group is either

poorly informed about the potential of organizations or has
non-economic reasons to oppose group efforts.
case,

In either

producers in the second grouping have a very weak

sense of organizational benefits.
The data suggests that there is a difference between
the two groups,

but not as strong a difference as I had

originally suspected.

Also,

the basis of the difference is

not what I had thought it would be.

Ultimately,

I think

these questions test understanding of the industry in which
the producer is operating,

rather than the impact of adverse

effects of stalemate on the individual producer.
environmental hostility questions

The

(especially the last four

of the six questions in the next section)

are a better

measure of the adverse impact of the business environment
and the ability of a marketing strategy to insulate one from
this impact.
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and the ability of a marketing strategy to insulate one from
this

2.

impact.

Environmental Hostility
The second set of questions

(questions 9-14)

is

intended to distinguish producers according to their
perception of environmental hostility.

This set consists of

six statements with which producers can to varying degrees
agree or disagree.

The questions address price volatility

and predictability issues,

the significance of

firm initiative in a dominating environment,
stress,

and survivability issues.

individual

and risk,

Here the producers are

asked how they feel about their environment rather than what
they think about the structure of their industry.

This set

of responses sharply differentiates the two strategies of
pooling

(Canada)

and non-pooling

(U.S.).

As might have been expected farmers in both countries
are experiencing relatively high degrees of environmental
hostility.

However,

the Canadians as a group are

experiencing hostility to a notably lower degree than are
American producers as a group.

The data suggest that the

second hypothesis has more support than the first.
The first set of responses,
price,

regarding the volatility of

shows only a modest but nevertheless important

difference.

44% of the pooling group think prices are

highly volatile,

whereas 71% of the non-pooling group feels
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they are quite volatile.

Another 38% of the first group

thinks prices are somewhat volatile, whereas only 14% of the
second group thinks prices are just somewhat volatile.
short,

In

almost all producers think price volatility is at

least substantial,
this volatility.

but the pooling group is less aware of
Comments from the pooling group shed some

light on this difference.

Four explicitly stated that they

feel cushioned from the price fluctuations.

Almost all said

that while they are generally interested in the price
(because their ultimate pool settlement price is some
function of the overall season price),

they themselves do

not follow the prices that closely because they do not need
to make marketing decisions.
Both groups are in total agreement that the price of
grain is almost totally unpredictable.

The groups may have

different reasons for feeling this way,

but the effect is

the same:

the groups cannot be distinguished by their

response to this question.

In fact,

these two questions are

not in themselves designed to distinguish between the two
groups.

What these responses establish is that both groups

recognize that there is price volatility and
unpredictability.
The third question builds on the response to the
previous two.

It asks,

given the existence of price

volatility and unpredictability,

are there opportunities to

earn high profits or sustain great losses?

86% of the non-
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pooling group say there is a very high chance,

whereas only
i

13% of those who had the opportunity to pool,

felt as

strongly about the impact that these market conditions have
on their firm's profitability.

Exactly half of those who

pool feel that market fluctuations have very little to do
with their profitability; no Americans feel this way.
Clearly the pooling strategy insulates producers from an
important aspect of environmental hostility.
Another major difference between the two groups is
evident when we consider riskiness and firm survivability,
an important component of overall environmental hostility.
When asked if they thought the market is very risky and
whether they agreed that a bad year could seriously threaten
the existence of their firm,

79% of those who fail to pool

agree in the strongest terms possible, whereas only 31% of
those who pool agree as strongly.

63% of the Canadians

mostly disagree or only agree somewhat with the risk
statement.

This number is in contrast to the 14% of

Americans who feel an egual level of security.
As might be expected,

both groups agree

(75% and 79%)

that the grain market is a dominating environment and that
individual initiative by producers counts for "very little
against tremendous competitive, political,
forces."

and technological

This question was designed to lead into the next

question regarding stress,
interesting.

and the response to it is very

When asked to what extent they agree that

(a)
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marketing grain is very stressful and
difficult to stay afloat,

(b)

it is very

no Canadians strongly agree but

half of the Americans agree strongly.

93% of the Americans

agree to some extent, while 63% of the Canadians disagree to
some extent.

Clearly the pooling strategy has substantial
I

ability to provide a degree of insulation from stress.

C.

Performance Variables Comparison

1. Market Price Data
Neither the CWB nor the ERS/USDA collect data or
maintain a data base which shows directly comparable prices
received by U.S.
however,

and Canadian farmers.

It is possible,

to adjust the available data to reflect more

closely relative differences between prices in the two
countries.
late 1960s.

World wheat prices were fairly stable until the
At that time,

competition the U.S.

coinciding with the increased

and Canada received from Australia's

entry into the market, prices became increasingly volatile.
By the early 1970's prices had become so volatile that they
could change by over 100% between years.

As a result U.S.

and Canadian farmgate prices from 1965 to the present are of
most interest.
The Canadian farmgate price is taken to be the
difference between the pool price

(i.e.,

the price all

Canadian farmers receive for grain delivered to Vancouver or
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Thunder Bay)

and the average price of delivering the grain

from the farm to one of these two terminals.
figures
payments

(i.e., pool price [Table XXIV]
[Table 23],

and transaction

CWB, various years)

independently by the CWB.

Both of these

are maintained

Pool prices are available for the

relevant time period; deductions are available from 1979
onwards and may be interpolated for earlier years.
CWB payment" to the farmer

(in Table 4)

The "Net

is the pool price,

less the deduction.
The USDA has collected price data on the average
American farmgate price for northern plains red spring wheat
from 1973 to the present.

The Minnesota Department of

Agriculture has maintained average farmgate prices for red
spring wheat during the relevant time period.

One would

expect these figures to be very similar to the national red
spring wheat average;
period,

in fact,

during the overlapping

they are within a few cents.^

similarity,

Given this

I have used them to supplement the USDA data.

Finally,

the data must be normalized,

Canadian prices must be converted to U.S.

i.e.,

the

dollars and

American bushels must be converted to metric tons.

The Bank

of Canada calculates an average exchange rate

dollars

required to purchase Canadian dollars)

(U.S.

for each year.

This

exchange rate conversion factor multiplied times the

^
The small difference can be attributed to the fact
that the state figures include small amounts of Durum wheat,
for which growers receive slightly higher payments.
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adjusted Canadian pool price provides that year's average
Canadian fanngate price per ton in U.S.

dollars.

The

average American bushel price is multiplied by the metric
conversion factor
price per ton.

(36.743710)

to provide an average American

The results of these calculations are listed

in Tables 4 and 5:

Table 4

Calculation of Net CWB Price to Farmer

Calculation on Net CWB price to farmer.

CROP
YEAR
65/66
66/67
67/68
68/69
69/70
70/71
71/72
72/73
73/74
74/75
75/76
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
80/81
81/82
82/83
83/84
84/85
85/86
86/87
87/88
88/89
89/90

ewe Poo/
Payment
to Farmer:

Ave. Farm
Transport
Paid by
Farmer:

$73.38
73.01
66.65
62.46
61.72
61.40
58.64
79.14
168.21
164.39
146.28
117.15
120.30
160.53
196.43
222.12
199.62
192.34
193.98
186.37
160.00
130.00
134.02
197.14

$4.40
4.55
4.70
4.85
5.00
5.10
5.25
5.50
7.80
8.20
8.60
9.00
9.40
9.70
10.13
11.07
11.52
12.12
12.62
14.80
13.46
13.64
13.99
15.90

=

Net CWB
Price for
Wheat to
Farmer:
$68.98
68.46
61.95
57.61
56.72
56.30
53.39
73.64
160.41
156.19
137.68
108.15
110.90
150.83
186.30
211.05
188.10
180.22
181.36
171.57
146.54
116.36
120.03
181.24
0.00

SOURCE:
CWB Annual Reports; "Schedule for CWB Payments"
& "Weighted Average Deductions for Farmers"

Table 5

Comparative U.S. And Canadian Average Farm Prices
for Spring Wheat

CANADA:

U.S.A.
CROP
YEAR

$/bu $/tonne
1.49
1.76
1.52
1.39
1.46
1.59
1.37
1.94
4.42
4.52
4.00
2.90
2.50
2.84
3.65
4.12
3.73
3.56
3.71
3.54
3.42
2.56
2.65
3.80

65/66
66/67
67/68
68/69
69/70
70/71
71/72
72/73
73/74
74/75
75/76
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
80/81
81/82
82/83
83/84
84/85
85/86
86/87
87/88
88/89
89/90

54.75
64.67
55.85
51.07
53.65
58.42
50.34
71.28
162.41
166.08
146.97
106.56
91.86
104.35
134.11
151.38
137.05
130.81
136.32
130.07
125.66
94.06
97.37
139.63
0.00

Net CWB
C$/tonne
68.98
68.46
61.95
57.61
56.72
56.30
53.39
73.64
160.41
156.19
137.68
108.15
110.90
150.83
186.30
211.05
188.10
180.22
181.36
171.57
146.54
116.36
120.03
181.24
0.00

Difference:
Exchange
Rate:
$/bu $/tonne
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.950
1.096
0.960
1.025
0.991
1.020
0.940
0.877
0.854
0.855
0.834
0.816
0.811
0.772
0.733
0.719
0.754
0.812
0.845

1.88
1.86
1.69
1.57
1.54
1.53
1.38
2.20
4.19
4.36
3.71
3.00
2.84
3.60
4.33
4.91
4.27
4.00
4.00
3.61
2.92
2.28
2.46
4.01
0.00

(Canada over US)
$/bu $/tonne
0.39
0.10
0.17
0.18
0.08
-0.06
0.01
0.26
-0.23
-0.16
-0.29
0.10
0.34
0.76
0.68
0.79
0.54
0.44
0.29
0.07
-0.50
-0.28
-0.19
0.21
0.00

14.23
3.79
6.,10
6.54
3.07
-2.12
0.40
9.43
-8.43
-5.99
-10.53
3.76
12.42
27.93
24.91
29.15
19.82
16.25
10.84
2.43
-18.32
-10.35
-6.83
7.61
0.00

$0.15

$5.67

68.98
68.46
61.95
57.61
56.72
56.30
50.74
80.71
153.98
160.09
136.44
110.31
104.28
132.28
159.03
180.53
156.88
147.06
147.16
132.50
107.34
83.71
90.54
147.24
0.00

AVERAGE
NOTES:

The "Net CWB" price/tonne is the CWB pool price less the average cost to transport grain to
Vancouver or Thunder Bay (in Canadian dollars), for the year of concern.
1 bushel = 60 lbs; 1 metric tonne = 36.743710 bushels (2,204.6226 lbs.)

SOURCES:
Canadian prices: The Canadian Wheat Board "Annual Reports:" Payments & Deductions
U.S. prices: 1965-1973: Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Statistics Division.
1973-1989: "Wheat: Situation and Outlook Reports." Economic Research Service, USDA.
Exchange rates: Bank of Canada statistics (provided by CWB).
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The Canadian price appears on average to be higher than
the U.S.

price.

At first glance,

this fact might argue for

the greater effectiveness of the Canadian marketing
strategy.

However,

conclusively,

it is difficult to infer this

based solely on price data,

are not truly comparable.
to be slightly higher,
unexpected.

because the data

While the Canadian price appears

this situation is not totally

There are possible alternative explanations for

a higher Canadian grain price.

Canadian grain is cleaner

and brings a higher price on the world market.

Presenting a

higher quality grain is a form of product differentiation,
and this wheat marketing strategy is easier to implement
through a centralized marketing board approach.

However,

there is an indirect cost associated with this processing.

2. Average versus Weighted Average Prices
A pool price is essentially a weighted average price.
A certain amount of grain is placed in a pool,

and

throughout the term of the pool, various amounts are sold at
various prices.

At the termination of the pool all the

grain will have been sold.

The pool price is determined by

dividing the total dollar amount received
insignificant amount for overhead)
bushels sold.

(less a relatively

by the total number of

All Canadian growers receive the identical

^ Similarly, the CWB's monopoly power in the domestic
market enhances the overall price to farmers.
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price per bushel

(ignoring small individual adjustments for

transportation).

Therefore,

if we want to compare marketing

strategies by comparing the CWB pool price per bushel to the
price per bushel received by American farmers,
compare it to a weighted average.

we must

Even then we will only be

able to say that on average,

the American price was higher

or lower than the Canadian.

We will be able to conclude

very little about any specific American grower.
A weighted average price is really the figure we need
for comparison,
year or month,
monitored.

not simply the average cash price for the
the only agricultural data currently

In order to determine the relative benefit of

one strategy over another, we need to know how much wheat
was sold a what price,
average prices.

that is, we need to compare weighted

This data is simply not available.

The difference between a pool price and the fluctuating
cash market price,

is illustrated by a graph devised by

Harvest States Cooperative

(see Figure 7).

The purpose of

the graph is to demonstrate the potential benefits of
pooling.

When plotted against price per bushel on the

vertical axis and time
horizontal axis,

(i.e.,

term of pool)

on the

the final pool price will of course be a

horizontal line at some particular price level.

The daily

cash price can then be overlaid to reveal those days on
which a more aggressive,

less cooperative strategy would

have outperformed the pooling strategy.
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MCCANNA. ND - SPRING WHEAT

Ficmre 7. Comparison of HSC Wheat Pool Settlement Price and
the Net Cash Value for Elevator Stored Spring Wheat
in McCanna, ND (2/26/90 - 7/27/90). HSC, 1990.

However,

in order to determine how well a particular non¬

pooling strategy would have performed,

one must know how

many bushels were in fact sold on which days.

3.

Market Distortions
Even if it were possible to construct U.S. weighted

average prices received,
payments to producers,
form or another,

the enormous amount of other

i.e.,

government subsidies in one

in both countries precludes meaningful

The "net cash value" (NCV) is calculated each day of
the pool period for each location. The NCV is defined as the
cash market price a producer can receive minus the cost of
carrying the grain since the start of the pool period.
For elevator stored grain, the costs are interest and
storage. (For farm stored grain, the major cost is interest.
HSC also deducts a nominal aunount from the farm storage NCV
to reflect the cost of shrink or quality deterioration.)
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price comparisons.

The operations of the CWB are financed

completely from grain sales

(refer back to Table 3)

should not be thought of as a subsidy^.

and

This direct

marketing cost is deducted to calculate the "net price
received”

(see Table 4).

The comparison problem arises as

one tries to include non-market producer income.
t

If one knew that each year the total amounts of the
subsidies were approximately equal in the two countries
while at the same time the prices received differed greatly,
one might reasonably conclude that the system which offered
the higher price was likely the more effective.

However,

the subsidy levels are rarely the same in the two countries
and the prices on average are close.

From year to year the

nature and the total amounts of the subsidies in the two
countries vary,

often dramatically.

Therefore,

one cannot

ignore government support costs in comparing costs and
benefits to growers using differing marketing strategies.
If the free trade goals of the U.S. proposals to the
recently concluded round of GATT talks were to have been
implemented,

the subsidy complications would eventually be

eliminated and prices henceforth would become comparable.

In rare cases the initial CWB payment to producers
will be higher than the final pool settlement price.
This
initial price is guaranteed, regardless of the settlement
price.
Therefore, the difference between the initial
payment and a lower settlement price, would have to be
considered a subsidy.
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The U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement
"free trade"

somewhat more broadly,

(FTA)^ envisions

i.e.,

be eliminated but they do have to be equal
countries.

subsidies need not
in the two

The agricultural chapter of the FTA includes a

provision on market access for grain and grain products.
Canada protects

its grain industry by requiring import

permits for wheat,

barley,

and oats.

The FTA requires

Canada to eliminate its import permits when the U.S.

level

of government support becomes equal to or less than
Canada's.

Canada now no longer requires import permits for

oats and oat products because U.S.

support for oats was

lower than Canada's in 1989.

1990)

In short,

one-way market access is available to the

country with the
calculations

(GAO,

lower level of subsidy.

indicate that Canada's total

wheat and barley are slightly lower
Therefore,

Canada could,

1990 subsidies for

(about 1%

if it so desired,

grain into the American domestic market.
extremely low cash market price,

Current

freely export
However,

given the

there is currently little

incentive for Canada to export into the U.S.
potential U.S.

lower).

By contrast,

grain exports into the Canadian domestic

market are of greater interest to both parties.

The

^ On January 2, 1988 the U.S. and Canada entered into
the Free Trade Agreement. The countries negotiated the
agreement, which became effective January 1, 1989, with the
intent to eventually eliminate trade barriers in order to
improve market access to each country's goods and services.
The agreed upon goal was to eliminate all tariffs within ten
years.
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monopoly power generated by the CWB arrangement and the
protective tariff,

keeps the

Canadian domestic market price

firm relative to the world wheat price.
would

like to retain control

would

like the
The

of this market,

opportunity to compete

economic

Obviously,

and the U.S.

in this market.

importance of the Canadian market

considerable discussion of how the government
should be

calculated.

This

in a year,

such as

1990,

depressed,

and

the

(b)

concern

when

(a)

support

countries might
There

fact
the

is

the

constitutes
sources

country's

the world wheat market

levels

are

elements

in

13

support must
transfers"
dollars)

subsidy.

be

and the

The

extremely close,

FTA specifically

support.

If

support calculations,

major categories
considered.

to wheat producers

in Table

of the

agreeing upon what

6:

The

a

one

1987

U.S.

are reported

each

simply

total

of direct and

in

identifies

formulas used to derive

of government

examines the U.S.

is

switch.

of data

level

levels

is particularly evident

obvious problem of
a

leads to

support

with a high possibility that the relative positions
two

Canada

of

25

indirect

"policy
(in millions

of

141

Table 6. U.S. Government Support (in millions of dollars) for Wheat in 1987 (from GAO, 1990).
A. DIRECT PAYMENTS:
1. Payments of the Commodity Credit Corporation:
a. Deficiency payments
b. Disaster payments
c. Diversion payments
2. CCC storage payments
3. Conservation Reserve Program
4. Acreage Reduction Program
5. Certificate premiums & discounts

$3,129.09
3,279.06
3,279.06
0.00
0.00
144.75
102.47
-479.54
82.35

B. OTHER SUPPORT:
6. CCC loan forfeiture benefits
7. Price enhancement
8. Advance payments benefits
9. Crop Insurance
10. Government service programs:
a. Federal grain inspection
b. Research & extension
c. Irrigation
d. Inland waterways freight
e. Conservation
f. Rail freight
g. Low interest loans for rail
h. Cooperator export programs
i. Marketing services
j. Plant disease & pest control
k. Targeted export assistance
11. CCC commodity loans
12. State budget outlays
13. Farm credit programs

2,178.27
105.51
1,433.00
9.65
1.64
103.56
0.35
44.05
4.18
17.60
27.34
0.79
1.62
1.07
0.64
4.59
1.34
308.47
106.00
110.43

TOTAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

$5,307.37

The year to year accounting process is further complicated
by the volatility of the subsidy amounts,

and by the fact

that subsidies can move in different directions

in the two

countries.
The percent of a grower's
government support

income that comes from

is calculated by dividing total

government support by the adjusted producer value.
"Adjusted producer value"

is simply the sum of the actual

value of wheat production and the direct transfer payments.
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TABLE 7. Calculation of U.S. Wheat Percent Level of 1987 U.S. Government Support (from
GAO, 1990).
A. VALUE OF PRODUCTION:
Level of production (MT^)
X Producer price ($/ton)

57.36
$95.84

= Value of production (x $1 billion)

$5,497

B. GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS TO PRODUCERS (x $ billion):
Direct payments
3.129
+ Indirect payments
2.178

= Total government payments
C. ADJUSTED PRODUCER VALUE:
Value of wheat production (A)
+ Direct payments (from B)

$5,307

5.497
3.129

= "Adjusted producer value"

$8,626

D. PERCENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT:
Total government payments (B) $5,307
/ Adjusted producer value (C)
8.626
X 100
.615

= Percent level of support

61.5%

During the same year,

equivalent calculations showed

that Canadian wheat producers derived only 46.7% of their
income from government support.

Therefore,

the Canadian

domestic wheat market would clearly not have been open to
American competition in that year.
calculations for 1990
are 45.80%
of

excluded,

similar

indicate the percent levels of support

for the U.S.

less than 1%.

However,

and 44.83% for Canada,

At these levels the U.S.

a difference

would remain

but the calculations become more critical and

controversial.
One conclusion from the foregoing analysis
"producer price

8

($/ton)"

is that

is probably not as useful an

Expressed in millions of metric tons

(MT)
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indicator of performance as it might first appear to be.
The necessary adjustments to price received are
substantially more complicated than multiplying the Canadian
prices by the annual exchange rates and making deductions
for the annual CWB overhead and related expenses.
Allowances must be made for non-market payments,
the FTA reguired these calculations,
standardized,

rigorous manner.^

the data available,

they were not made in a

While we can conclude from

that actual cash price for wheat in the

two countries is similar,
precise,

but until

it is impossible to determine the

effective price differentials.

It is therefore

impossible either to support or to reject hypothesis 3 on
the basis of price alone.

Since price advantage is

indeterminate, we need another indicator of performance.

4.

Non-price Performance Measures
In light of the enormous obstacles to comparing

benefits of pooling and non-pooling strategies in terms of
price enhancements,
U.S.

it is perhaps not surprising that the

and Canadian pool administrators who I interviewed

never mentioned higher price per bushel as a strategic goal.

Even with today's more accurate cost accounting, it
would be difficult to establish comparable prices received
in the two countries. The FtA calculations use the average
of two previous years as a proxy for the current year's
government support level, and growers often do not know what
their final payment will be for 18 months after harvest.
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Pool managers cited a number of benefits to all participants
or components of the industry.
For example,

these executives point out that pooling

leads to a more rational flow of grain through the market.
It is easier to coordinate rail and water transportation
needs.

It is easier to meet the enormous grain storage

needs with the limited terminal storage capacity.
Canadians discuss pooling,
wheat,

they compare the marketing of

the main commodity pooled,

system of marketing wheat

When

not with the American

(as I had expected they would),

but rather with the marketing of canola,

the main commodity

marketed without benefit of a pooling strategy.
storage is needed for both commodities,

Terminal

but due to the more

orderly flow of wheat, wheat utilizes existing storage three
to four times more efficiently than does canola.
results in a better through flow,

Pooling

and in this manner pooling

reduces transaction costs for all participants.
Pooling gives managers of marketing organizations
control over larger amounts of grain and therefore greater
flexibility in arranging larger grain deals more quickly.
In Canada this leads to the ability to offer buyers "one
desk" shopping.
large buyers,

This feature is especially attractive to

such as Russia.

Again,

the strategy enables

seller and buyer to reduces transaction costs.

Canadians

This observation was made during my interview of Ms.
Mitura and Mr. Harach of the SWP (October 1990).
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are thus able to compete on service rather than solely on
price.

Similarly,

since the CWB has control of the total

national supply of wheat,

a grain quality program

cleanliness and graded protein content)

(e.g.,

can be implemented

with the intention of differentiating Canadian grain.
Again,

this leads to non-price competition.

supply control,

Without total

transaction costs would be too high to make

such a program feasible.
As with the other market participants,

the main benefit

of pooling to individual producers is that transaction costs
are reduced.

Managers do not speak specifically in terms of

transaction cost benefits,

such as reducing some of the

limitations imposed by the "bounded rationality" of
individual producers.

But in effect this is what pool

managers and producers mean when they observe that fewer of
the producer firm's limited resources must be devoted to
monitoring the market,
movements,

attempting to anticipate its

and deciding on when to sell grain.

producers in both countries

(83%)

primarily interested in production

Almost all

claim in the survey to be
(question 19).

They also

feel that they receive a better return on those resources
devoted to production

(question 20).

In short,

they clearly

believe that their comparative advantage is in production as
opposed to marketing.

(The question that comes immediately

to mind is that if farmers in both countries feel this way,
why do Americans devote so many resources to marketing?)
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Lanny Jass of Harvest States stated that the main
service the cooperative's pools offer is to "pull the
trigger" for the grower.

If one refers back to Figure 5,

it

is evident that timing of sales is critical to success in
the cash market.

Timing is the single greatest source of

risk and stress.

When the pool's marketing specialists

assume the responsibility for timing
trigger"),

(i.e.,

"pull the"

they also reduce the stress associated with the

marketing decision.
It is not necessary to stretch the term "transaction
costs" to include stress.

The transaction cost which is

reduced is the cost of gathering enough information to make
a rational marketing decision.

By transferring the firm's

marketing decisions to a jointly integrated organization,
price variability is reduced,
stress.

and a by-product is lower

There will be times when there may not be any

attractive prices in the market.

For example,

current wheat

prices, which earlier were volatile and unpredictable -but
overall high,

are now moving in a steady downward direction

with little likelihood of increasing over the next year.
Growers will not necessarily be truly satisfied with the
price received either in the cash market or with the pool
settlement price.

However,

those who delegate

responsibility to the pool will lower transaction costs,
will experience less stress,

and most likely will receive a

higher overall price than those who fail to pool.

Many,
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perhaps most,

of those who are not pooling their grain are

currently holding their grain in storage.
The survey reveals a substantially lower level of
stress among those who pool
question 14).

(refer back to the discussion of

The telephone interview conversations with

producers corroborate these relatively different degrees of
stress.

Both American and Canadian producers were

remarkably open and cooperative during the telephone
interviews.

The most overriding difference was in apparent

levels of stress regarding the market.

All are concerned

with the dramatic decline in the market and with the low
prospects for recovery in the near future.

However,

the

Canadian producers as a group express considerably less
anxiety and reveal a greater distancing from the day-to-day
marketing decisions.
A number of American growers had failed to sell any of
their grain at the time of the interview (fall 1990).
are now in the position of either
price this year or
consequence,

(b)

selling at the lowest

holding their grain,

continuing to pay a monthly fee

cents per bushel per month),
proceeds,

(a)

They

and as a
(about three

not having use of the sale

and hoping against very high odds that the market

price will at some point increase by more than their storage
costs and interest foregone.
An anecdote from an American survey respondent
illustrates the problem well.

Earlier in the year this
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grower encountered the cooperative manager at the gasoline
station.

The elevator manager told the grower that the

cooperative had contracts for wheat at $3.36 per bushel.
While the price had a few times earlier in the season been
slightly higher,

the cooperative manager did not feel the

price would go any higher this year.

Recall that the USDA

had projected that the 1990 wheat crop prices would be in
the $2.90 to $3.30 range.
come by that afternoon,
truck in time.

The farmer said he would try to

if he could finish servicing his

He did not find the time that day,

but he

did go down to the elevator first thing the next morning.
Unfortunately by that time,
cents per bushel,

the price had dropped twenty

the entire profit margin that this grower

could have expected.
I asked him what he did.
grain in storage

He answered that he kept the

(at three cents per bushel per month)

and

had watched with frustration as the price continued to fall
to its current level of $2.51 per bushel.
"sealed” his grain

(i.e.,

He has now

is using it as collateral for a

Commodity Credit Corporation [CCC]

loan)

and used the $1.90

CCC loan to pay some of his operating expenses.

However,

his total cost of production is substantially over $2.51.
If he sells now,

he will not cover his variable costs.

in order to operate for another crop year,
already incurred operating expenses.

Yet

he must pay the

His alternative is to

"roll- over" his operating loan into a term loan,

a
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procedure not favored by bankers.

I asked him,

"If you had

known at the beginning of the growing season that you would
not receive more than $2.50 per bushel,

would you have

borrowed money and exerted the effort to plant,
harvest the crop?"
way!"”

story;

His answer was an unqualified,

Two things struck me:

which he told me,

first,

and

"No

the openness with

a stranger on the telephone,

and secondly,

depression,

grow,

his tone of deep,

this moving

overwhelming

his sense of being individually powerless,

and

his obviously high stress level.
Conversations with Canadian producers provide a sharp
contrast.

All Canadian responses can easily be placed into

one of two categories:
marketing.
category.

focus on production or focus on

Only one producer can be placed in the second
All producers but one identify their primary

interests and competitive advantage as production rather
than marketing.

Most volunteered that they follow the

market somewhat but only out of curiosity because their
final pool price to some degree reflects the general trend.
As noted earlier,

they all recognize that the wheat market

price is volatile and unpredictable.
All but one Canadian and all but one American agree
that the business of producing grain places severe demands

Ironically, he could have purchased a futures
contract or a put option where by he could have sold all or
a large part of his crop at a guaranteed price well above
his break-even point.
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on their available resources

(question 17).

Furthermore,

71% of the Americans claim not to have adequate resources
left over to do an adequate job of marketing

(question 18).

Canadians generally do not consider this an issue because
they pool.

(So once again,

the question comes to mind, why

are the Americans marketing their grain individually in the
cash market?)
While a few Canadians expressed concerns about the
governance of the provincial wheat pool and/or the CWB,

88%

of those who had the option to pool are satisfied or highly
satisfied with their marketing system

(question 22)

and 88%

are relatively satisfied with their financial return from
this system

(question 23).

By contrast,

no American

surveyed is highly satisfied with either the system or the
returns.
In summary,

the survey results suggest that it is

possible to develop a non-price measure of relative
performance of marketing strategies.

The preferred strategy

should be the strategy which results in a greater reduction
in stress and which increases firm survivability,

in short,

the strategy which better reduces the impact of
environmental hostility.
difficult.

The wheat market is inherently

Structurally it is a stalemate industry and it

exists within a hostile environment.
evident which strategy,
advantage,

While it is not

if any, has a price performance

clearly the collective strategy of pooling
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performs better in terms of reducing transaction costs and
in particular,

on the firm level,

reducing stress and

increasing survivability.

Again,

an anecdote is representative of the overall

effect of joint vertical integration,

of producing at ‘the

local level but integrating to carry out marketing at a
higher level.

I interviewed one respondent over the

telephone while he was working in his machine shop.
end of the formal survey questioning,

At the

I thanked him for his

time and specifically apologized for taking time from his
repair or maintenance of his farm machinery.
he had enjoyed talking,

He said that

and in any case he was not working

on his machinery but rather on completing his conversion of
a bus into a mobile home for a trip this winter.

He was

planning to take his wife, his two young daughters,

and

himself on a trip to Mexico where there would be "lots of
sun and cheap tequila."

He felt it would cost him less to

make this trip and it would be more fun for his family,

than

it would be to over-winter in northern Saskatchewan.
Most interesting for this study, he felt there was
nothing he could do to improve the pool settlement price he
would eventually receive.
profit,

He would like to earn a greater

but he has a longer-term perspective, with survival

of his farming operation and his family's well-being as a
higher priority than simple short-run "profit-maximizing."
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Perhaps most importantly,
respondents,

he,

like the other Canadian

expressed a significantly lower level of

anxiety than those in the American group.
As a conclusion to this section,

it is worth noting

that while pooling is the preferred marketing strategy in
Canada,

it is not the only effective Canadian marketing

strategy available to producers.

The single Canadian

respondent who claimed to be more interested in marketing
than production,
respondents.
his office.

is clearly different from all other

When I reached him on the telephone,

He warned me that he was not typical and that I

might not want to interview him.

I of course said that I

would like to include him in the survey,
cooperate.

he .was in

and he agreed to

Although he did use some of the SWP services

(and this is why his name happened to be included in the
random list), he did not sell any grain through the CWB.
He markets all of his grain on his own.
small feed mill,

He owns a

and he processes much of his wheat and

barley production into livestock feed.
this feed by feeding it to sheep.
livestock producers.

He markets most of

He sells the rest to

If the price is high enough,

diverts some of his grain to a local ethanol plant.

he
As the

price of oil continues to rise, more of his grain will be
diverted from feed to fuel production.
the organic grain market,

He has considered

but at this time he feels the

extra production costs and lower yields would not justify
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diverting resources from his feed production.

This producer

is an enthusiastic entrepreneur who has adopted a very
different strategy from his fellow producers,

namely t;o

integrate vertically as an individual rather than jointly.
Other Canadian and American producers either do not perceive
similar opportunities or do not have similar inclinations.
Although this particular producer does not appreciate
the benefits of pooling,

most of the other Canadian

respondents specifically recognize the importance of the
pooling strategy.

This fact is significant because I

intentionally avoided using the term "pooling,"
explicitly or implicitly.

All Canadians who specifically

mentioned the importance of pooling,
Americans referred to pooling.
no Canadians,

either

did so voluntarily.

A number of Americans,

No

but

volunteered that they were "at wit's end" as

to what to do about their predicament.
if this survey was

Some wanted to know

in part intended to help figure out some

marketing alternatives.

At this point I asked,

aware of the HSC pooling experiment?"

"Are you

Most had heard about

it but were unclear as to how it would work.

In general,

Canadian producers utilize a pooling marketing strategy to
reduce transaction costs,
transaction costs,

and American producers have high

in part due to "bounded rationality"

"asset specificity."

The superior performance of the

pooling strategy prevents one from supporting the third
I

hypothesis.

and
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D.

Cultural Differences

It seems clear from the responses to the survey that
there is a detectable difference between the effectiveness
of the two strategies.

But is there a difference between

the strategic posture of the Canadians and Americans?

The

final hypothesis concerns the possibility that group
differences

in preferred strategic posture can be attributed

to Canadian and American cultural differences.
(1990)

Lipset

argues that the two cultures differ fundamentally in

terms of their attitudes toward individualism and
cooperative efforts.

He traces the origin of this

difference to Colonial America's revolutionary spirit,

as

opposed to the loyalist counter-revolutionary spirit of
Canada.

The paradox Lipset confronts is that the fervor of

American individualism,

which leads to America's

indefatigable optimism and enormous economic development,
also its greatest potential weakness,
once the source of

its Achilles heel,

its vigor and its tragic flaw.

is
at

We can

acknowledge the virtues of the country's intense
individualism,

but we need also to recognize that this

attitude does not easily translate into the good society.
Contemporary Americans somehow develop an ironic stance
which allows them to accommodate an unusual degree of
ambiguity.

That is,

even as one recognizes the artistic,

scientific,

technological and economic achievements that
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might have been less likely without this revolutionary
individualism,
crime,

one must also be able to accommodate the

drug abuse,

care system,

and homelessness,

the inadequate health

the exploitation and abuse of the environment,

the excessive degree of corruption in government,
religious fanaticism,
system.

the

and the stagnant public education

As Lipset reminds us, America chose the opportunity

for "life,

liberty,

and the pursuit of happiness" rather

than Canada's goal of "peace,

order,

and good government."

The contrasting attitudes toward government,

in

particular government's potential role to develop a better
society,

further define the cultural difference between the

two countries.

Whereas Americans have categorically

distrusted government since before there was an American
national state,

Canadians have recognized the capacity of a

stable government to achieve cooperatively what might not
otherwise be achievable.
service is a good,

The Canadian national health

non-agricultural example.

The successful

Canadian health insurance system stands in sharp contrast to
the inadequate system currently available to American
citizens.

The American approach has historically been to

leave health care to the private sector.

Admittedly,

Canada's geographic expanse relative to its sparse
population gave the government and cooperative efforts a
greater role and to some extent explains the different
approach.

But the underlying difference between the two
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countries is the pervasive attitudes of the different
populations to the role of government in the good society.
In Lipset's words:
If one society leans toward communitarianism —
the public mobilization of resources to fulfill
group objectives — the other sees individualism - private endeavor — as the way an 'unseen hand"
produces optimum, socially beneficial results.
(132)

The Canadian Wheat Board was organized by the Canadian
government.

It is not a government agency although it

receives its mandate from the government,
government,
government.

reports to the

and receives economic direction from the
Wheat marketing is considered too important to

be left to an "unseen hand," and the vast majority of
Canadian producers accept this view.
The two samples of producers surveyed appear to have a
similar appreciation of the stalemate characteristics 'of the
wheat industry

(HI).

The Canadians as a group perceive

somewhat less environmental hostility than the Americans,
probably because,

as one Canadian expressed it,

cushions the Canadian producers"(H2).

However,

"the CWB
these two

conclusions do not indicate cultural differences per se.
The area in which the groups seem to differ fundamentally is
in their manifest strategic posture,

that is,

attitude toward cooperative group effort,
individual initiative,

in their

as opposed to

and in their attitudes toward risk.

These differences are not absolute,

but there do seem to be
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significant underlying group tendencies in one direction or
the other.

Questions 15 through 23 were intended to reveal

deeper differences regarding strategic posture and perhaps
cultural group differences.
The clearest distinction in the responses to this set
of questions is the response to question 16.

All but one

American feel their marketing goals are better achieved as
individuals, whereas all but one Canadian believe their
strategic interests are better served by group action.
Perhaps as important as the individual/group choice is the
way they answer.

The Canadians are much more sure of

themselves in their responses.
qualification of their answers.

There is no hesitation in or
The one Canadian who

answered that individual action was better for him is the
person described in the previous section.

He quite

correctly described himself as somewhat of an anomaly; he
has a strongly entrepreneurial outlook and is predominantly
a marketing rather than a production person.
he is somewhat group-oriented,
would be a better term,

(In fact,

even

or perhaps "team-oriented”

in that his business is a five

person partnership.)
By contrast,

the Americans as a group are almost as

strongly oriented to individual action as Canadians are to
group action.

Again,

answered is revealing.

the way in which the question is
Some of the Americans lack

conviction regarding a preference for individual action but

158
they are also uncertain as to what a better way might be.
These producers recognize to varying degrees that their
marketing goals are not being realized well as individuals
and that perhaps they would be better off working
collectively.

After wavering in providing an answer,

most

retain their initial preference for individual action,
primarily it seems because they do not think one can
organize farmers to work cooperatively.
who chose group action,

The one respondent

is also one of the most dissatisfied

with the marketing system and with his returns for his
product.
The phrasing of question 21 seemed to cause
considerable confusion.
16,

In some ways it is quite similar to

and I had expected similar responses to both.

A number

of Canadians hesitated on this one and answered in
contradiction to their answer to 16.

The problem seems to

have been the phrase "Take full responsibility for you
marketing decision."

Even though they are group oriented,

they feel that they take responsibility for their actions.
I think they meant that they in general are responsible,
whereas I had meant specifically in terms of day-to-day
marketing.

The repeated misunderstanding suggests that,

for

the purposes of this survey,

the responses to this question

should probably be ignored.

If the survey were to be

repeated,

the question should be rewritten.
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Is it fair to claim that growers choose their marketing
system?

Historically,

as noted earlier,

Canadian and

American farmers did consciously chose to organize their
wheat marketing systems.

The current institutions in

essence closely resemble the forms developed in the mid1930's.

The national differences suggest an underlying,

fundamental cultural difference.

The current participants

obviously were not involved in this initial decision,

and

therefore one cannot claim that the present day farmers have
actually adopted this strategy by choice.

Furthermore the

marketing systems have been institutionalized to the extent
that they will not easily be radically altered.

However,

in

the survey the respondents were given the opportunity to
express their attitude toward the marketing system of which
they were a part.
The Canadians express a much higher level of
satisfaction with their marketing system.

In one case the

respondent strongly approves of the concept but vehemently
objects to the way it is being administered.

In a few cases

the support for the group marketing strategy is
enthusiastic.

Along these lines as noted earlier,

of comparison is not with the American system,
expected it would be,

as I had

but rather with the system of

marketing canola in Canada.
in Canada,

the point

Canola,

an important commodity

is grown as an alternative to wheat and barley,

but the CWB does market it.

One grower, who had produced
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canola successfully,

stated that he no longer grows canola

because he cannot tolerate the stress of trying to market
canola in the cash market.
The Americans as a group are not as satisfied with
their marketing system or their financial returns.
their Canadian counterparts,
the marketing system.

Unlike

none are "very satisfied" with

Farmers in both groups are

dissatisfied with their financial returns,
Canadians feel less dissatisfied,

but most

in part because they feel

that their returns are probably as good as can be expected
considering the weak world market.
Three observations may be worth making in regards to
the responses to questions 22 and 23.

First,

Canadians

volunteered that they like the fact that everyone receives
the same price per bushel of wheat.

Their reasons for

preferring this arrangement may include the fact that
equalizing price shifts the emphasis from marketing to
production,

the area producers favor.

An equally plausible

reason for preferring equal prices is that equal prices
reduce direct competition within the group.
A second observation is that the Americans' more
negative responses may further reflect the overall tone of
depression and frustration that their system is not working
well,

rather than any fundamental disenchantment with an

individualistic strategic posture.
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Finally,

the American respondents seem not to see any

viable alternatives.

While they do recognize that there are

obvious benefits to being organized,
power,

such as greater market

they do not think farmer's can organize or be

organized effectively.

In one of the few direct references

to Americans by Canadians,

three Canadians saw their

greatest hope to gaining a stronger world wheat price in
developing a cartel-like cooperation with the Americans.
This point-of-view perhaps reflects a desire to return to
the situation in the late 1960's when the two countries
operated as a duopoly.

It is particularly interesting that

the all three Canadians also thought it would be hopeless to
try to organize the Americans.
specifically ask,

Although I did not

it was evident that none of the American

respondents utilize the risk-reducing features of the '
futures or options markets.
market seems irrational to me

Failure to utilize the options
,

but perhaps it further

reflects a preference for the riskiness of the cash market.
Question 15 was the most explicit probe of the
producer's strategic posture.

Agreement with the first

expression of attitude indicated an aggressive,
entrepreneurial strategic posture.

risk-seeking

This option is not as

popular with American producers as I had initially

The 1990 market, unlike some years offered an
excellent year to hedge. Futures prices were high in the
spring and a grower could have locked in a minimum price
well above the current market price.
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anticipated,
Americans

but nevertheless a substantial number of

(36%)

do prefer it.

prefers this stance.
(57%)

Significantly,

no Canadian

All but one of the remaining Americans

choose the second option.

The one American who

selected the third strategic posture is also the one who is
total dissatisfied both with the marketing system and with
the financial return from the American marketing system.
44% of the Canadians choose this third strategic stance as
the one which best represents their perspective.
One is always concerned whether or not the question is
measuring what was intended,

especially when the response

differs somewhat from what one had anticipated and when over
half of the Americans and Canadians overlap
option 2).

(i.e.,

choose

In this regard it is perhaps worthwhile relating

an anecdote which illustrates why I feel relatively
confident that the responses are representative.
mentioned American grower,
third

the single American to choose the

(i.e., most conservative)

strategic stance,

same last name as another respondent,
address and telephone number.
second person by that name,

had the

although a different

After I had interviewed the

I inquired of this second person

if he was related to the first.
and that they farmed together,
shares of the grain separately.
brother answer the questions?"
confidential,

The above

He said they were brothers
although they marketed their
He then asked,

"How did my

While the survey was

this seemed like a reasonable request.

Since
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his brother's answers were entered directly above his own on
the Lotus spreadsheet,

the responses were easy to compare.

I told him that he and his brother had answered all the
questions identically except for three.
difference was unimportant

The first

(a "don't know" to question 2)

because I think he simply misunderstood the question.

The

second difference was on number 15; the second brother had
chosen option 2 whereas the first brother had chosen option
3,

the more conservative strategic stance.

brother,

the one I was talking with,

that ever fit!

The second

exclaimed,

"Boy,

does

We are always arguing about that one issue,

and that is why we can produce together but must market
separately.

I keep telling him he has to be more aggressive

in his marketing,

but he always says he doesn't care about

making the most money possible,

he just wants to survive,

make sure the farm continues."

The third item on which the

two differed was number 22,
system.

to

satisfaction with the marketing

The first brother expressed the greatest degree of

dissatisfaction of any American respondent, whereas the
second had chosen "mostly satisfied."
brother concurred with the difference.

Again,

the second

He said his brother

"is definitely down on the way in which we must market."
Both were equally dissatisfied

("very dissatisfied")

with

their financial returns.
In regards to hypothesis four,

the evidence from this

survey indicates that there does appear to be a fundamental

164
cultural difference between the two groups.

Each group

includes at least one who is more representative of the
other group,

but as a whole the groups reflect different

sets of characteristics.

Canadian producers do appear to

strongly prefer the more so-called "conservative"
posture

(Model

strategic

1 strategic behavior in the typology)

and

American producers appear to prefer the more
"entrepreneurial"
typology).

strategic posture

(Model 2 behavior in the

There is clearly an attitude difference between

the two groups,

especially regarding individual and

cooperative marketing strategies.
However,

one may ask,

"Is it clear that this difference

is a cultural difference or simply a group of pragmatic
farmers who are able to recognize when a system is working
or not?"

I

suspect the causes for the difference are

intertwined;

the mere fact that two very different

institutions of capitalism arose suggests that they emerged
from culturally different environments.
At the same time I do not think the Americans are
predestined to endless individualistic behavior and to being
incapable of

implementing a pooling system.

The extreme

environmental hostility in combination with a somewhat
dampened enthusiasm for individualism,

may provide the

context for a fundamental structural change.
a U.S.

cranberry cooperative which pools.

Ocean Spray is

It is an

extraordinarily successful organization which the strategic
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management literature on cooperative strategy always points
to.

It is a voluntary

organization,

(i.e.,

not state mandated)

and its membership includes over 90% of all

cranberry producers.
situation for wheat,

However,

in sharp contrast to the

95% of the cranberry crop is produced

by a few hundred growers in Massachusetts and Wisconsin.

It

is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the likelihood
that marketing strategy in the wheat industry will be
radically altered.

The relationships revealed by the survey

do suggest that conditions for change exist.

However,

the

essential intermediary for change will be a different
vision of a marketing strategy.

The structure,

following

Chandler's paradigm, will then change to accommodate the
strategic needs.

E.

Conclusions

The four main conclusions of this study can be briefly
summarized as follows.
1.

Wheat producers as a whole are acutely aware of the

constraints the stalemate industry structure imposes on
their individual firm's marketing possibilities.

However,

while some producers are generally overwhelmed by the
industry structure,

others see some potential to reduce the

impact of these constraints through a collective strategy of
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joint vertical integration.

In general,

producers who

market through the CWB fall into the latter category.
2.

The price volatility and unpredictability in the

international wheat market,

caused by a high supply of wheat

relative to the total demand and by a complex set of other
factors,

imposes severe environmental hostility for wheat

producers.

While all wheat producers are sensitive to

environmental hostility,
marketing strategy

(i.e.,

those who have adopted a pooling
Canadians in this survey)

are

significantly more insulated from the adverse effects of a
hostile environment,

and they experience substantially less

stress from the overall business environment.
3.

While it is intuitive to assume producers who pool

will on average receive a higher price for their product
than those who fail to pool,

this assumption cannot be

verified conclusively with existing data.

The efforts to

demonstrate that a pooling strategy yields a higher average
price is further complicated in a cross-cultural study.
While we must conclude that the price difference is
indeterminate,

there are more important criteria for

evaluating performance.

One of these criteria is the

ability of a strategy to reduce risk and the associated
stress.
4.

It is possible to categorize a producer's marketing

strategy as either more or less aggressive,
cooperative.

and more or less

Canadians as a group appear to be more
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predisposed,
risky,

than are Americans,

to less aggressive,

more cooperative marketing efforts.

less

These

observations would be consistent with observations by social
scientists,

such as Lipset

F.

(1990).

Limitations and Future Research

There are three major limitations to the interpretation
of these results:
1.

Given the limited number of producers interviewed,

the study should be regarded as exploratory and the
conclusions subject to further verification.

This is not to

say that this research cannot lead to legitimate hypotheses.
Indeed,

a major purpose of this study is to use these

investigations to point to areas that need further research.
I hope to pursue some of the questions raised by the

. .

.

interviews
2.

13

.

As has already been indicated, performance is

extremely difficult to measure directly.

It would be very

useful to have a variable that would reflect the goals of
cooperative strategies better than gross earnings and which

Ms. Ruth Reardon, the CWB librarian, in a telephone
conversation indicated that she is unaware of any other
studies which focus on competitive strategy from the
producer's point of view. She is understandably puzzled by
this since the CWB is ostensibly the producers'
organization.

.
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would be readily quantifiable and relatively easy for
government statisticians to monitor over time.
3.

It may be that fundamental cultural differences

between Canada and the U.S. make direct comparisons of
strategy effectiveness inappropriate.

Lipset

(1990)

refers

to this underlying difference between the two cultures as
"the Continental Divide;" he observed that Canadians and
Americans relate differently to the role of government in
business.

There appears to be a distinct difference between

the more individualistic American and the Canadian who does
not find it anathema to work closely with a more collective
institution.

Lipset's perspective,

the idea of studying one

culture to understand another, proves to be an
extraordinarily effective means of focusing clearly on the
strategy problems addressed in this study.
An further example of how complicate comparative
strategic studies can be is the Miller and Friesen

(1983)

study which attempted to compare the environmental
hostility-entrepreneurial behavior relationship to high
performance in firms in the U.S.

and Canada.

They found a

negative correlation in Canada and a positive correlation in
the U.S.; that is,

a highly entrepreneurial,

innovative

strategic posture in a highly hostile environment in Canada

did not lead to higher performance in Canadian firms, but
did lead to better performance in U.S. firms.

This

unexpected situation suggests that the paradigm being used
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was inadequate,

or that there may be a third

interactive variable involved.

(cultural)

It was not clear in this

study how organization structure differed.
One direction for further research might be to add a
more traditional intra-country comparison to the
international comparison of this study.

The characteristics

of Americans who are not pooling could be compared with
Americans who are involved in the HSC pooling experiment.
Similarly,
in Alberta,

a comparison of Saskatchewan growers with growers
may reveal strategic differences.

(spring 1990)

SWB survey,

In a recent

it was found that western

Canadians were less supportive of the CWB approach than were
growers from the two eastern prairie provinces.

AFTERWORD

As I conclude this exploratory study it may be
worthwhile to step back for a moment to trace briefly how I
came to be interested in this area of research,

to highlight

a few of the things I learned from writing this
dissertation,

and to speculate on the directions in which I

may take this line of inquiry.
in the smaller firm,

I have long been interested

that most basic of organizational forms

which is almost synonymous with the entrepreneur,

and

especially in how these firms come to be organized in the
way they are,

in how they function,

chiefly strategic decisions,

in how decisions,

are made,

that motivates the firm's manager

and in what it is

(often the entrepreneur

who organized the firm).
For a while I thought the answers to these and other
related questions were to be found in the study of
economics.

I remember thinking I was on the verge of great

insights when one day,

in my agricultural economics Master's

level microeconomics theory seminar, we finally turned to
the theory of the firm.

That day's seminar concluded before

we could proceed as far as I had hoped we might,

but I went

up to the professor after class and expressed my delight
with our beginnings and my great anticipation for our next
meeting.

I was dismayed to learn that,

as far as he was
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concerned,
firm,

we had covered all that was important about the

and that really,

the theory of the firm was only of

interest insofar as it helped in the development of a theory
of prices.
At Madison I was also introduced to institutional
economics.

The concepts of economic organization expressed

in this branch of economics would eventually prove more
fruitful for my interests.
During the subsequent four or five years I worked
closely with managers of small firms, mostly in the
agricultural sector,

and continuously observed that these

real firms bore little resemblance to the neoclassical
theoretical firm.

Ultimately I concluded that my

microtheory professor had in a way been correct:

the firm of

neoclassical microeconomic theory did not have a great deal
more to offer than he had indicated.
Management studies,
particular,

and strategic management in

appeared to take the firm far more seriously.

I

turned my attention here and to industrial organization
economics,

and hoped that my change in focus would lead to a

synthesis which would be far more useful in my applied
economic work.
readings,
Porter,
Best,

I was not disappointed.

From the outset

such as Allison, March and Simon, Williamson,

and later Berle and Means,

and others,

Eisenhardt and Bourgeois,

revealed that many had been and were

confronting the complexities of the firm.

However,

I was
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struck by the fact that whole sectors of the economy

(i.e.,

those sectors which consisted of so-called "stalemate"
industries),

were largely ignored.

During a strategic

management seminar I was given the opportunity to present a
seminar,

and I chose to focus on strategic management

problems in this area.

This dissertation in part evolved

from that seminar presentation.
The "strategy -> structure -> performance" paradigm,
fundamental to studies in both strategic management aiid
industrial organization economics,

is a useful organizing

construct and was the starting point for this study.
However,

as my work progressed I became increasingly aware

of a serious limitation inherent in this paradigm,
limitation with implications I previously,
had not fully appreciated.
adequate theory of the firm.

a

perhaps naively,

I was back to my need for an
One's theory of the firm,

especially one's underlying assumptions about the nature of
decision-makers,

predisposes one's use of this paradigm and

consequently affects one's research findings.
The standard assumptions of the neo-classical
microeconomic theory of the firm may effectively lead to a
theory of prices.

However,

the view that the entrepreneur's

sole or at least primary pursuit is profit-maximization,
fails to reveal how most firms actually function.
Transactional cost theory expands the horizons of the
standard theory,

and in so doing addresses some of its
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limitations.

Transactional cost economic analysis seems

particularly useful in explaining why producers in some
industries may want to develop cooperative strategies and to
organize vertically in order to reduce transaction costs.
The extended research of this exploratory study has
taken me further along this path.

I now believe that in

order to explain why firms are organized and operate in a
certain way,

we must examine more carefully the firm's

implicit or explicit underlying motivations or goals.

This

research suggests that it may be especially important to
adopt this perspective if we are to understand how firms
operate within stalemate industries and hostile
environments.
If we simply assume that the firm's goal is to maximize
profits, we can then conclude which strategy and structure
is best by simply comparing the financial performance of the
various approaches.
comparison,

As I discovered in this study,

especially a cross-cultural comparison,

such a
poses

insurmountable problems and does not allow a determinant
conclusion.

Equally important, we may be comparing the

performance of firms with substantially different goals.
When we can go beyond this simplistic approach,

that is

to consider that the firm's strategy and structure may be
determined to a greater extent by its effort to reduce
transaction costs, we are in a better position to discover
how firms organize and function.

It may not however be any

174
easier to quantify performance for valid comparisons of
strategy and structure.

Others who have struggled with this

problem have suggested that in such comparisons,

it is more

useful to focus on attaining market share rather than on
profitability.
The telephone interviews led me to conclude that to a
large extent,

the greatest concern of producers who are

experiencing high degrees of environmental hostility,
market riskiness and the risk of losing their firm.
primary goal,
such,

is
Their

although not always directly expressed as

is usually to reduce the stress associated with the

constraints of their stalemate industry and the
unpredictability of their hostile business environment.
Thus,

a third approach to measuring performance is to

evaluate the degree to which stress appears to be reduced
(a)

by a particular strategy and

(b)

by the structure

adopted to implement this strategy.
Pooling is a marketing strategy which is available to
producers and which can be implemented through various
cooperative organizational structures.

Initially my

research direction was to determine whether or not pooling
led to higher producer prices.
would lead to higher prices,

My inclination was that it

at least on average.

I,

like

others before me, was unable to demonstrate this difference
conclusively.

This inability to demonstrate a price

advantage perhaps explains why,

as I discovered,

neither
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producers nor managers of marketing organizations argue that
pooling leads to higher prices,

even on average.

Concerns

with profit-maximization were generally not evident at
either firm or cooperative level.
Pooling offers an opportunity to reduce transaction
costs.

Producers who pool and organizations which offer the

pooling option,

emphasize the advantages of reducing

transaction costs through the convenience of
(or "single desk")

(a)

selling for the producer and

"one stop"
(b)

"one

stop" shopping for the larger international buyers.

For

some firms this advantage alone may justify adopting the
pooling strategy.
market share.
market,

The larger the pool,

the greater the

In the case of the domestic Canadian wheat

producers through their organization,

achieved a 100% market share.

have nearly

Internationally their

organization is the single largest player.
However,

reducing market risk and reducing the stress

associated with the risk of not surviving,

may ultimately be

the strongest motivation for implementing the pooling
strategy.

Again,

it is extremely difficult to measure the

strategy's performance quantitatively.

I found the best

measure was to determine through the interview process,
what degree producers felt reduced stress with different
strategies.

The results of the interviews in this study

indicate that those who,

for whatever reason,

adopted a

to
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pooling strategy,
stress

experienced a significantly lower level of

in a hostile environment.

These observations are not to suggest that this third
motivation or performance measure is a radically new
approach.

I

see it rather as an extension of transaction

cost economic analysis.

But it moves in a direction that

might not have been readily apparent without this
exploratory study.

I now think that cooperative strategies,

such as the one considered in this study,

need to be

analyzed and evaluated in terms of the stress and the
survivability issues.

Cooperative strategies can help firms

better adapt to hostile environments,

but in attempting to

explain how they adapt and to predict under what conditions
they will most effectively adapt,
relevant,

one needs to have a

sound theory of the firm.

I was surprised to see how little the Canadians and the
Americans understood about the marketing activities of their
counterparts.

While I would not advocate that one group

begin to investigate the other simply in order to copy their
approach or even to pick up some pointers,

I did find that

understanding the Canadian approach helped me to better
understand the overall American approach and the potential
for improvement.
essential

Constant review and innovation is

for organizations

in both systems,

and cross-

cultural research can facilitate this renewal process.
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I think the research findings of this study will,
presented in a different form,

be of interest to U.S.

Canadian producers and cooperative organizations.
findings are not limited to wheat production;

and

The

the principles

can be applied to some extent to all commodities.
Managerial economists

in Russia currently struggling with

developing appropriate "market-oriented”

organizational

forms for production and marketing of commodities,

may find

this research of interest.
The U.S.

producers I

interviewed appeared substantially

more stressed than their Canadian counterparts and genuinely
seemed to be at a loss regarding their strategic options.
think that with cooperative initiatives,

I

similar to the

impressive leadership already demonstrated by Harvest States
Cooperative,

we could see a dramatic increase in the

adoption rate of pooling strategies by U.S.

wheat producers.

My exploratory research confirms Lipset's observations about
national characters,

in this case,

that American producers,

as compared to Canadian producers,

tend to be less inclined

to cooperate extensively.

At the same time,

more rational marketing strategy,

pooling is a

and presented effectively

the logic of the argument should in many instances overcome
an inherent resistance.

Without taking an advocacy role,

I

hope my current and subsequent research will help articulate
the circumstcmces in which we would expect to see specific
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marketing strategies emerge and how we would expect to see
firms improve performance.
This study has been a multicultural and
multidisciplinary effort.

I believe this multidimensional

approach has led to insights that would have been less
likely to surface had the research been contained within the
stricter confines of a single discipline or country.
Perhaps as important,

at least for me,

is that writing

within this mode has been a truly delightful experience.
one's PhD program,

In

the dissertation is often anticipated

with some apprehension.

In fact,

the approach that I have

been able to take seems to have transformed the dreaded
ordeal into a remarkably pleasant,
Written in this way,

integrating event.

this study has allowed me to bring a

wide range of studies and experience to bear on an important
problem.

APPENDIX A
PRE-SURVEY LETTERS TO PRODUCERS

INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN
TRADE AND ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AT AMHERST

School of Management
Amherst, MA 01003
(413) 545-3253
FAX: 413-545-2969
BITNET: INATE @ UMASS

November 19,

1990

Mr. Kenneth Ferguson
General Delivery
Dinsmore, Saskatchewan
Canada SOL OTO
Dear Mr.

Ferguson:

The University of Massachusetts Institute for North American
Trade and Economics is working in cooperation with the
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool to survey a small sample of Saskatchewan
farmers. Your farm has been selected randomly as one of those to
be surveyed by telephone during the week of November 19th. The
phone call will take less than 10 minutes.
The purpose of the survey is to learn more about how farm
managers view their grain marketing, especially in terms of their
attitudes toward risk and toward the current marketing
environment.
Ultimately, we are interested to see if marketing
structures affect these attitudes.
Since only about 60 farm
managers (about 30 in Saskatchewan and a total of about 30 from
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana) are being surveyed, your
input is extremely important to the success of the overall
research effort.
The questions are straight forward, and the multiple choice
answers are simple and brief, usually a "yes or no" or an "agreedisagree" scale of 1 to 5.
We will not ask any personal
questions, and all the answers will be strictly confidential.
As
a participant the final results in aggregate will be directly
available to you.
Of course, your participation in this effort is completely
voluntary, and we appreciate that your time is valuable, but we
very much hope that you will choose to give 10 minutes of your
time to be interviewed on the telephone.
Sincerely,

Kent Fleming
v
Research Associate &
Agricultural Economist
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INSTITUTE FOR NORTH AMERICAN
TRADE AND ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AT AMHERST

School of Management
Amherst, MA 01003
(413) 545-3253
FAX: 413-545-2969
BITNET: INATE @ UMASS

November 13,

1990

1

"

Dear 2":
The Institute is working with Harvest States Cooperative to
survey a small sample of members. Your farm has been selected
randomly as one of those to be surveyed by telephone during the
week of November 17-23. The phone call will take less than 10
minutes.
The purpose of the survey is to learn more about how farm
managers view their grain marketing. Since relatively few people
are being surveyed, your input is extremely important to the
success of this research effort. The questions are straight
forward, and the answers are simple, multiple choice selections.
We will not ask any personal questions, and all the answers will
be strictly confidential. As a participant the final results in
aggregate will be directly available to you.
The goal of this project is to improve the grain marketing
services available to the farming community. All farmers will
benefit from a stronger, more responsive Cooperative. Of course,
your participation in this effort is completely voluntary, and we
appreciate that your time is valuable, but we very much hope that
you will choose to give 10 minutes of your time to be interviewed
on the telephone.

Sincerely,

Kent Fleming
Research Associate &
Agricultural Economist

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONAIRRE

PRODUCER ATTITUDES TOWARD INDUSTRY STALEMATE & ENVIRONMENTAL HOSTILITY
IN THE NORTH AMERICAN GRAIN MARKET:
A Telephone Survey of 30 U.S. & Canadian Wheat Producers

Grain market focus of this survey:
The complex set of processes and actions involved in grain farming can be roughly
categorized into three activity groups: resource assembly (e.g., obtaining land, labor and capital
resources: obtaining required production inputs, such as seed, fertilizers, etc.; developing
management expertise): production (e.g., preparing the seed bed and planting: responding
appropriately to physical environmental conditions: harvesting and drying the crop): marketing
(e.g., storing grain and transporting it to a buyer; deciding which level of price risk one is
prepared to accept; deciding when and in which market to sell; developing better grain
markets).
All aspects of the process are important, but in this survey we wish to focus on the grain
marketing component. Gross income is simply yield times price. Yield is primarily a function of
the production component, but price is largely determined by the market in which one operates.
Therefore, in this survey we will focus on price, and risk will refer to price risk, as opposed to
production risk (e.g., weather) or input risk (e.g., rising interest rates, wage rates, or fuel costs).
Farms which produce wheat may produce other commodities. For the purposes of this
survey we are specifically interested in the wheat (and barley) enterprise.

Stalemate hypothesis:

1. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you
(or any individual farm) to differentiate the quality of your grain from that of other producers or
countries, and thus to receive a higher price?
1
EXTREMELY LOW

2
LOW

3
MODERATE

4
HIGH

5
EXTREMELY HIGH

2. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become
involved) which can differentiate grain qualities in the market and can therefore extract higher
prices for these better quality grains?
NO

YES

DON’T KNOW
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3. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you
(or any individual farm) to differentiate your farm from those of other producers (or countries),
and thus to receive a higher price? What is the likelihood that you could, for example, develop a
reputation for timely deliveries that would inspire brand-name loyalty.
1
EXTREMELY LOW

2
LOW

3
MODERATE

4
HIGH

5
EXTREMELY HIGH

4. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become
involved) which does or could differentiate itself in terms of services offered and therefore is able
to or could extract higher prices for its grain products?
NO

YES

DON’T KNOW

5. To what extent would you say the wheat industry is characterized by opportunities for you
(or any individual) to take control of a large enough market segment so that by withholding
supply, you could affect the overall market price?
1
EXTREMELY LOW

2
LOW

3
MODERATE

4
HIGH

5
EXTREMELY HIGH

6. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become
involved) which can take control of a large enough market segment so that by withholding
supply. It could affect the overall market price?
NO

YES

DON’T KNOW

7. How great is the opportunity for you (or any individual) to directly supply a buyer (either a
processor or an end-user), for example, a bakery, flour mill, or ethnic group, with a significant
portion of your crop; that is, how great is the opportunity for you to develop or locate a niche
market to supply?
1
EXTREMELY LOW

2
LOW

3
MODERATE

4
HIGH

5
EXTREMELY HIGH

8. Is there an organization in which you are currently involved (or with which you could become
involved) which could develop or locate a niche market to supply?
NO

YES

DON’T KNOW
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Environmental hostility hypothesis:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following six statements:

9. Prices in the cash grain market for wheat are quite volatile.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

10. Price movements in the cash grain market for wheat are highly unpredictable.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

11. The volatility and unpredictability of the grain market provides one with many opportunities
to earn substantial profits or to sustain great losses.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

12. The grain market is very risky; a bad year could threaten my firm’s survival.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

13. The grain market is a dominating environment in which my firm’s initiatives count for very
little against tremendous competitive, political, or technological forces.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

14. I find marketing grain very stressful and exacting; I find It very difficult to stay afloat.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
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Strategic posture hypothesis:

15. Which ONE of the foiiowing best characterizes your actuai or desired grain marketing
approach;
A. To be very aggressive in hopes of achieving the highest possibie price, even at
substantiai risk of uitimateiy achieving a iower overaii price.
B. To be somewhat iess aggressive, reducing the potentiai for gaining the highest price
but also reducing the risk of achieving a lower overall price.
C. To be relatively more cautious ("conservative"), substantially reducing the chance of
hitting the market highs or lows, i.e., reducing the variability.

16. Whichever is your preferred grain marketing approach and goal, do you feel you are better
able to achieve your goal on your own or within a group?
INDIVIDUAL

GROUP

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the foiiowing two statements:
17. The grain farming business places extraordinary demands on the limited resources (time,
money, knowledge, current information, access to records, etc.) necessary to make sound
economic decisions.
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

18. Given my marketing approach, I have adequate resources available within my firm to do a
satisfactory job of marketing?
1
STRONGLY
AGREE

2
MOSTLY
AGREE

3
AGREE
SOMEWHAT

4
MOSTLY
DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

19. Do your main interests lie in production or marketing?
PRODUCTION

MARKETING

20. Do you receive a greater financial return to the resources devoted to production or
marketing?
PRODUCTION

MARKETING
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21. Do you take full Individual responsibility for your marketing decisions, as opposed to
working
cooperatively with other growers and/or paid marketing specialists?
NO

YES

22. How satisfied are you with your current wheat marketing system?
1
VERY
SATISFIED

2
MOSTLY
SATISFIED

3
SOMEWHAT
SATISFIED

4
5
MOSTLY
VERY
DISSATISFIED DISSATISFIED

23. How satisfied are you with the financial return on your personal efforts and farm resources
devoted to wheat marketing?
1
VERY
SATISFIED

2
MOSTLY
SATISFIED

3
SOMEWHAT
SATISFIED

4
5
MOSTLY
VERY
DISSATISFIED DISSATISFIED

Farm characteristics:

24. What proportion of your gross earnings would you estimate are derived from the direct sale
of spring wheat (and barley)?
ALL
MOST
ABOUT HALF
MINOR

(>90%)
(60-90%)
(40-60%)
(<40%)

25. Approximately what are your annual gross sales of spring wheat (including barley)?
<$50,000
$50,000-100,000
>$100,000

26. Approximately what is your age?
<30 years old
30-45 years old
46-60 years old
>60 years old

APPENDIX C
SURVEY RESULTS

1. Differentiate grain quality
at farm level?
100%

80% -

60% -

40% -

20%

-

0%

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

2, Differentiate grain quality
through an organization?
100%

No

Yes

Doni Know

3. Differentiate firm (brand name)
at farm level?
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

4. Differentiate firm (brand name)
through an organization?
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
No

Yes

Doni Know

188

5. Gain large market share
at farm level?
100%

80% -

60% -

40% -

20%

-

0%
Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

6. Gain large market share
through an organization?
100%

80% -

60% -

40% -

20%

-

0%
No

Yes

Don't Know

7. Opportunity to develop niche market
at farm level?
100%

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

8. Opportunity to develop niche market
through an organization?
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
No

Yes

Doni Know
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9. Cash market prices are
quite volatiie.
100%

•0% -

60%

40%

20%

-

Srongly A^m

Morty Agr**

Agr** SomMi*iat

Mosfy

10. Cash market prices are
highly unpredictable.

Spangly Diaagra*

11. Grain market provides opportunities
for high profit or loss.
100%

OOongty A^m

Ma«ty Agrv*

AgrM SonwwM

Moaly Dm^m

OiugrM

12. Grain market is very risky;
a bad year could threaten survival.
100%

■Tangly Agra*

Ma«0y Agra*

Agra* ■onwthi

Mo*ly OiM^**

■Tangly OiMT**

13. Grain market is dominating;
firm’s initiatives count for iittie.

Srongly Agra*

Moaty Agraa

Agraa So«naaM

Moafy Diaagraa

S^ongly Diaagraa

14. Grain marketing is very stressfui;
it is difficuit to stay afioat.
100X

atangty A^aa

lybaty Agiaa

Agraa BowiawhM

Moaty OtMgraa

Spangly Diaagraa

15. Which strategic posture best
characterizes your marketing approach?
100%

Entrepreneurial

Mcxierate

“Conservative'

16. Are you better able to market
on your own or in a group?
100%

Ind^idual

Group

17. Grain business places extraordinary
demands on limited resources.
100%

•0% -

60%

40% -

20%

-

Svongly

Mocty Agr**

Agr** SommiM

Moaty Otoagra*

Saongiy Oiaagraa

18. I have adequate resources to do a
satisfactory job of marketing.
100%

Saof^Agraa

MoatyAgraa

Agraa 8omaa4tal

Moaty CNaagraa

aacngly Paagraa

19. Do your main interests lie in
production or marketing?

20. Do you receive greater return from
production or marketing?
100%

Production

Marketing

Doni Krx)w
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22. How satisfied are you with your
current wheat marketing system?
100%

VarySil

MoatlySat

Somawtwt Sot

MocOyDlMat.

V*ryDiMat.

23. How satisfied are you with your
financial return from marketing?
100%

Vary SaL

Moatty Sat

Soawwttat Sat

MoaUy Dtaat

Vary Diaaat

24. What proportion of gross earnings
are from direct sale of spring wheat?
100%

Al

Mo«

About W

Mnor

25. What are your annual gross sales
of spring wheat?
100%
Canada
□□ IMadSMa
•0% -

60%

.^
-W?..w. my.

A0% -

20%

0%

<S50.000

S60-100,000

>6100,000

26. Approximately, what is
your age?
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